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The Values of Retired Adults: Measurement Issues, Links to Weil-Being, and the 
Correlates of Value Change 
Andrew Burr, Ph.D. 
Concordia University, 2009 
Research on values has focused almost exclusively on samples of university 
students and working adults and is significantly lacking for older, retired adults. The 
general focus of this dissertation is on extending research on values to older adults and to 
the post-employment stage of life using a sample of 433 recently retired individuals from 
the Montreal area. The dissertation is divided into three separate studies, presented as 
individual manuscripts. The first of these is focused on the structural and measurement 
properties of a widely used value questionnaire (the Portrait Value Questionnaire: 
Schwartz et al., 2001) that has seen little use with older adults. The second study 
examines how values, health, and money, independently and in combination, are 
longitudinally linked with affective well-being in retirement. The third study investigates 
subjective perceptions of value change compared to longitudinally-assessed value change 
over three years of retirement and the extent to which these different kinds of change are 
adaptive processes linked to positive and negative affect and meaning in life. The major 
areas of interest in the dissertation (values, retirement, subjective well-being, and value 
change) are reviewed in a general introduction, followed by the three manuscripts. 
Finally, an integrative discussion of the findings across the three studies is presented. 
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The concept of values, or what is most important in life, has a long tradition 
dating back to the earliest chapters of human civilization when ancient thinkers grappled 
with the question of what creates a morally good life (Haidt, 2008). The values discussion 
has been present in many academic domains, including psychology, sociology, 
anthropology, economics, political science, education, and religion (Feather, 1999). It 
was not until the early 20th century that psychologists took up the question of values, a 
delay likely linked to values' nebulous meaning and difficulty of measurement. 
Psychologists were the first to attempt to address values from an empirical perspective 
with operational definitions and corresponding measurement tools. An important 
distinction in the work of psychologists on values, however, is that psychologists, unlike 
philosophers, were generally not attempting to address the question of what values people 
should have, but rather to describe values in empirical terms, and to examine the 
correlates and consequences of different kinds of value systems. The investigation of 
moral development - knowing what is good and right - is often linked to the 
development of particular value systems, but the "moral values" literature can be 
considered distinct from the literature investigating the more general nature and function 
of human values. It is this latter version of values that will be the focus of this 
dissertation. 
A general characteristic of the values literature in psychology is definitional 
inconsistency (Rohan, 2000). Values have varied in definition because: (a) they resemble 
other psychological constructs such as goals, attitudes, preferences, interests, aspirations, 
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and needs; (b) they can be conceptualized on a variety of levels, including personal 
values, social value systems, worldviews, and ideologies; and (c) because the term 
"value" can be used as both a noun (denoting worth) and a verb (indicating the action of 
evaluating worth), each representing a slightly different target for investigation (Rohan, 
2000). In the recent literature, one value theory in particular (Schwartz, 1992) has 
facilitated the effort of psychologists to understand values with a widely accepted 
definition of what values are and with corresponding validated measurement tools. 
Before describing this recent development, however, the evolution of the approach to 
values in psychology will be briefly reviewed. 
History of the values construct in psychology. In a review of the development of 
the values construct in psychology, Rohan (2000) notes that early value theories were 
focused on individual differences in prioritization of a set of principles or attitudes (e.g., 
Shand, 1914; Spranger, 1928). These theories led to the development of a series of 
measurement tools that suggested the relative priority of different values through 
individuals' responses to questions (Allport, Vernon, & Lindzey, 1960) or through their 
preferences for various "ways to live" (Morris, 1956). 
A major figure in the development of a psychology of values was Clyde 
Kluckhohn, whose definition of values influenced several later value theorists, including 
Schwartz (1992). Kluckhohn (1951) defines values as follows: "A value is a conception, 
explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the 
desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means, and ends of 
action" (p. 395). Of note, there is an implicit connection between values and morality in 
Kluckhohn's value theory, such that values are not merely things that are desired, but 
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rather, in a more abstract sense, represent "the desirable", and therefore signify what 
people as individuals or groups "ought or should" desire (p. 396). What is desirable, 
however, goes beyond a sense of morality (right and wrong) to include as well aesthetic 
judgment and cognitive appraisals. The desirable, then, according to Kluckhohn (1951), 
is partly attached to morality, partly a cultural product, but is also open to individual 
interpretation. 
Another major development in the value construct in psychology was Rokeach's 
(1973) value theory and the accompanying Rokeach Value Survey. Building on 
Kluckhohn's conception of values as "the desirable," Rokeach defined a value as "a 
belief that a specific mode of behavior or end-state of existence is preferred to an 
opposite mode of behavior or end-state . . . " and elaborated on the idea of values as 
general and broadly applicable standards that guide multiple areas of human functioning: 
"This belief transcends attitudes toward objects and toward situations, it is a standard that 
guides and determines action, attitudes toward objects and situations, ideology, 
presentation of self to others, evaluations, judgments, justifications, comparisons of self 
with others, and attempts to influence others" (p. 25). Operationalizing these standards as 
the principles that people see as most important in life, Rockeach's measurement tool 
asked people to rank a list of values in terms of their importance as guiding principles in 
their lives. The values to be ranked included specific goals (terminal values) such as 
"comfortable life (a prosperous life)" as well as more abstract "modes of conduct" 
(instrumental values) such as "broad-minded (open-minded)" (Rokeach, 1973, p. 359-
361). In sum, Rokeach's influential theory proposed that values were distinct from both 
attitudes and specific beliefs, were hierarchically organized, and represent abstract 
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guiding principles, standards, or "general beliefs that people hold about desirable and 
undesirable modes of conduct and end states of existence" (Feather, 1999, p. 53). 
One major debate that emerged in the values literature was over ranking versus 
rating methods of measuring values. The Rokeach Value Survey popularized the ranking 
task, in which respondents are asked to place a list of values in order of importance. This 
was often a difficult task for respondents, and, as some argued, had inherent drawbacks 
such as being time consuming, forcing distinctions between values of equivalent 
importance, and not being amenable to standard statistical analyses due to the 
interdependence of the ranks (Ovadia, 2004). The alternative to ranking tasks for 
measuring values are rating tasks in which respondents rate each value independently of 
the others, usually on a Likert-type rating scale. Rating tasks have also come under 
criticism for the possibility of under-dispersion of responses, or the tendency of 
respondents to use only a narrow range of the response scale resulting in the equivalence 
of several values (Ovadia, 2004). Although some critics argue strongly for one method or 
the other (e.g., Maio, Roese, Seligman, & Katz, 1996, argue the superiority of the rating 
method), the issue of the best way to measure values remains debatable. In a review of 
the ratings and rankings debate for values measurement, Ovadia (2004) suggests that both 
methods have methodological and statistical imperfections, and neither is clearly 
superior. Further, Ovadia recommends using both methods as complimentary sources of 
information about values: rankings tell us about value structure (i.e., the relative 
importance of values in relation to other values), whereas ratings tell us about values 
independent of other values. The rationale for using both methods is as follows. First, two 
people could have the same overall ranking of values, but differ significantly on their 
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value ratings. Second, in the analysis of change in values over time, these two methods of 
measurement can provide different results: change may occur in value ratings, but that 
change may not be enough to upset the overall ranking of values in the system (Ovadia, 
2004). Each method on its own, then, can be seen as representing an incomplete 
understanding of values, and Ovadia argues that they should not be seen as mutually 
exclusive but rather complimentary approaches to the measurement of values. The 
Schwartz (1992) value measurement system (described in detail later) can be seen as a 
combination of rating and ranking methods, as respondents use a rating scale but raw 
ratings can then transformed into ipsative scores that indicate the relative importance of 
values as a system. 
Through the 1970's and 1980's, the Rokeach (1973) value theory was widely 
used by researchers, while at the same time other approaches to the measurement of 
values were also developed (see Braithwaite & Scott, 1991 for a review). These 
approaches have generally been superseded by the more recent Schwartz (1992) value 
theory, which represents an integration and extension of the previous values literature. It 
must be acknowledged that there are currently several other ways of conceptualizing and 
measuring values both on a personal level (e.g., agency and communion values; 
Pohlmann, 2001) and cultural level (e.g., Hofstede, 2001; 2008; Inglehart & Baker, 
2000). An on-going large-scale international research program targeting values - the 
World Values Survey - incorporates multiple value tools from both the personal and 
cultural perspective in its lengthy assessment battery 
(http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/). A review of all values literature and measurement 
tools, however, is beyond the scope of this dissertation. As the Schwartz (1992) value 
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theory is a dominant theory of personal values in the current psychological literature, the 
development of the Schwartz (1992) value theory will be discussed next. 
The Schwartz (1992) value theory. Building on the common themes in the values 
literature, including those outlined above, and highly influenced by Kluckhohn (1951) 
and Rokeach (1973), Schwartz and Bilsky (1987, 1990) identified five formal features of 
values as the basis for the Schwartz value theory: 
Values (1) are concepts or beliefs, (2) pertain to desirable end states or behaviors, 
(3) transcend specific situations, (4) guide selection or evaluation of behavior and 
events, and (5) are ordered by relative importance. Values, understood this way, 
differ from attitudes primarily in their generality or abstractness (feature 3) and in 
their hierarchical ordering by importance (feature 5). (Schwartz, 1992, p. 2) 
In addition to these formal features, values were reasoned to be derived from three 
universal requirements of human beings, namely (1) biological needs; (2) requisites of 
coordinated social interaction; and (3) demands of group survival and functioning 
(Schwartz, 1992). From these universal needs, Schwartz and colleagues derived ten 
universal motivations that represent the ten values in the theory (defined and summarized 
in Table 1): power, achievement, universalism, benevolence, self direction, stimulation, 
hedonism, conformity, tradition, and security. 
The first measurement tool developed to assess the theory was the Schwartz 
Value Survey (SVS: Schwartz, 1992), an instrument that asks respondents to rate 57 
specific values that represent the ten higher-order value types in terms of how important 
each value is as a guiding principle in life. To address one important limitation of the 
SVS, namely its highly abstract nature, a second measurement tool, the Portrait Value 
Questionnaire (PVQ: Schwartz et al., 2001) was developed. Respondents to the PVQ read 
40 brief descriptions of individuals (portraits) in terms of what is important to them and 
rate the similarity of each portrait to themselves. The 40 items and the values that they 
represent are listed in Table 2. While the SVS is a highly abstract and explicit measure of 
values, the PVQ is a shorter, more concrete task that is less transparent since it does not 
explicitly identify values as the topic of investigation. 
Both the SVS and the PVQ have been used widely in psychological research in 
cross-cultural (e.g., Schwartz & Rubel, 2005), social (e.g., Caprara & Steca, 2007) and 
personality domains (e.g., Cohrs, Moschner, Maes, & Kielmann, 2005), as well as in 
management (e.g., Ralston, Egri, Stewart, Terpstra, & Yu, 1999), political (e.g., Caprara, 
Schwartz, Capanna, Vecchione, & Barbaranelli, 2006), and marketing research (e.g., 
Steenkamp, ter Hofstede, & Wedel, 1999). In addition, short versions of the PVQ are 
included in two on going large-scale international research programs, the European 
Social Survey and the World Values Survey (for details, see 
http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/; http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/). The PVQ is, 
in short, one of the most important and popular measures of values in current 
psychological and sociological research. 
The ten values in the Schwartz value theory have shown associations with a wide 
variety of variables including demographics, behavioral tendencies, attitudes, personality 
traits, and well-being. Demographic correlates of values include age, gender, education, 
and culture (Prince-Gibson & Schwartz, 1998; Schwartz & Rubel, 2005; Schwartz et al., 
2001); behavioral correlates include major in school, autocratic behavior, change seeking, 
use of mobile phones, and use of alcohol (Schwartz et al., 2001) as well as environmental 
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conservation (Schultz et al., 2005), and voting behaviors (Barnea & Schwartz, 1998); 
attitudinal correlates include religiosity and political orientation (Caprara & Zimbardo, 
2004) as well as readiness for out-group social contact (Sagiv & Schwartz, 1995); 
personality correlates include the big five traits (Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, & Knafo, 
2002); and finally, well-being correlates include the experience of worry (Schwartz, 
Sagiv, & Boehnke, 2000) and of positive emotions (Sagiv & Schwartz, 2000). 
There are two important features of Schwarz's (1992, 1994) theory related to how 
values function as a system: (a) the structure of relations among the values and (b) the 
idea of value "priorities" (Oishi, Schimmack, Diener, & Suh, 1998). The structural 
aspects of the theory have implications for making predictions about the relations of 
values to other values and other variables, whereas the "priorities" view of values has 
implications for how value scores should be calculated. 
In terms of the structure of relations among values, Schwartz (1992) argues that it 
is crucial to consider particular values not in isolation but rather as a part of a larger value 
system. Each of the ten values in this theory is, therefore, related to the others as a 
function of the degree of compatibility of the motivational goals of each value with the 
other values. A circumplex structure emerges from this system of congruities and 
conflicts among the values. Within this structure, values adjacent to one another are most 
compatible in terms of motivation, while those on opposite sides of the circumplex are 
the most conflicting. For example, the values of power and achievement, which are based 
on enhancing the self, are closely related to one another but oppose the values of 
benevolence and universalism, which are focused on concern and caring for others. 
Schwartz (1992) argues that this pattern of systematic associations among values makes it 
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possible to generate hypotheses about how other variables will relate to values. For 
example, if conformity values are predicted to increase with age, then stimulation values, 
with opposite motivational content, could be predicted to decrease with age. The content 
and structural aspects of Schwartz's theory of basic human values were assessed and 
generally supported in a series of large-scale cross-cultural studies in the 1990's 
(Schwartz, 1992, 1994; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987, 1990; Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995) that 
examined over 200 samples in more than 60 countries (Schwartz & Boehnke, 2004). 
Despite this large database on personal values from tens of thousands of 
participants worldwide (Schwartz & Rubel, 2005), no data exist to support the content 
and structural aspects of the Schwartz value theory in the context of older adulthood. It is 
important for the integrity of this theory that the same 10 latent value factors emerge in 
older adults, as they have in younger and working adults, and that the 10 values show a 
pattern of relations among each other (i.e., the circumplex structure) in older adults that 
approximates previous findings with younger and working adults. In addition, in order to 
investigate group differences in values, for example between young adults and retirees, or 
to examine the stability of values across several points in time, it is crucial to address the 
issue of measurement invariance. These issues are addressed in detail in the first 
manuscript. 
In addition to the idea of the values having a predictable pattern of inter-
correlations with each other and with outside variables, Schwartz and colleagues (1992; 
Schwartz & Rubel, 2005) have argued that mean scores for each value based on the value 
instruments are not, in and of themselves, the most important quantification of values. 
Rather, a scoring procedure known as ipsatizing is advocated as a way of representing the 
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relative importance of each value in relation to the entire value system (Schwartz & 
Rubel, 2005). Although there is theoretical reason to use such transformations, and they 
appear to be used in most research conducted by S. H. Schwartz and colleagues, such 
transformations come with a set of both costs and benefits (e.g., see Baron, 1996; Fischer, 
2004 for reviews). The nature and purpose of ipsative transformations, their conceptual 
meaning, and related statistical issues will, therefore, be examined in greater detail next. 
The ipsative scoring debate. There has not been much debate about the use of 
ipsative scores with the PVQ; their use is near ubiquitous given that S. H. Schwartz 
advocates for this type of transformation and he has been a collaborator on the majority 
of published research using these measurement tools. There are, however, important 
theoretical and statistical issues related to the use of ipsative scores that have not received 
much attention (Fischer, 2004). 
In the scoring manual for the PVQ-IV (Schwartz, n.d.: see Appendix A), S. H. 
Schwartz advocates within-subject ipsative scoring of the PVQ prior to most, but not all 
types of statistical analyses. This type of ipsative scoring involves creating a deviation 
score representing the relative importance of a particular value for an individual in 
relation to all of the other values. Ipsative scores are calculated by taking an individual's 
mean score across all 40 PVQ items and subtracting it from the individual' mean score 
for a particular value. The ipsatizing of PVQ scores is intended to serve two functions: (a) 
remove a response bias and (b) to represent the relative rather than absolute importance 
of each value (Schwartz & Rubel, 2005). Fischer (2004) defines response bias as follows: 
Response bias is the systematic tendency to distort individual responses to rating 
scales so that observed scores are unrelated to the true score of the individual by 
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either selecting extreme or modest answers (extreme or modest response bias) or a 
shifting of responses to either end of the scale (acquiescence response bias), (p. 
263) 
Schwartz (n.d.) notes that individuals differ on their use of response scales and suggests 
that, "scale use differences often distort findings and lead to incorrect conclusions" (p. 1). 
The argument for ipsatizing is that a raw mean value score, or in other words the absolute 
importance of a single value across individuals, does not reflect values as a part of a 
system. This systemic view of values is deemed important because, "the way that values 
affect cognition, emotion, and behavior is through a trade-off or balancing among 
multiple values that are simultaneously relevant to action" (Schwartz, n.d., p. 2). The 
ipsatizing process described above converts absolute value ratings into relative value 
ratings, or the individual's "value priorities" (p. 1). Schwartz and Rubel (2005) cite 
Fischer (2004) as supporting the legitimacy of ipsatizing value scores from the Schwartz 
value theory instruments. In the same review, however, Fischer outlines a variety of 
potential problems and complications as a result of within-person ipsatization. These will 
now be briefly addressed. 
The ipsatization process has both strengths and limitations, depending on the 
research question and the issues ipsatization is intended to address (Baron, 1996). In a 
review of standardization methods in cross-cultural research, Fischer (2004) identifies 
several important problems with ipsatization. He provides a useful analogy involving two. 
very different-sized animals, a mouse and an elephant, for conceptualizing the effects of 
ipsatization on data analysis. 
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Assume someone measured the extremities of both animals and used within-
subject (within-animal) standardization. If the researcher would now proceed to 
compare the length of, let us say, the legs, probably no significant differences 
would be found. This is despite the fact that the legs of an elephant and a mouse 
are surely different. This is because all the measures are related to the size of the 
whole animal, (p. 275) 
A question that follows from this logic, regarding ipsatizing PVQ scores, is to 
what extent is the size of the whole animal (i.e., the strength of identification with values 
overall) a variable of interest or a source of variance one wishes to consider as response 
bias? 
To explore this question, let us consider some examples of how ipsative scores 
represent different response patterns on the PVQ. If person A's raw mean score for items 
assessing benevolence was 5 (on a scale ranging from 1 to 6), and his average score 
across all PVQ items was 3, suggesting he does not identify strongly with many values, 
then the ipsative score for person A on benevolence would be 5 - 3 = 2, the positive 
value of the number indicating that benevolence is more important than all of the other 
values, on average. If person B had the same raw mean score for benevolence (5), but 
instead had an average score across all items of 5, suggesting she identifies strongly with 
multiple values, then the ipsative score for person B on benevolence would be 5 - 5 - 0, 
indicating that, although benevolence is important to this individual, it is not more or less 
important than any other value on average. Now consider person C who does not 
consider benevolence highly important (a mean of 3 for all benevolence items) but who 
also does not identify strongly with most values (with an average score across all values 
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of 3). Person C's ipsative score would also be zero. Two individuals then (person B and 
person C), one of whom indicated on the questionnaire that benevolence was important, 
the other who did not, can end up with identical ipsatized benevolence scores. 
Although ipsative scoring is intended for specific purposes (controlling for 
response bias and representing the relative importance of values), the ipsative score has 
the potential to misrepresent the importance of values in certain cases. For example, 
when an individual rates most values as important, the ipsatized score will represent these 
important values as being of average importance (i.e., no different than most other 
values). The same is true of an individual who rates most values as unimportant: when 
ipsatized, each value appears to be of average importance. As a results, ipsative scores 
have the potential to equate individuals who identify strongly with many values with 
those who do not identify strongly with any values. This is a crucial point, especially in 
regards to how values are related to well-being outcomes. A clearly articulated value 
system likely has implications for well-being in terms of being able to enact important 
values in meaningful activities and behavior. A general lack of clearly defined guiding 
principles may in and of itself be related to reduced levels of well-being through a 
general lack of direction and lack of purpose in life. An important question, then, is 
whether one wishes to consider the tendency to rate many or few values as important as a 
type of acquiescent response bias or as a potentially important individual difference 
variable. 
Beyond the issue of the conceptual implications of ipsatization, there are practical 
problems associated with ipsative scores in statistical analyses. After reviewing several 
issues regarding the implications of within-subject standardization for various forms of 
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statistical analyses, Fischer (2004) notes that within-subject ipsative scores, "have various 
undesirable properties, especially for statistical techniques involving correlations" (p. 
278), and advises against the use of ipsative scores with factor analytical techniques. The 
undesirable properties include the way ipsative scores function in a covariance matrix 
(i.e., creating, "a singular matrix with no regular inverse which creates problems for 
factor analyses) as well as problems with inflated reliability (Fischer, 2004, p. 273). 
Regarding multivariate analyses, Fischer concludes that, "authors might be advised to 
refrain from using multivariate techniques with ipsative scores pending further 
investigation of the impact of ipsatization on these techniques" (p. 276). Fischer seems to 
provide, at best, only tentative support for within-subject standardization as proposed by 
Schwartz and Rubel (2005), noting that little is known about the performance of ipsative 
data with correlation-based analyses such as structural equation modeling, and suggesting 
that more research is required in this area. 
A further issue not addressed by Fischer (2004) is the conceptual issue of 
comparing ipsative scores over time in longitudinal research. When raw mean scores for 
a value, for example for benevolence, are examined over time, the question is about 
whether there is change in the importance of that particular value. If ipsative scores are 
used in longitudinal research, then the question of change is not about change in how 
participants rated a particular value, but rather how they responded to that value as well 
as all of the other items on the questionnaire. While ipsative scores in longitudinal 
designs can answer questions about change in the relative importance of values (value 
priorities), there is a loss of specificity in terms of knowing where that change may have 
or have not occurred. An individual who valued benevolence moderately at one point 
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with an ipsative score of zero (3 on benevolence minus 3 across all items), who increases 
in benevolence over time to a score of 4, but also finds other values more important, 
could end up with the same ipsative score at the second point of measurement (4 on 
benevolence minus 4 across all items), suggesting no change in the value despite the fact 
that the individual indicated higher benevolence values at the second assessment. The 
question of change in particular values, rather than in the value system, would therefore 
be better served by an examination of raw scores rather than ipsative ones. 
Despite the rather ubiquitous convention of using ipsative scores in research using 
the PVQ, the research in this dissertation is focused on the raw means (or absolute value 
importance) rather than ipsative scores (or relative value importance). This approach was 
chosen based on (a) the host of statistical issues regarding ipsative scores and 
correlational techniques raised by Fischer (2004); (b) the possibility that the overall mean 
score across all values may be a meaningful individual difference variable relative to 
well-being (i.e., representing the strength of identification with values in general), as 
opposed to a type of response bias; and (c) the longitudinal research question regarding 
change in specific values (which raw scores alone can answer) rather than change in 
value priorities. 
Research objectives 
Although S. H. Schwartz and colleagues have collected data from tens of 
thousands of participants the world over, very little of this research has focused on 
populations of older adults. The large samples studied are often referred to as "nationally-
representative" but little information is provided on specific age ranges (e.g., Schwartz & 
Rubel, 2005). When non-student samples are included, they are often described as 
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"adults" without indicating mean age or age range (e.g., Sagiv & Schwartz, 2000). 
Although it is difficult to know for certain what age range the current literature on the 
Schwartz values represents, it is most likely representative of students and working adults 
under the age of 50 years. From the perspective of adult development and aging, much 
work remains to clarify to what extent one can generalize from the existing literature 
based on younger adults to middle and later stages of adulthood. This dissertation 
therefore seeks to extend the literature on the Schwartz value theory by addressing three 
main objectives. First, measurement and structural aspects of Schwartz's value theory 
were investigated in retired adults and compared to the measurement and structural 
properties found in a university student sample. Second, links were explored between 
values, demographic variables, and affective well-being in retirement. Third, changes in 
retirees' values over time were studied in terms of how subjective perceptions of change 
differ from objective (i.e., longitudinal) assessments of change, and how each of these 
types of change are related to well-being outcome measures. The remainder of this 
introductory section reviews the literature in general content areas (retirement, subjective 
well-being, and value change) relevant to these objectives. 
Retirement 
The study of retirement is growing in importance for a variety of reasons. 
Demographically, the oldest members of the large baby-boom cohort (born between 1946 
and 1964 or 1965, depending on the source) reached the age of 60 in 2006 and have 
begun to retire (Callanan & Greenhaus, 2008; Statistics Canada, 2001; U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2006). The proportion of retirees in western society will therefore rise 
dramatically in coming years. In addition, advances in health and medicine have 
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contributed to an increased life expectancy, which translates into individuals spending a 
longer time in the retirement stage than ever before and in better health. This is 
historically novel. Third, retirement, while not typically a crisis, is a unique transition in 
the lifespan that involves changes in roles, relationships, and daily routines as well as 
shifts in income and in health. Retirees face the dual challenges of adjusting to the loss of 
the work role and its social ties as well as establishing a new and satisfying post-
retirement lifestyle (van Solinge & Henkens, 2008). Retirement, in other words, is a 
multi-dimensional transition that affects both social and physical worlds (Kim & Moen, 
2001). 
Defining retirement. Defining retirement is not as straightforward as one might 
imagine and official policies defining retirement vary from country to country. The 
concept of retirement involves some degree of withdrawal from the workforce at the tail 
end of a career of work, but the age, length of career, and the extent of withdrawal 
(partial or complete) necessary to be considered retired are debatable and vary across 
definitions. Retirement can be defined either as a subjective, self-perceived status 
reported by an individual or based on objective criteria, such as being over a specific age, 
being out of the labor force for a specific amount of time, or receiving over a certain 
percentage of total income from retirement-income sources (Bowlby, 2007). Retirement 
is not, however, simply a clean break from full-time work. There is an increasing 
tendency toward "blurred" exits from the workforce involving multiple entrances and 
exits from the labor force as well as combinations of part-time work and retirement 
(Mutchler, Burr, Pienta, & Massagli, 1997). Traditional definitions of retirement, based 
on the idea of retirement as the end of employment and the beginning of receiving 
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pension benefits (Atchley, 1988) are too narrow to encompass the range of situations and 
experiences that are now encountered in later adulthood in the process of withdrawing 
from the workforce. Indeed, policy makers in Canada have recently begun to implement 
policy changes that would give people the choice to work later in life as well as to have 
more flexibility in balancing work, leisure, learning, and care giving throughout the life 
course (Stone, 2006). 
The concept of retirement, even if it is an evolving one, does however rest on a 
few fundamental criteria: (a) retirement is a.process of withdrawing from the workplace 
rather than a discrete event; (b) retirement does not necessarily mean economic inactivity; 
and (c) people of a relatively young age should not be considered retired (Bowlby, 2007). 
In Canada, the median retirement age, defined in a labor force survey as being over age 
50, not having worked in the past year, and self-reporting retirement as the reason for not 
working, was 61 years in 2005 (Bowlby, 2007). Several decades prior in the 1970s, 
people in Canada were retiring at about age 65 but retirement age began dropping in the 
1980s and 90s in conjunction with public sector early retirement incentives (Bowlby, 
2007). 
Retirement and well-being. While free time without the pressures of work may 
seem an inevitable boon to well-being, this is not necessarily the case. The impact of 
retirement on well-being has been a subject of much debate among researchers. In early 
research on retirement, Atchley (1976) proposed that retirees tend to move through 
several different stages of adaptation in the first few years of retirement, from a 
honeymoon phase, to disenchantment, to a re-orientation period, and eventually to a new 
stability in routine (Reitzes & Mutran, 2004). Subsequent research has supported some 
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components of this stage model, but has also demonstrated the complexity and variability 
in the retirement adaptation process. Some studies have reported that the retirement 
transition is accompanied by improved well-being (e.g., Gall, Evans, & Howard, 1997), 
while others have reported the opposite (e.g., Richardson & Kilty, 1991). Although a 
negative impact of retirement on well-being is not the norm, up to 30% of retirees have 
been estimated to experience adjustment difficulties (Braithewaite & Gibson, 1987; 
McGoldrick & Cooper, 1994). Different categories of responses to retirement have also 
been proposed, including the following four types of retirement transitions: (1) retirement 
as a transition to old age (a time to wind down, reflect, rest, and put one's life in order); 
(2) retirement as a new beginning (a time to energetically pursue long-awaited goals); (3) 
retirement as a continuation (continuing with valued activities in as less pressured 
manner); and (4) retirement as an imposed disruption (losing a part of the self as a result 
of forced retirement) (Hornstein & Wapner, 1985; Hanson & Wapner, 1994). 
More recently, the retirement transition has been depicted by researchers as 
heterogeneous in nature, its impact depending upon a host of both contextual and 
psychological factors, including economic resources, personal resources, and social-
relational resources (Drentea, 2002; Kim & Moen, 2002; Mein, Martikainen, 
Hemingway, Stansfeld, & Marmot, 2003; Pinquart & Schindler, 2007; Szinovacz & 
Davey, 2004; van Solinge & Henkens, 2008). Understood as a non-uniform transition, 
retirement may then represent a crisis for some and a relief for others. Satisfaction in 
retirement has been linked with retirees' access to key resources (finances, health, and a 
marital relationship), the characteristics of the transition (involuntary or voluntary), type 
of job from which people retire (physically demanding or intrinsically interesting), and 
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expectations about retirement (van Solinge & Henkens, 2008). In addition, age at 
retirement, duration of retirement, gender (Pinquart & Schindler, 2007) and finally 
quality of social relationships with spouse and family, personality characteristics (Kim & 
Moen, 2001), and spousal employment status (Szinovacz & Davey, 2004) have all been 
associated with the well-being of retirees. Personal values, however, have not yet been 
the focus of investigations regarding retirees' well-being. The following section 
addresses definitions of well-being and how different types of motivation, including the 
Schwartz values in particular, have been linked to well-being outcomes in prior research. 
Subjective well-being 
Defining subjective well-being. As opposed to what are often considered objective 
indicators of the quality of a person's life such as health and financial status, subjective 
well-being refers to individuals' experiences of positive and negative emotions and their 
cognitive judgments about how satisfied they are with their lives (Diener, Suh, Lucas, & 
Smith, 1999). Although related, positive and negative affect are considered independent 
constructs with distinct structures and different causes (for a review, see Schimmack, 
2008). It is also worth noting that affective experiences and life satisfaction do not 
necessarily have the same determinants, and experts in the field have noted a poor 
understanding of the differential relations between predictor variables and the affective 
and cognitive components of subjective well-being (Diener et al., 1999). However, taken 
together the affective and cognitive components of subjective well-being represent 
people's feelings about and evaluations of their lives, and are usually understood, either 
separately or together, as indicators of happiness and quality of life. 
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The scientific study of subjective well-being over the past 30 years has identified 
a variety of biological, psychological, and social determinants of subjective well-being, 
but no single variable has emerged as both necessary and sufficient for well-being 
(Larsen & Eid, 2008). Subjective well-being has been found to vary with personality, 
social relations, genetics, environmental effects such as early family environment and the 
larger national environment; subjective well-being has also been found to vary with 
demographic characteristics such as education, health, income, employment, marriage, 
widowhood, age, and culture (for reviews, see Diener et al., 1999; Larsen & Eid, 2008). 
A recent model of the multiple determinants of subjective well-being suggests that both 
person and situation level variables make unique contributions (Sheldon & Hoon, 2007). 
Regarding subjective well-being and values, Sagiv, Roccas, and Hazan (2004) propose 
that there are three pathways through which values may impact on well-being. The first is 
through holding specific "healthy values" that in and of themselves are likely to promote 
well-being; the second is through making progress toward important goals; the third is 
through congruence between personal values and the prevailing environment or activities. 
In this dissertation, the focus is primarily on the first of these pathways — the direct 
effects of values on well-being, but these direct effects are considered from a 
developmental perspective in the sense that the impact of values on subjective well-being 
is considered dependent to some extent on position in the lifespan. 
Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. The literature on life strivings (e.g., Kasser & 
Ahuvia, 2002; Kasser & Ryan, 1993; 1996; Kasser, Ryan, Couchman, & Sheldon, 2004) 
provides a starting point for understanding how the values of the Schwartz paradigm 
might relate to aspects of subjective well-being. The life strivings literature posits that a 
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balance is required between intrinsic and extrinsic goals. According to self-determination 
theory (Deci & Ryan, 2000), intrinsic motivation can be understood as, "doing something 
because it is inherently interesting or enjoyable," whereas extrinsic motivation is, "doing 
something because it leads to a separable outcome" (i.e., in order to attain attractive 
environmental incentives or to avoid aversive consequences; Ryan & Deci, 2000, p. 55). 
Intrinsic motivation is thought to be especially beneficial because it leads to the 
fulfillment of fundamental human needs for competence, relatedness, and autonomy, 
which are, according to Deci and Ryan (2000) "innate psychological nutriments that are 
essential for ongoing psychological growth, integrity, and well-being" (p. 229). 
Several studies suggest that placing relatively high importance on intrinsic goals 
—goals derived from the basic psychological needs of autonomy, relatedness, 
competence, and community— tends to promote well-being; in contrast, placing 
relatively high importance on extrinsic goals — goals derived from the need for external 
approval, such as financial success, attractiveness, and fame — tends to be associated 
with lower well-being (Kasser & Ryan, 1993; 1996; Sheldon, Ryan, Deci, & Kasser, 
2004; for a review, see Kasser, 2004). This pattern of associations between goal content 
and well-being has been observed in different age ranges (adolescents, students and 
working adults) and in several different cultures (Kasser, 2004), but notably no 
investigations have focused on older adults. 
Intrinsic and extrinsic categories of motivation may represent, to some extent, an 
oversimplification of human motivation, as it is possible to pursue an action for both 
intrinsically satisfying and extrinsically rewarding reasons (e.g., becoming a psychologist 
in order to help others while at the same time gaining status and income potential). To 
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partially take into account the pluralism of human motivation, many of the studies above 
have studied the impact of intrinsic and extrinsic goals in terms of the ratio or balance 
between the two, rather than absolute levels of one or the other. Deci and Ryan (2000) 
also acknowledge the potential overlap between the two, and propose they exist on a 
continuum of self-determination. Extrinsic motivation can, therefore, be transformed into 
intrinsic motivation through a process of internalization involving the transformation of, 
"socially-sanctioned mores or requests into personally endorsed values and self-
regulations" (p. 235). It seems possible, however, that both intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivation could simultaneously exist within the same individual without having to be 
simply one or the other. 
Related to the construct of extrinsic values, a body of research has investigated 
the construct of materialistic values and their impact on well-being. Materialistic values 
(also referred to as materialism) can be understood generally as beliefs about the central 
importance of material possessions in one's life. Materialistic values by their nature are 
manifested in extrinsic goals. In addition to the desire for money and possessions, 
materialistic values have also been conceived of as pertaining to image and popularity 
(Kasser & Ahuvia, 2002; Kasser & Ryan, 2001). Placing a high importance on material 
goods (and therefore on extrinsic goals) has shown consistent associations with lower 
levels of happiness and life satisfaction (for a review, see Burroughs & Rindfleisch, 
2002). The dominant conceptualization of materialism, therefore, is that it is a value 
orientation that is detrimental to well-being. 
While the negative associations between materialism and well-being have been 
extensively documented (e.g., Kasser, Ryan, Couchman, & Sheldon, 2004), the 
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mechanism through which materialism is negatively associated with well-being has 
received less research attention. Existing studies suggest that materialism impedes well-
being through interfering with the fulfillment of intrinsic psychological needs, especially 
needs for relatedness and community. People who highly value material goods are 
hypothesized to, in effect, replace people with objects in their lives (Kasser & Ryan, 
1993, 1996). 
Another conceptualization of the mediating mechanism between materialism and 
well-being is that materialistic values may stem from "experiential avoidance" (Kashdan 
& Breen, 2007). Kashdan and Breen suggest that in efforts to avoid psychological 
discomfort, people use maladaptive avoidance-based strategies such as suppression of 
internal distress through indulgence in immediate environmental stimuli (i.e., material 
goods). This narrowing of focus onto the acquisition of material goods in order to reduce 
psychological pain —termed experiential avoidance — is proposed to distance people 
from their longer-term goals and to interfere with, "movement toward intrinsically valued 
directions in life" (Kashdan & Breen, p. 523). Kashdan and Breen found that students 
with strong materialistic values reported lower well-being across a variety of both 
hedonic well-being (positive and negative emotions) and eudaimonic well-being 
measures (meaning in life, relatedness, competence, autonomy, and gratitude). Further, in 
support of experiential avoidance as a mechanism through which materialistic values are 
detrimental to well-being, Kashdan and Breen found that experiential avoidance fully 
mediated the relationship between materialism and each of the dimensions of well-being. 
How do the values from the Schwartz (1992) value theory relate to intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivations? Sagiv & Scwhartz (2000) suggest that the value most clearly 
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conceptually linked to extrinsic goals is power. Power values involve a desire for money 
and expensive things, as well as control and dominance over others. Achievement values, 
though not described by Sagiv and Schwartz as representing extrinsic motivation, 
nonetheless appear to reflect extrinsic goals as they involve a competitive type of 
ambition (i.e., to do better than others) and desire for the external markings of success: 
admiration, impressing others, getting ahead in life, and demonstrating competence. 
It is important to note here a difference in meaning of the term 'competence' in 
the Schwartz paradigm compared to self-determination theory, discussed earlier. 
According to self-determination theory, 'competence' is a fundamental psychological 
need that can be understood as "a propensity to have an effect on the environment as well 
as to attain valued outcomes within it" (Deci & Ryan, 2000, p. 231). In other words, 
people seek competence because it is inherently satisfying to feel effective in the world. 
The pursuit of competence as a component of achievement values in the Schwartz 
paradigm, however, has a different, more socially competitive connotation. Achievement 
is defined as placing importance on "personal success through demonstrating competence 
according to social standards" (Schwartz et al., 2001: see Table 1) and is assessed by 
items tapping ambition, desire to impress others, desire for admiration, and desire to be 
better than others (see Table 2). In other words, competence in the Schwartz paradigm is 
a demonstration of ability for the purpose of recognition as opposed to seeking success 
according to internal standards. Comparing the conceptualizations of'competence' in 
self-determination theory and the achievement category of the Schwartz value theory, it 
appears that while the former is consistent with doing something because it is inherently 
26 
enjoyable (intrinsic motivation), the latter is more consistent with doing something 
because it leads to a separable outcome (extrinsic motivation). 
Regarding intrinsic goals and values, Sagiv and Schwarz (2000) suggest that self-
direction, benevolence, and universalism values correspond to the innate psychological 
needs represented by intrinsic goals. Self-direction involves the desire to be creative, 
independent, and curious; benevolence involves the desire to help close others, respond to 
their needs, and to be loyal and forgiving; and universalism involves the desire for 
equality, broad-mindedness, social justice, a world at peace, and environmental 
protection. 
Despite the conceptual links between the values in the Schwartz theory and the 
categories of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, the values have not shown a consistent 
pattern of association with well-being that would be predicted based on an 
intrinsic/extrinsic division of the values. That is to say, the a priori intrinsically oriented 
values (self-direction, benevolence, universalism) do not appear to be uniformly 
associated with higher well-being, nor do the a priori extrinsically oriented values 
(power, achievement) show consistent associations with lower well-being (Sagiv & 
Schwartz, 2000). These results will now be discussed in more detail. 
Subjective well-being and the Schwartz value theory. Only one set of studies has 
investigated the association between values from the Schwartz theory and measures of 
subjective well-being (Sagiv & Schwartz, 2000). The participants in the first study were 
undergraduate students and adults in six different samples from Israel and the former 
West Germany and East Germany. Neither average age nor age range were reported, 
making judgments about the adults' stage in the lifespan difficult. Presuming, however, 
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that the results apply most directly to students and working adults, Sagiv and Schwartz 
(2000) found that across age groups and across three cultures, values showed weak but 
significant associations with the affective component of well-being (positive affect 
ratings), but no association with the cognitive component (ratings of life satisfaction). 
Achievement, self-direction, and stimulation positively correlated with higher positive 
affect, and may therefore represent "healthy values" in young adults. In contrast, 
tradition, conformity, and security values correlated with lower positive affect, and may 
therefore represent a less healthy value orientation associated with fewer positive 
emotions. Notably, neither benevolence nor universalism, both of which were 
hypothesized to represent intrinsic strivings, correlated with any of the measures of well-
being. In addition, the extrinsically-oriented values power and achievement showed 
differential results: achievement was associated with higher positive affect while power 
showed links with reduced positive affect in two of the six samples, an effect which 
disappeared when results were averaged across all of the samples. 
In the second part of their study, Sagiv and Schwartz argue that what may be 
more important for well-being than particular values is the fit between values and 
environment. Value-congruent environments allow individuals to express their values, 
attain their important goals, and consequently experience a sense of positive well-being 
(Sagiv et al., 2004). Sagiv and Schwartz (2000) found that particular values were more 
strongly associated with well-being when congruent with the prevailing value 
environment. The authors compared students of business administration and psychology, 
hypothesizing that each environment has a prevailing value hierarchy, with business 
training supporting power and achievement values and psychology training supporting 
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universalism and benevolence values. Among business students, those who reported 
higher power values and lower universalism values scored higher on measures of 
subjective well-being. In contrast, among psychology students, higher power values were 
associated with lower well-being. 
Kasser and Ahuvia (2002) suggest that these findings, especially regarding power, 
contradict some previous consistent findings that extrinsic goals are associated with 
lower well-being. They argue that the difference in measurement tools accounts for this 
contradiction. Schwartz's construct of power assesses desire for money and possessions, 
but does not assess the full range of extrinsic strivings (i.e., money, possessions, image, 
and popularity). 
To summarize, the values from the Schwartz theory show small but significant 
associations with well-being among younger and working adults. The amount of shared 
variance between each particular value and well-being outcome measures is small 
(generally between 1% and 2 %), with significant Pearson correlations ranging from .10 
to a maximum of.24 (without taking into account corrections to significance levels for 
multiple comparisons: Sagiv & Schwartz, 2000). These findings are not entirely 
compatible with the goals/personal strivings literature, and the ten values do not 
uniformly predict well-being as would be expected based on their status as intrinsic or 
extrinsic goals. 
Extending existing findings to older adulthood. Should we expect to find a similar 
pattern of healthy values in both younger adulthood and in retirement? While it is 
reasonable to assume that some of the same links between values and well-being might 
also emerge for retired adults, it is also reasonable to assume that the link between values 
29 
and well-being might depend on position in the lifespan. For example, achievement 
values may be important for young adults in the establishment of a career and in 
developing financial independence and in this way are positively related to the affective 
well-being of students (Sagiv & Schwartz, 2000). In retirement, however, without the 
context of the hierarchies and rewards of the workplace, achievement values may not 
serve the same adaptive function (Burr, 2008). 
An additional consideration not taken into account by Sagiv and Schwartz (2000) 
are the multiple determinants of well-being. A wide variety of factors, including basic 
demographic variables, independently account for variability in well-being outcome 
measures (Sheldon & Hoon, 2007). It is important to ask, therefore, whether values, as 
motivational constructs, would account for the same small portion of the variance in 
affective well-being outcomes if basic demographic predictors of well-being were taken 
into account. These demographic control variables were not considered by Sagiv and 
Schwartz (2000), but are especially important to consider in older, retired adults, when 
constraints such as inadequate income and health problems can have a significant impact 
on well-being. The second manuscript in this dissertation, therefore, examines personal 
values, important demographic variables, and the interaction between the two in a 
longitudinal study of affective well-being among retirees. 
Lifespan changes in goals and values 
A key role for values as individuals retire may be their contribution to a sense of 
stable identity (Atchley, 1999). Maintaining important goals and values is likely to 
promote a sense of continuity in identity across changing life circumstances. At the same 
time, however, the importance placed on certain goals and values depends on 
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developmental context and position in the lifespan. Rokeach (1973) proposed that while 
values are generally stable, they could be modified in order to preserve a positive self-
concept. Similarly, Schwartz (2005) suggests that although values are generally stable, it 
may be beneficial for individuals to adjust their values to the opportunities and 
constraints of different life stages. This could be achieved by upgrading the importance of 
values that can be readily attained, while downgrading the importance of values whose 
pursuit is blocked by life circumstances (Schwartz, 2005). Valuing what is attainable may 
facilitate the perception of one's self as capable of achieving desired outcomes and as 
living in accord with one's values, whereas valuing what is unattainable may have 
negative consequences for self-esteem (Johnson, 2001). 
Adapting one's commitment to goals in order to meet situational and biological 
opportunities and constraints is considered a healthy life management strategy (Baltes & 
Baltes, 1990; Brandtstadter, 2002; Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999; Heckhausen, 
2002; Wrosch, Scheier, Carver, & Schultz, 2003). A growing body of research suggests 
that goal disengagement in the face of unattainable goals is beneficial for both physical 
and psychological health, especially in older adulthood (e.g., Wrosch, Heckhausen, & 
Lachman, 2006; Wrosch, Miller, Scheier, & de Pontet, 2007; Wrosch, Scheier, Miller, 
Schulz, & Carver, 2003). Little is known, however, about the continuity of values across 
major transitions in the lifespan, or whether value continuity or adjustment across 
transitions is beneficial for older adults. 
What do we know about the fluidity of values in general? There is evidence for 
both the general stability of values over time as well as changes in values during 
important times of transition. Some of this evidence comes from research that examines 
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goals, so it is worth first reviewing the similarities and differences between values and 
goals. Values are perhaps best conceptualized as goals in their most abstract form. Values 
are separable from goals in that goals represent concrete aspirations for the future 
whereas values represent more abstract, global aspirations of how to live based on what is 
most important in life. While goals may be accomplished as particular projects, values 
are unending projects and represent relatively stable motivational traits. 
In some research on motivation elements of goals and values have been blended 
together in the measurement tools. For example, Atchley's (1999) personal goal 
inventory combines specific, concrete goals (e.g., having a comfortable place to live) 
with motivation at the more broad level of values (e.g., seeking new experiences: p. 45). 
Goals and values also overlap when goals are defined in broad terms, such as long-term 
life goals (e.g., Schmuck & Sheldon, 2001), personal strivings (e.g., Emmons, 1991), or 
aspirations (e.g., Lapierre, Bouffard, Dube, Labelle, & Bastin, 2001; Plagnol & Easterlin, 
2008). Life goals, personal strivings, and aspirations have much in common with values 
in that they are all motivational principles that help to guide behavior. Values, however, 
represent sets of beliefs and principles that tie together the themes of various concrete 
goals. 
Longitudinal studies of goals and values. Given the conceptual overlap between 
goals and values, the literature on the stability of goals across time provides a good 
starting point for the development of hypotheses regarding value stability in older 
adulthood. In a longitudinal study across 20 years of older adulthood, Atchley (1999) 
examined the "developmental goals" of over 1000 older adults who were a minimum age 
of 50 years in 1975, and followed over 300 of them until 1995. Participants rated a list of 
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16 personal goals as to their importance in their lives. For example, "being well-read and 
informed", "having close ties with my family", and "having a substantial family income" 
were among the personal goals listed (Atchley, 1999, p. 45). 
Results across 20 years indicated that the vast majority (79% of participants) 
showed stability or continuity in personal goals, while a minority (21%) showed 
discontinuity (Atchley, 1999). Reflecting life context, the goals most likely to be 
downgraded in importance were "having a satisfying job" (as most participants retired 
during the study) and "being prominent in community affairs", while those most likely to 
increase in importance were "forming long-lasting friendships" and "having a close, 
intimate relationship with another person" (p. 46). The goals that did not change for the 
majority of people across 20 years were focused on "personal qualities, human 
relationships, and supports for a comfortable lifestyle" (p. 136). In particular, these goals 
were "accept myself as I am," "be self-reliant", "have a comfortable place to live", "be 
dependable", "do things for others", "have close family ties", "be well read and 
informed", "have long lasting friendships", and "have substantial family income" (p. 
135). Overall then, the personal goals of these older adults tended to show a general 
pattern of continuity, with the vast majority showing no significant change in their goals 
across 20 years. Where changes do occur, they relate to the downgrading of work-related 
goals or an increase in the importance placed on close personal relationships. 
Moving now from goals to values, there are few existing investigations into the 
longitudinal stability of values. Sheldon (2005) found evidence of normative changes in 
young adults' values over the course of their college career. Large shifts were observed 
across four years in the form of the decreasing importance of extrinsic values (relating to 
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money, popularity, and appearance). Increases in intrinsic values were smaller, and 
occurred in the domain of emotional intimacy. Students, then, appear to normatively 
move away from extrinsically-motivated values as they approach graduation from 
college, and begin to place a higher importance on emotional intimacy as they mature. 
There is also a body of longitudinal research specific to adults' work values 
across time. Work values refer to the general importance individuals place on various 
aspects of working in their lives (Isakson, Johansson, Bellaagh, & Sjoberg, 2004). 
Studies focused on the transition to adulthood have found that the work values of young 
adults are dynamic and tend to shift during the transition to the adult labor force and also 
tend to interact with work experiences and level of education attained (Johnson, 2001; 
Johnson & Elder, 2002). Further, in a study examining the influence of marriage and 
parenthood on work values, Johnson (2005) found that entering into family roles tended 
to alter the meaning of work and commitment to work. Upon family formation, the 
extrinsic rewards of working (pay, security, prestige) decreased in importance for wives, 
but not husbands, whereas for both men and women the importance they placed on the 
intrinsic rewards of work (interest, challenge, responsibility) decreased when they started 
a family. Particular developmental challenges of adulthood and the associated changes in 
life circumstances (e.g., entering the labour force, starting a family) have, then, been 
shown to have an impact on personal value systems. Exiting the workforce — a major 
normative transition involving significant changes in life circumstances— is an excellent 
opportunity, therefore, to examine potential value change in older adults. 
Studies of value change in older adulthood. In one of the few studies of the values 
of older adults, Ryff (1982) found differences between women's retrospective, current, 
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and prospective reports of their values. Ryff concluded that these differences represent a 
self-perceived shift from an extrinsic to an intrinsic value orientation from middle age to 
old age. In middle age (age 40-55), women emphasized competence-focused instrumental 
values, whereas in old age (age 60 and up), women emphasized terminal values related to 
desirable end states such as inner harmony. Questions about veridical change in older 
adults' values, however, are not answered by this study, as the cross-sectional 
methodology only permits conclusions at the level of self-perceived differences between 
past, present, and future values. 
Only one previous empirical study has focused specifically on values in the 
retirement transition, but its limited methodology prevents drawing any firm conclusions 
about value change. Thurnher (1974) compared the values of adults facing the transition 
to an empty nest (average age of 50 years) to a group of adults who were still working but 
facing the imminent transition to retirement (average age about 60 years). Results 
indicated that ease-contentment values predominated in the older, pre-retired group, 
while interpersonal-expressive values predominated in the younger, empty-nest group. 
Thurnher interprets these results as changes in the importance of certain value 
orientations from about age 50 to age 60. However, only within-subject longitudinal 
designs can offer strong conclusions regarding change within individuals over time, and 
such studies in the realm of value change in the retirement transition are lacking. 
Value change within the Schwartz value paradigm. Longitudinal studies of 
Schwartz's (1992) values have not yet been conducted at any stage of the lifespan. No 
research to date, therefore, has examined the values of the Schwartz theory in the context 
of the retirement transition. Given the absence of longitudinal studies of Schwartz's 
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values, age differences in value priorities from cross-sectional studies allow us to begin to 
conceptualize how these values might change across middle and older adulthood, and 
across the retirement transition in particular. Schwartz and colleagues (2001) reported 
that in representative national samples from Italy (vV= 5,867) and South Africa (N = 
3210), age was positively associated with security, tradition, conformity values 
(conservation category), and universalism and benevolence values (self-transcendence 
category), whereas age was negatively associated with stimulation, self-direction, 
hedonism (openness to change category) and achievement and power values (self-
enhancement category). In a recent Italian study, Caprara, Caprara, and Steca (2003) 
examined the four higher order values (as measured by the PVQ) of 145 men and 171 
women from age 20 to 80, and divided the sample into four age groups: age 20-35; age 
36-50; age 51-65; and age 66-80. Caprara and colleagues found value differences 
between the groups that were mostly consistent with the correlational findings of 
Schwartz and colleagues (2001): Openness to change and self-enhancement values 
declined from the youngest to the oldest groups, while conservation values increased 
from youngest to oldest. Unlike Schwartz and colleagues (2001), however, Caprara and 
colleagues did not find age differences for self-transcendence values. 
Schwartz (2005) suggests that there are three sources of age differences in values: 
cohort effects, physical aging, and life stage. Schwartz speculates that younger cohorts 
are likely to place more importance on hedonism, stimulation, and self-direction values, 
and less on security, tradition, and conformity values, as a result of a general increase in 
prosperity over the past 50 years in many countries. He hypothesizes that these younger 
cohorts face fewer threats to economic and physical security than previous generations, 
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allowing for a shift away from materialist values and toward values focused on self-
expression and quality of life. Schwartz also hypothesizes that age-related changes in 
physical and cognitive domains might also affect values, resulting in increases in the 
importance of security, conformity, and tradition values, and decreases in the importance 
of stimulation, hedonism, achievement, and power values. Finally, life stage may affect 
values due to the particular set of opportunities and constraints that occur at different 
points in the lifespan. In regards to retirement in particular, Schwartz (2005) hypothesizes 
that with the end of paid employment comes a decrease in opportunities to express 
achievement, power, stimulation, and hedonism values, and possibly an increase in the 
importance of security and tradition values. These hypotheses, however, are for the most 
part unsubstantiated and remain to be tested. 
Continuity theory. Although retirement presents changes in life circumstances that 
create potential for adaptive value change, some theorists argue that values are less likely 
to change at this later point in adulthood than they are in early adulthood, when identity 
and life circumstances are more fluid and when much less life experience, upon which 
values are based, has been accumulated. For example, Glenn (1980) argues that change in 
values becomes less likely in older adulthood as older adults already have a well-
established set of attitudes, values, and beliefs that provide them with a sense of 
understanding of their world and an ability to cope with their reality. Challenges to this 
system are likely resisted at a psychological level. 
A general framework for understanding change and continuity through the aging 
process is Atchley's (1999) continuity theory. This theory proposes that aging individuals 
tend to seek both internal and external continuity in important goals, values, and activities 
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across changing life circumstances in order to maintain a coherent sense of self. With 
age, then, adults tend to show more consistency in their general patterns of thinking, 
behaving, relating to others, and in their living circumstances. At the same time, 
fluctuations in the details of these patterns may reflect adaptation to changing life 
context. 
From the perspective of continuity theory, the maintenance of values across 
transitions can be conceptualized as potentially contributing to a sense of internal 
continuity. According to continuity theory, values that are most likely to remain stable 
across time are those that are most central to a sense of identity and self. Values that are 
more tied to particular contexts, such as work, may be more likely to shift with the end of 
full-time work. If particular values become less achievable due to changes in life 
circumstances, then some degree of value adjustment may be adaptive in times of 
transition. Putting together continuity theory with the possibility of adaptive value 
change, we can hypothesize that 1) most of the values from the Schwartz (1992) value 
theory are likely to show continuity across the early years of the retirement transition, as 
a function of the preservation of well-established identity across changing life 
circumstances; but that 2) the values related to the importance of extrinsic rewards 
associated with working (i.e., achievement and power) are the most likely to be the focus 
of change, particularly in the direction of declining importance, as these general goals 
may become less attainable and less relevant in a post-employment context. 
Subjective change in the self over time 
Individuals tend to perceive defining aspects of the self, such as personality, as 
changing to some extent across the adult lifespan (Fleeson & Heckhausen, 1997). There 
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is longitudinal evidence to suggest such changes in personality traits do actually occur to 
some extent (e.g., Terracciano, McCrae, Brant, & Costa, 2005). Research into the way 
that people remember their lives, however, has consistently shown that objective 
measures and recall are not always consistent and that memory for one's personal past in 
particular is a process of active reconstruction that is typically biased by a variety of 
factors (e.g., Ross & Buehler, 1994; Ross & Conway, 1986). Individuals' subjective 
perceptions of how they have changed, then, may or may not be correlated with how they 
have actually changed over time. Regarding subjective perceptions of change, temporal 
comparison theory (Albert, 1977) predicts that people are likely to perceive positive 
changes in the self (i.e., personal growth), especially in times of major life transitions. 
Positive illusions of personal growth represent a type of memory bias in which the 
current self is evaluated favorably relative to the past self (Ross & Wilson, 2003; Wilson 
& Ross, 2001). There is some evidence for the illusory nature of such temporal self-
comparisons (i.e., the tendency to see improvement in the self over time where none 
actually occurred: e.g., Woodruff & Birren, 1972). This bias toward perceiving an 
improving self may exist for several reasons: 1) People have a basic desire to perceive 
progressive improvement in themselves (Albert, 1977); 2) perception of change is 
derived at least in part from general beliefs and stereotypes about how people change 
with age and under what circumstances (McFarland, Ross, & Giltrow, 1992; Heckhausen, 
Dixon, & Baltes, 1989); and 3) perceptions of personal improvement can arise as a means 
of coping with negative and stressful experiences such as illness (McFarland & Alvaro, 
2000; Ransom, Sheldon, & Jacobsen, 2008). 
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There is evidence to suggest that the way that people interpret their lives, 
especially over the course of major transitions or after traumatic events, has implications 
for psychological well-being. This evidence comes from narrative-based research into the 
types of stories that people tell about themselves in times of transition. In particular, the 
themes that individuals emphasize in describing how they have changed through 
challenging life transitions have shown links with psychological well-being. For example, 
Bauer and McAdams (2004) found that people whose stories of life transitions 
emphasized personal growth, in particular intrinsically-oriented directions (concerns for 
friendship and love, dialogue and sharing, connections with groups, society, humankind, 
or a god or higher power, and helping and caring for others), reported higher levels of 
well-being in general. The tendency to perceive negative events as having eventual 
positive outcomes in life stories is also associated with higher levels of psychological 
well-being and reduced depression (e.g., McAdams, Reynolds, Lewis, Patten and 
Bowman, 2001). The perception of positive life gains resulting from stressful events has 
become known as post-traumatic growth (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1996), and has spawned a 
growing literature in the field of health psychology (e.g., Calhoun & Tedeschi, 2006). In 
sum, personal interpretations of life transitions, and especially the idea of growth through 
adversity, represent a temporal self-enhancement process and play an important role in 
subsequent psychological well-being. What has generally not been assessed in the 
narrative literature is the extent to which perceptions of personal growth are accurate and 
to what extent they therefore may be considered positive illusions. The third manuscript 
in this dissertation, then, focuses on perceived changes in retirees' personal values as 
indicative of positive illusions of personal growth, and examines perceived change in 
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values as an adaptive, meaning-making process preceded by life struggles but promoting 
psychological well-being. 
Contributions to the literature 
The three studies that follow combine research on values and lifespan 
development and as such are novel in several ways. First, they bring the values of older 
adults into focus, when the majority of existing research on personal values has been 
conducted with younger adults. Second, little is known from an empirical perspective 
about the impact of the retirement transition on personal values, or the impact of values 
on well-being during retirement. Third, the research herein represents the first application 
of a widely used value theory, the Schwartz (1992) value theory, to the study of lifespan 
transitions in older adults. These studies are timely in their relevance to our aging 
workforce, and will likely be of interest not only to lifespan development researchers, but 
also to those nearing or living the retirement transition. In terms of practical implications, 
the results of this research may provide a framework for the development of policy and 
interventions that support and engage retired adults in the community in ways that are 




Categories and Definitions of Values and Sample PVQ Items, Male Version (Adapted from 
Schwartz et al, 2001) 
Self-Enhancement 
POWER: Social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources. 
(It is important to him to be rich. He wants to have a lot of money and expensive things.) 
ACHIEVEMENT: Personal success through demonstrating competence according to social 
standards. (Getting ahead in life is important to him. He strives to do better than others.) 
Self-Transcendence 
UNIVERSALISM: Understanding, appreciation, tolerance and protection for the welfare of all 
people and for nature. (He wants everyone to be treated justly, even people he doesn't know. It is 
important to him to protect the weak in society.) 
BENEVOLENCE: Preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in 
frequent personal contact. (It's very important to him to help the people around him. He wants to 
care for their well-being.) 
Openness to Change 
HEDONISM: Pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself. (Enjoying life's pleasures is 
important to him. He likes to 'spoil' himself.) 
STIMULATION: Excitement, novelty, and challenge in life. (He thinks it is important to do lots 
of different things in life. He always looks for new things to try.) 
SELF-DIRECTION: Independent thought and action-choosing, creating, exploring. (Thinking up 
new ideas and being creative is important to him. He likes to do things in his own original way.) 
Conservation 
TRADITION: Respect, commitment and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional 
culture or religion provide the self. (Religious belief is important to him. He tries hard to do what 
his/her religion requires.) 
CONFORMITY: Restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm 
others and violate social expectations or norms. (It is important to him to always to behave 
properly. He wants to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong.) 
SECURITY: Safety, harmony and stability of society, of relationships, and of self. (Having a 
stable government is important to him. He is concerned that the social order be protected.) 
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Table 2 
PVQ Items Representing the 10 Value Constructs (Male Version) 
Power: 
(#2): It is important to him to be rich. He wants to have a lot of money and expensive things. 
(#17): It is important to him to be in charge and tell others what to do. He wants people to do 
what he says. 
(#39): He always wants to be the one who makes the decisions. He likes to be the leader. 
Achievement: 
(# 4): It's very important to him to show his abilities. He wants people to admire what he does. 
(#13) Being very successful is important to him. He likes to impress other people. 
(#24): He thinks it is important to be ambitious. He wants to show how capable he is. 
(#32): Getting ahead in life is important to him. He strives to do better than others. 
Hedonism: 
(#10): He seeks every chance he can to have fun. It is important to him to do things that give him 
pleasure. 
(#26): Enjoying life's pleasures is important to him. He likes to 'spoil' himself. 
(#37): He really wants to enjoy life. Having a good time is very important to him. 
Stimulation: 
(#6): He thinks it is important to do lots of different things in life. He always looks for new things 
to try. 
(#15): He likes to take risks. He is always looking for adventures. 
(#30): He likes surprises. It is important to him to have an exciting life. 
Self-Direction: 
(#1): Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to him. He likes to do things in his 
own original way. 
(#11): It is important to him to make his own decisions about what he does. He likes to be free to 
plan and to choose his activities for himself. 
(#22): He thinks it's important to be interested in things. He likes to be curious and to try to 
understand all sorts of things. 
(#34): It is important to him to be independent. He likes to rely on himself. 
Universalism: 
(#3): He thinks it is important that every person in the world be treated equally. He believes 
everyone should have equal opportunities in life. 
(#8): It is important to him to listen to people who are different from him. Even when he 
disagrees with them, he still wants to understand them. 
(#19): He strongly believes that people should care for nature. Looking after the environment is 
important to him. 
(#23): He believes all the worlds' people should live in harmony. Promoting peace among all 
groups in the world is important to him. 
(#29): He wants everyone to be treated justly, even people he doesn't know. It is important to him 
to protect the weak in society. 
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(#40): It is important to him to adapt to nature and to fit into it. He believes that people should not 
change nature. 
Benevolence: 
(#12): It's very important to him to help the people around him. He wants to care for their well-
being. 
(#18): It is important to him to be loyal to his friends. He wants to devote himself to people close 
to him. 
(#27): It is important to him to respond to the needs of others. He tries to support those he knows. 
(#33): Forgiving people who have hurt him is important to him. He tries to see what is good in 
them and not to hold a grudge. 
Tradition: 
(#9): He thinks it's important not to ask for more than what you have. He believes that people 
should be satisfied with what they have. 
(#20): Religious belief is important to him. He tries hard to do what his religion requires. 
(#25): He thinks it is best to do things in traditional ways. It is important to him to keep up the 
customs he has learned. 
(#38): It is important to him to be humble and modest. He tries not to draw attention to himself. 
Conformity: 
(#7): He believes that people should do what they're told. He thinks people should follow rules at 
all times, even when no-one is watching. 
(#16): It is important to him always to behave properly. He wants to avoid doing anything people 
would say is wrong. 
(#28): He believes he should always show respect to his parents and to older people. It is 
important to him to be obedient. 
(#36): It is important to him to be polite to other people all the time. He tries never to disturb or 
irritate others. 
Security: 
(#5): It is important to him to live in secure surroundings. He avoids anything that might 
endanger his safety. 
(#14): It is very important to him that his country be safe. He thinks the state must be on watch 
against threats from within and without. 
(#21): It is important to him that things be organized and clean. He really does not like things to 
be a mess. 
(#31): He tries hard to avoid getting sick. Staying healthy is very important to him. 
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Investigating the Portrait Value Questionnaire (PVQ) in the Context of Older Adulthood: 
Testing Quasi-Circumplex Structure and Measurement Invariance. 
The Schwartz (1992) value theory postulates the existence often universal values 
(benevolence, universalism, self-direction, stimulation, hedonism, achievement, power, 
security, tradition, and conformity) that exist for all people (see Table 1). Values in this 
theory are defined as desirable, trans-situational goals that serve as guiding principles in 
people's lives. The values and theoretical structure of relations among them were derived 
by Schwartz and Bilsky (1987, 1990) based on motivational theory suggesting that values 
stem from three universal needs of humans: biological needs of individuals; needs for 
interpersonal interaction; and needs to ensure the welfare and survival of groups. Ten 
values were derived a priori from these three universal human needs. Based on visual 
representations of data, the ten values appeared to represent distinct motivational domains 
(Schwartz, 1992). The first measurement tool developed to assess the theory was the 
Schwartz Value Survey (SVS; Schwartz, 1992), an instrument that asks respondents to 
rate 57 specific values that represent the ten higher-order value types in terms of how 
important each value is as a guiding principle in life. To address one important limitation 
of the SVS, namely its highly abstract nature, a second measurement tool, the Portrait 
Value Questionnaire (PVQ) (Schwartz, et al., 2001) was developed. The PVQ asks 
respondents to read 40 brief descriptions of individuals (portraits) in terms of their goals 
and what is important to them. Respondents on the PVQ rate the similarity of each 
portrait to themselves. While the SVS is a highly abstract and explicit measure of values, 
the PVQ is a shorter, more concrete task that does not explicitly identify values as the 
topic of investigation. 
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Both the SVS and the PVQ have been used widely in psychological research in 
cross-cultural (e.g., Schwartz & Rubel, 2005), social, (e.g., Caprara & Steca, 2007) and 
personality domains (e.g., Cohrs, Moschner, Maes, & Kielmann, 2005), as well as in 
management (e.g., Ralston, Egri, Stewart, Terpstra, & Yu, 1999), political (e.g., Caprara, 
Schwartz, Capanna, Vecchione, & Barbaranelli, 2006), and marketing research (e.g., 
Steenkamp, ter Hofstede, & Wedel, 1999). In addition, short versions of the PVQ are 
included in two on going large-scale international research programs, the European 
Social Survey and the World Values Survey (for details, see 
http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/; http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/). The PVQ is, 
in short, one of the most important and popular measures of values in current 
psychological and sociological research. 
Each of the ten values in this theory is theoretically related to the others as a 
function of the degree of congruence or conflict with other values. This pattern of 
congruity and conflict forms a two-dimensional circular structure called a circumplex 
(Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987, 1990; Schwartz & Boehnke, 2004). A circumplex structure 
refers to a circular representation of related variables where the strength of association 
between variables increases the closer the variables are to one another on the circle. 
Within this circumplex structure, values adjacent to one another are the most compatible, 
while those on opposite sides of the circumplex are the most conflicting. For example, the 
values of power and achievement, which are based on enhancing the self, are closely 
related to one another but conflict with the values of benevolence and universalism, 
which are focused on concern and caring for others (see Figure 1). Schwartz (1992, 1994) 
found that a quasi-circumplex structure best fit the data he had collected. Tradition was 
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found to have a more peripheral location on the value circle than conformity, but that the 
two values were on the same polar angle (see Figure 1). This quasi-circumplex structure 
became the definitive version of the structure of human values (Schwartz & Boehnke, 
2004). 
The content and structural aspects of Schwartz's theory of the ten basic human 
values have been assessed and generally supported in over 200 samples in more than 60 
countries (Schwartz & Boehnke, 2004). Upon close inspection of the existing support for 
the structural aspects of the value theory, however, two features stand out. First, there is 
an absence of clear support for the quasi-circumplex model when confirmatory factor 
analysis techniques are employed. The majority of the support for the quasi-circumplex 
value structure comes from exploratory methods of data analysis such as multi-
dimensional scaling and smallest space analysis that describe patterns in the data but that 
involve no statistical tests for goodness of fit (Grunert & Juhl, 1995; Kozan & Ergin, 
1999; Lindeman & Verkasalo, 2005; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987, 1990; Spini & Doise, 
1998). Second, there is an absence of data from older adults, and a resulting lack of 
studies focusing on values in older adulthood. It appears that no studies have examined 
the Schwartz value theory specifically in the context of older adulthood. Although 
Schwartz and colleagues have collected data on personal values using the SVS and PVQ 
from tens of thousands of participants around the world (e.g., Schwartz & Rubel, 2005), 
these samples consist for the most part of younger and working adults. The current study 
seeks to extend this literature on values by assessing the measurement and structural 
aspects of the Portrait Value Questionnaire (PVQ) in the context of retired adults. 
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Circumplex structures were first formalized by Guttman (1954), and have since 
been applied to a variety of research domains, including, personality, interpersonal 
relationships, and mood research (see Hinz, Brahler, Schmidt, & Albani, 2005 for a 
review of the development of circumplex models). Support for the quasi-circumplex 
structure of human values proposed by Schwartz (1992) rested, until recently, on visual 
plots of the relations among value items (Schwartz & Boehnke, 2004). These visual plots 
were typically produced by multi-dimensional scaling (MDS) analyses or similarity 
structure analyses (SSA) of SVS (e.g., Schwartz, 1992) or PVQ (e.g., Schwartz et al., 
2001) data. What these analyses provided was a visual representation of how each of the 
values is related to the others in terms of two-dimensional space. The visual plots were 
useful in so far as they provided a location on a circular structure for each value, and 
therefore a sense of proximity or distance from other values. An important limitation of 
these visual plots, however, is that they did not involve any kind of statistical test to 
assess the goodness of fit of the circumplex structure to the observed data. 
To address these limitations, Schwartz and Boehnke (2004) provided the first 
statistical test of the quasi-circumplex structure of the Schwartz (1992) value theory. 
They used a constrained confirmatory factor analysis with SVS data to test the quasi-
circumplex structure, involving comparisons of the observed data with a reference matrix 
of expected factor intercorrelations, using 23 different samples from 27 countries (N = 
10, 857). The reference matrix of expected correlations among the values was generated 
through a data-driven approach. Average correlations were calculated across all pairs of 
adjacent values on the circumplex (.68), and between opposing sets of values (.08), and 
then the reduction in association for each of four steps from one value to its opposing 
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value was computed (.15). They tested 10 different variations on the circumplex 
structure, including models with nine rather than ten values (e.g., combining power and 
achievement) as well as teasing apart some values into sub-types (e.g., nature and social 
concern within universalism; personal and group security within security). Although fit 
indices were similar for several of these models, the definitive model was reported to be 
the original quasi-circumplex model, where tradition and conformity occupy a shared 
space on the circumplex but have particular positioning unlike the other values with 
tradition more peripheral on the circumplex (see Figure 1). Schwartz and Boehnke 
concluded that the quasi-circumplex model was supported through their confirmatory 
factor analyses. Some researchers, however, have questioned this conclusion 
(Perrinjaquet, Furrer, Usunier, Cestre, and Valette-Florence, 2007). 
Perrinjaquet and colleagues (2007) note several limitations of the results reported 
by Schwartz and Boehnke (2004). First, the best of the fit indices reported in Schwartz 
and Boehnke (2004) were only marginally acceptable (Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA) = .065; Standardized Root Mean Residual (SRMR) = .088), 
and other indices (chi square/df) indicated poor fit for most of the models tested. In 
addition, Perrinjaquet and colleagues argue that several important fit indices which would 
have allowed more conclusive assessment of the model were not reported (e.g., 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI)). 
Only one other study (Perrinjaquet et al., 2007) has evaluated the quasi-
circumplex structure of values with confirmatory factor analysis techniques. Perrinjaquet 
and colleagues tested the quasi-circumplex structure, based on SVS data, in large samples 
of French (N = 1891) and Swiss (N= 1405) respondents. They used a constrained 
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confirmatory factor analysis technique similar to the procedure employed by Schwartz 
and Boehnke (2004), although a different method for computing the reference matrix of 
expected factor inter-correlations was used. Three different reference matrices were 
tested, reflecting variations on circumplex structure. Consistent with previous findings, 
initial multi-dimensional scaling analyses showed support for the quasi-circumplex 
structure of values. When constrained confirmatory factor analyses were applied, 
however, support was lacking. None of the models tested came close to an acceptable 
level of fit. Perrinjaquet and colleagues suggest that the failure to support the quasi-
circumplex may be due to problems of the SVS's construct and discriminant validity that 
result from too much overlap (i.e., multicollinearity) among the values. 
The quasi-circumplex structure as assessed by the PVQ has received less research 
attention. In the original PVQ article, Schwartz and colleagues (2001) reported smallest 
space analyses of PVQ data from three countries (Italy, South Africa, and Uganda) and 
concluded that these spatially-mapped data supported the circular structure of the ten 
values. They also suggested that the PVQ data strengthened the value theory by 
replicating the structure that had originally been established with SVS data. Hinz and 
colleagues (2005), however, in the only other tests of value structure with PVQ data, 
failed to find support for the quasi-circumplex structure of values. Using a representative 
sample of the German population (JV = 1896), Hinz and colleagues applied a variety of 
exploratory statistical techniques (including MDS and principal component analyses 
(PCA)) to investigate the quasi-circumplex structure of values as measured by the PVQ. 
MDS analyses that typically have supported the quasi-circumplex structure in this case 
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failed to support it. The values, when mapped in two-dimensional space, did not form a 
circular pattern. PCA analyses also failed to support a circular structure. 
The Schwartz value theory, then, while having extensive support for the existence 
of the ten values, has mixed statistical support for the presence of a quasi-circumplex 
structure of relations among the values. Some studies evaluating the SVS and the PVQ 
have reported support for the quasi-circumplex, but the majority of that support comes 
from exploratory data analyses methods. Where stricter confirmatory factor analysis 
methods have been employed, results have been mixed, with one study supporting the 
circumplex structure (Schwartz & Boehnke, 2004) and the other failing to support it 
(Perrinjaquet et al., 2007). 
Another important statistical issue facing the PVQ is the establishment of its 
measurement invariance (Byrne, Shavelson, & Muthen, 1989). Measurement invariance 
refers to the similarity of the measurement properties (i.e., item intercepts, factor 
loadings, and error covariances) across groups or across time, as well as to the similarity 
in the structure of a measure (i.e., the variances and co-variances of the latent variables) 
across groups or across time (Steinmetz, Schmidt, Tina-Booh, Schwartz, & Wieczorek, in 
press). Steinmetz and colleagues note that measurement invariance is often considered 
and tested in cross-cultural research but is rarely considered in within-society or 
longitudinal studies. They suggest that researchers have tended to assume that there is no 
systematic variation of the measurement structure across different sub-samples, nor 
across different stages of the lifespan. Steinmetz and colleagues argue that such 
assumptions are risky because without actually testing this assumption, any observed 
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differences between sub-samples or across time could be due to systematic differences in 
the measurement and structural properties of the measure. 
Tests for measurement and structural invariance assess four types of questions: 1) 
whether the measurement parameters (factor loadings, measurement errors, etc.) are the 
same across groups or time; 2) whether there are pronounced response biases in a 
particular group or at a particular time point; 3) whether one can unambiguously interpret 
observed mean differences between groups or across time; and 4) whether the same 
construct was measured in all groups or at all time points (Steinmetz et al., in press). 
The most widely used method to answer these questions (i.e., to test for 
measurement invariance) is multi-group confirmatory factor analyses (MGCFA). The 
particular tests for measurement invariance examine configural, metric, and scalar 
invariance, as well as invariance of factor variance, factor co-variance, latent means, and 
error variances (see Steinmetz et al., in press, for complete definitions of these tests of 
invariance). Steinmetz and colleagues (p. 5-6) describe the types of invariance that may 
be established, in the order that they should be tested: 1) configural invariance, a pre-
requisite for all other tests of invariance, "implies the same number of factors in each 
group and the same pattern of fixed and free parameters"; 2) metric invariance "implies 
equal factor loadings across groups" and "concerns construct comparability; 3) scalar 
invariance "refers to invariance of the item intercepts in the regression equations that 
link the indicators to their latent variable"; 4) invariance of factor variance examines the 
homogeneity of the latent variables and "exists when groups have the same variances in 
their respective latent variables"; 5) invariance of the factor covariances " refers to the 
equality of the association among the latent variables across groups"; 6) invariance of 
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latent means refers to testing for "differences between groups (or points in time) in the 
latent means; and finally invariance of error variance "concerns the hypothesis that the 
measurement error in the manifest indicators is the same in all groups". 
Full measurement invariance is demonstrated only if all of the parameters in a test 
of invariance are equal across groups or time. A less conservative approach to 
establishing measurement and structural invariance has also been proposed. Byrne and 
colleagues (1989) suggest that invariance in a minimum of two parameters indicates that 
latent mean comparisons between groups or across time are meaningful. In other words, a 
minimum of partial invariance must be established (i.e., at least two indicators must be 
invariant) in order to permit meaningful mean comparisons. 
Support for the measurement invariance of the PVQ has begun to emerge through 
a shortened version of the PVQ that has been included in the on-going international and 
longitudinal European Social Survey (ESS). Research from the first waves of the ESS has 
begun to address the issue of measurement invariance across the 25 countries involved, 
and across time. Using MGCFA on the first wave of ESS data, configural and metric 
invariance of the short-form PVQ were established across 20 countries, but with a model 
of seven rather than ten values (Davidov, Schmidt, & Schwartz, in press). Several pairs of 
adjacent values (achievement/power; universalism/benevolence; conformity/tradition) 
had to be unified in order to achieve adequate fit indices. MGCFA of PVQ data from the 
second round of ESS (Davidov, 2008) did confirm the configural invariance of the seven-
value model established at the first wave, but only for 14 of the 25 countries involved. 
For these 14 countries, at least, values as measured by the short PVQ can be validly 
compared across nations. Metric and scalar invariance were also established between the 
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first and second rounds of the ESS data collection, suggesting the short-form PVQ is 
appropriate for longitudinal research tracking values over time (Davidov, 2008). 
Measurement and structural invariance of the PVQ has so far only been 
established between groups with different levels of education using MGCFA in a German 
sample (Steinmetz et al, in press) with a shortened version of the PVQ. Invariance of 
measurement and factor structure has not been tested in this manner, however, across age 
groups or across time with the full-length PVQ. A first step to ensure the validity of any 
observed mean differences in PVQ scores between age groups or across time would 
therefore be to use MGCFA to establish the similarity of the measurement properties and 
structure of the PVQ in both younger and older adults, and at two different time points 
for the same individuals. 
To summarize, two important gaps exist in the statistical literature on the 
Schwartz value theory that relate to its application across the adult lifespan. First, the 
circumplex structure of values has mixed support when tested with confirmatory factor 
analysis, and has not been tested in a sample of older, post-employment adults. Second, 
although evidence is emerging from ESS data as to the measurement and structural 
invariance of the short-form PVQ across countries, tests of invariance have yet to be 
applied to the full-length, 40-item version of the PVQ across age groups and across time. 
Rather than take a cross-country approach to the study of values with the PVQ, 
this study examines the properties of the PVQ within one country, but across different 
stages of the adult lifespan. Working within one city (Montreal, Canada), this study 
evaluated PVQ data from two age groups (retired adults and university students) from the 
same region. 
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The aims of the current study were as follows: 1) To test the validity of the quasi-
circumplex structure of values in both retirees and students using exploratory MDS 
analyses as well as a constrained CFA approach; and 2) To test measurement invariance 
of the PVQ across age cohorts and across a one-year interval using MGCFA. These tests 
of the measurement and structural invariance of the PVQ are an important precursor to 
research questions addressing value comparisons of different age cohorts, for comparing 
the association among values and other variables across age groups, and for examinations 
of the stability of values across time. 
Method 
Participants 
Older adults. Older participants were part of a larger longitudinal study 
investigating adjustment to life in retirement. Information about the retirement study was 
distributed by mail to recently retired employees of a major Quebec corporation through 
the corporations' retirees' association. Information about the study was also distributed to 
the wider Montreal community through other retirees' associations as well as ads in both 
French and English local newspapers over a period of one year. Criteria for participation 
in the study included fluency in French or English, having worked full-time for a 
minimum of 20 years, not currently being in paid employment for more than 10 hours per 
week, and mobility permitting attendance of annual testing sessions at Concordia 
University. A total of 446 retirees participated in the study. Of these, 13 (2.9%) were 
eliminated by the researchers because of difficulty understanding and/or following 
instructions, excessive missing data, or mistakes regarding date of retirement or previous 
participation, leaving a final sample size of 433 retired adults. Eighty-nine percent of the 
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final sample (n = 385) had been retired three years or less. The average duration of 
retirement upon entry to the study for the entire sample was 1.8 years (SD = 1.8). 
Longitudinal retention. Of the 433 participants in the first year of the study (Tl), 
393 returned for the second year (T2) for a retention rate of 91%. Twenty-one of the 40 
participants that did not return were either not reachable or did not respond when 
contacted; 15 withdrew voluntarily because they were too busy, were no longer 
interested, or had health problems; and four participants were eliminated by the 
researchers because of difficulty understanding and/or following instructions in the 
materials at Tl. 
Demographics. The demographic characteristics of this sample of older adults 
were as follows: 48.5% male {n = 210) and 51.5% female (n = 223); age ranged from 44 
to 79 years, with a mean of 59.20 years (SD = 5.21). Participants were generally healthy 
and well-educated (M — 14.8 years of education, SD = 2.52), had worked full-time for an 
average of 34.16 years (SD = 6.76), and had been retired for an average of 1.8 years (SD 
= 1.77). Three-quarters (75.3%) of the sample were parents to at least one child. The 
majority of the sample was either married (52%) or had a common-law partner (10.9%); 
20.3%) were divorced; 12.7%) were single; and 3.3% were widowed. In terms of language, 
60.7%) of participants completed the questionnaires in French and 39.3% in English. 
Younger adults. A total of 199 students at Concordia University in Montreal, 
Canada, volunteered to complete a package of questionnaires. Only those age 30 or less 
(N = 173) were selected for these analyses, given the focus on age comparisons with 
older adults. The demographic characteristics of this sample of younger adults were as 
follows: 44.5%) male (n = 77) and 55.5%) female (n = 96); age ranged from 18 to 30 years, 
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with a mean age of 22.73 (SD = 2.67). In terms of marital status, 47.4% were single with 
no steady partner; 40% were dating a steady partner; 12%> were either married or 
common-law; and 0.6%> were divorced. Student participants were from a range of 
academic departments and completed the materials in English. 
Materials 
Participants in both the student and retired samples completed a consent form (see 
Appendix B) , demographic questionnaire (see Appendix C), the Portrait Value 
Questionnaire IV (PVQ: see Appendix D) as a measure of personal values, and a series of 
other self-report measures. Only the PVQ is described here in detail. 
The Portrait Value Questionnaire IV (PVQ). The PVQ includes verbal portraits of 
40 different people, gender matched with the participant. Both English and French 
versions of the PVQ were used, with the latter adapted for the linguistic context of 
Quebec from an existing French version. Each portrait describes a person in terms of 
their goals and what is important to them. For example: "It is very important to him to 
help the people around him. He wants to care for their well-being" describes a person for 
whom benevolence values are important. Participants indicate how much the portrait is 
similar to them on a 6-point scale, labeled from "very much like me" to "not like me at 
all." Each value is represented by between three and six items, depending on the 
conceptual breadth of the value. Possible scores on the PVQ range from 1 to 6 for each 
value, where 1 represents a value of no importance to an individual, and 6 represents a 
value of high importance. Each individual's score for a value represents their average 
score across the items representing that value. 
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Internal reliability coefficients for the 10 values as measured by 40 PVQ items in 
this study were as follows, indicated in terms of retired/student samples: conformity 
(.73/.71); tradition (.60/.59); benevolence (.67/.74); universalism {.111.19); self-direction 
(.62/.60); stimulation (.70/.74); hedonism (.82/.72); achievement (J9/.78); power 
(.72/.71); security (.67/.68). Test-retest reliability of the PVQ has been reported to be 
moderate to high, depending on the value, ranging from .66 to .88 (Schwartz et al., 2001). 
Schwartz and colleagues (2001) reported that convergent and discriminant validity of the 
PVQ have been demonstrated to be adequate. In particular the values as measured by the 
PVQ have shown predictable associations with a variety of attitudes and behaviors, 
including age, gender, education, religiosity, field of study, political orientation, and 
alcohol use, across samples from several cultures (Schwartz et al., 2001). Schwartz and 
colleagues also reported support for convergent and discriminant validity of the ten 
values through a multi-trait multi-method analysis based on data from participants who 
completed two different measures of the same ten values (the PVQ and SVS, described 
earlier). The correlations between the two different measures of the same value ranged 
from .44 to .70, depending on the value. Schwartz and colleagues (2001) noted the 
problem of low internal reliabilities in the values measures, but concluded that the small 
number of items per value, especially in the PVQ, combined with the conceptual breadth 
of each value make the expectation of high reliabilities unreasonable for these measures. 
Perrinjaquet and colleagues (2007) also noted low levels of internal reliability and weak 
discriminant validity in the SVS resulting from multi-collinearity between value types. 
There remains some doubt, therefore, about the adequacy of the internal construct 
validity of both the SVS and the PVQ. 
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Procedure 
Older adults. Individuals interested in participating in the advertised retirement 
study contacted the researchers by telephone or email. Those who met inclusion criteria 
were given the choice of participating in either French or English, and then scheduled to 
come for testing at Concordia University in groups of up to 6 people. Upon completion of 
a battery of self-report questionnaires and cognitive tests that took approximately three 
hours, participants received a cheque for $50. 
Younger adults. Student participants were recruited at a booth at Concordia 
University which advertised participation in psychology research in exchange for being 
entered into a draw for three cash prizes ($200; $100; $50). Completion of the battery of 
self-report questionnaires (in English only) took approximately 15 minutes. Upon 
completion of the battery, students' names were entered into the prize draw. 
Statistical Analyses 
Preliminary analyses were conducted using multi-dimensional scaling (MDS) in 
order to generate a visual representation of the data comparable to Schwartz and 
colleagues' (2001) theoretical quasi-circumplex model of relations among the ten values 
as measured by the PVQ. Subsequent statistical analyses for tests of quasi-circumplex 
structure and measurement invariance were performed using structural equation modeling 
(SEM) in M-Plus 5.0 (Muthen, & Muthen, 2006). The first step of the SEM analyses 
involved a confirmatory factor analysis to ensure that the individual items of the PVQ 
loaded solely onto each respective latent value for (1) the retired sample and (2) for the 
student sample. The second step of the analyses required fitting the predicted quasi-
circumplex model (Schwartz & Boehnke, 2004) onto the latent factor covariance matrix 
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for (3) the retired sample and (4) for the student sample. Finally, tests of measurement 
invariance were conducted to ensure (5) invariance between the retired and student 
samples and (6) invariance across time. 
Results 
Observed values for each of the factors were calculated separately for the retired 
sample and the student sample. Table 2 illustrates the observed correlations between the 
10 values well as means and standard deviations for each sample. 
Preliminary MDS analyses 
MDS creates a map in two-dimensional space, where the closer in space two 
points are from one another, the stronger their correlation. Proximity therefore represents 
degree of association. MDS was conducted separately for the retired (n = 433) and 
student (n = 170) samples using SPSS 11.0. Two-dimensional models based on Euclidean 
distance were requested using the raw mean scores of the ten values. In previous studies 
using MDS analyses of values (e.g., Schwartz, 1992) analyses were based on maps of all 
of the individual items representing the values. In this case, as in other cases where 
researchers wish to visually evaluate the structure of the ten values (e.g., Hinz et al., 
2005) and not how the items themselves map onto each value, the ten mean value scores 
were used instead of all 40 individual PVQ items. As previously stated, the usefulness of 
MDS is primarily as a descriptive tool as it does not involve statistical tests to assess the 
goodness of fit of the theoretical quasi-circumplex structure to the observed data. 
Based on visual comparison to Schwartz's theoretical circumplex model (Figure 
1), both student and retired samples roughly approximate a circular structure (Figure 2). 
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There are also, however, some notable differences when each of these models is 
compared to the theoretical model and when student and retired models are compared to 
one another. 
Compared to the theoretical model, the student MDS graph (Figure 2) generally 
shows the expected pattern of proximities for all the values except for achievement. 
Achievement in this sample of students does not appear to be as closely linked with 
power as the theoretical model would suggest. Achievement does not occupy the same 
opposite pole from benevolence and universalism as power does. 
In the retired sample, the MDS graph (Figure 2) shows the expected pattern of 
proximities for most of the values except for the position of security, stimulation, and 
hedonism. Security appears between conformity and universalism, rather than between 
conformity and power, and hedonism appears between self-direction and stimulation 
rather than between stimulation and achievement. 
Comparing the retired and student MDS graphs on the basis of visual inspection, 
one difference between these cohorts is worth noting. For the retirees, achievement and 
power appear closely linked, and they map in polar opposition to universalism and 
benevolence. For the students, however, achievement is more distant from power, and 
closer to hedonism, stimulation, and self-direction. This difference, though merely 
descriptive, suggests a different pattern of associations among certain values in younger 
compared to older adults, due either to the effects of lifespan development or to cohort 
differences in value systems. In any case, as in previous MDS analyses of the Schwartz 
value theory, the quasi-circumplex structure appears, for the most part, to be validated 
through these visual two-dimensional plots, with some minor differences between student 
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and retired samples. The next step, however, was to go beyond exploratory data analysis 
and to conduct more comprehensive and rigorous tests of the fit of the theoretical quasi-
circumplex structure to the observed data in both retired and student samples. These tests 
are outlined next. 
1. Retired sample: Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Beginning with the retired sample, a latent factor model was tested in which the 
40 items loaded onto a total often latent factors (i.e., the ten value constructs) as defined 
by Schwartz and colleagues (2001). Compared to the standards for reasonably good fit 
for SEM models (where CFI > .90 and RMSEA < .06: Kline, 2005) the overall fit 
statistics for this model were poor (x2(657) = 1806.81, p < 0.05, CFI - 0.802, RMSEA = 
0.064). Lagrange multiplier tests revealed that a number of residuals would be reduced 
(and therefore model fit improved) by loading PVQ items with weak coefficients to their 
expected factors onto additional factors. There was, however, no theoretical justification 
for allowing PVQ items to load onto multiple factors, given that each value is intended to 
represent a distinct motivational domain. Instead, in an attempt to improve model fit, a 
revised latent factor model was generated in which only PVQ items that were strong and 
unique predictors of their respective factors were retained. 
This revised latent factor model in which 26 items loaded onto a total of 10 latent 
factors was then tested (see Appendix E for included and excluded items). The overall fit 
statistics (x2(254) = 612.40, p < 0.05, CFI = 0.908, RMSEA - 0.057) were substantially 
improved compared to the first model based on 40 PVQ items. The chi-square difference 
test (Ax2(403) = 1194.4, p < 0.05) revealed that the simplified model, based on 26 PVQ 
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items, was a significantly better fit to the observed covariance matrix. Table 3 provides a 
summary of these and all subsequent model fit indices. 
2. Student sample: Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Consistent with the approach for the retired sample, a latent factor model was 
tested for the student sample in which the 40 items loaded onto a total often latent 
factors. The overall fit statistics were again poor (x2(657) = 1124.41, p < 0.05, CFI = 
0.795, RMSEA = 0.064). Similar to analyses in the retired sample, Lagrange multiplier 
tests revealed that a number of residuals would be reduced by loading PVQ items with 
weak coefficients to their expected factors onto additional factors. As with the retired 
sample, given that each value is intended to represent a distinct motivational domain, 
there was no theoretical justification for allowing PVQ items to load onto multiple 
factors. 
In order to improve model fit, the same 26-item latent factor model that was 
generated on the retired sample was tested in the student sample. The overall fit statistics 
(X2(254) = 612.40, p < 0.05, CFI = 0.908, RMSEA = 0.057) were substantially improved 
compared to the theoretical model. The chi-square difference test (Ax2(403) = 512.0, p < 
0.05) revealed that the 26-item model was a significantly better fit to the observed 
covariance matrix. 
In both the student and retired samples, then, the original model often values 
based on 40 PVQ items was a poor fit to the observed co-variance matrix. Because the 
revised 26-item model showed the best fit indices for both retired and student samples, it 
was used for all subsequent analyses (see Table 3). 
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3 & 4. Testing the quasi-circumplex model using constrained CFA 
To test the degree to which the Schwartz quasi-circumplex model fit the retired 
sample, the covariances between the latent factors were constrained to the values 
suggested by Schwartz and Boehnke (2004). It was not possible, however, to constrain 
the covariances between the factors according to the established criteria and maintain a 
working model. In other words, the predicted model and the observed data failed to 
converge. The same problem occurred when attempting to constrain the covariances in 
the student sample: the hypothesized associations did not match those in the current study 
enough to maintain a working model, and the models failed to converge. Applying the 
full 40-item model instead of the revised 26-item model made no difference. In other 
words, the quasi-circumplex model, when tested with constrained CFA, was not 
supported. The pattern of correlations among the ten values in the current sample and the 
pattern proposed by Schwartz and Boehnke varied substantially. The differential patterns 
of hypothesized and observed associations among the ten values are depicted visually in 
Figure 3. 
5. Testing invariance across age groups 
To ensure that the latent factors (i.e., the ten value constructs) were comparable 
between samples, it was necessary to test for measurement invariance, starting 
specifically with conflgural, metric invariance, and scalar invariance. The revised 26-
item model was first constructed using the total sample (retirees and students, N = 606) 
with a reasonable fit (x2(254) = 635.99, p < 0.05, CFI = 0.929, RMSEA = 0.050). To 
ensure conflgural invariance (i.e., same number of factors), metric invariance (i.e., same 
loading of items onto factors) and scalar invariance (i.e., same intercepts), the identical 
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ten-factor model was tested in each group constraining the item coefficients and item 
intercepts to be equal for both students and retirees (x2(540) = 1128.89, p < 0.05, CFI = 
0.89, RMSEA = 0.060). While this led to a significant decrease in the overall fit of the 
model (Ax2(286) = 492.9, p < 0.05) largely due to a loss of parsimony through increased 
model complexity, the model itself was still acceptable. Therefore, configural invariance, 
metric invariance and scalar invariance were supported for both retired and student 
samples using the 26-item model. 
The next test of measurement invariance across age groups, invariance of error 
variance, assessed whether measurement error in each of the PVQ items was the same for 
both younger and older adults. The error variances on the indicators were therefore 
constrained to be equal between both samples. The resulting model was a poorer fit than 
the previous model (x2(566) = 1269.88, p < 0.05, CFI = 0.865, RMSEA = 0.064) and the 
difference between the models was significant (Ax2(26) = 140.999, p < 0.05). However, 
once one error variance for the factors with at least two indicators were freed, the 
resulting model fit was acceptable (x2(559) = 1154.76, p < 0.05, CFI = 0.89, RMSEA = 
0.060) and the difference between this and the previous model was not significant 
(Ax2(19) - 25.11, p > 0.05). Therefore, only partial invariance of error variances across 
age groups may be assumed in this dataset. 
Finally, invariance of factor variance was tested by constraining the variance of 
each of the ten factors to be equal for student and retired samples. The resulting model fit 
was acceptable (x2(569) = 1179.80, p < 0.05, CFI = 0.883, RMSEA = 0.060) though the 
difference between this and the previous model was significant (Ax2(10) = 25.80, p < 
0.05). Based on the above, the criteria for measurement invariance across the age groups 
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were met and therefore the idea that values can be measured similarly in each group was 
supported. 
Although value measurement appears to occur in an invariant way across age 
groups when using the PVQ, there were large differences in the obtained means of the 
latent factors and in the pattern of factor covariance between the student and retired 
samples. It appears, then, that latent value means and factor covariance can be assumed 
to vary across the two age groups. To delineate these differences, a series of follow-up 
analyses were conducted. 
In terms of similarity among the latent means of the values across age groups, 
only the means of benevolence (z-diff = -0.05, p = .72) and universalism (z-diff = 0.04, p 
= .65) were not significantly different between samples. Meanwhile, achievement (z-diff 
= 1.26, p < .05), stimulation (z-diff = 1.07, p < .05), self-direction (z-diff = 0.49, p < .05), 
hedonism (z-diff = 0.41, p < .05) and power (z-diff = 0.37, p < .05) were significantly 
higher in the student sample. On the other hand, conformity (z-diff = -0.35, p < .05), 
security (z-diff = -0.32, p < .05) and tradition (z-diff = -0.28, p < .05) were higher in the 
retired sample. 
Moreover, there were large differences in the covariances of the factors between 
retirees and students (see Table 2 and Figure 3). In other words, the ten values did not 
hang together in exactly the same way for younger and older adults. A visual 
representation of the pattern of associations (Figure 3) reveals that the pattern of 
associations among the values differs between students and retirees, especially in terms 
of strength of association. To summarize the pattern depicted in Figure 3 in terms of 
strength of associations, the covariance between the factors were tabulated in terms of the 
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number of very large, large, medium, and small effect sizes based on Cohen's (1983) 
guidelines. 
The strength of the covariances between the factors varied between the student 
and retired groups with the retired sample having generally more large and medium 
effects (one very large effect, 10 large effects, 17 medium effects and seven small effects 
with 10 non-significant effects) and the student sample having more small or non-
significant effects (one very large effect, four large effects, six medium effects and 17 
small effects with 17 non-significant effects). Retirees appear, therefore, to have greater 
interconnections among values than students, whose values show a lesser degree of inter-
relatedness. 
6. Comparing the retired sample across time 
To ensure that the measurement and structural properties were stable over time, 
measurement invariance across a one-year interval was tested using only the retired 
sample, for whom longitudinal data was available. The revised 26-item model was 
constructed with a reasonable fit (x2(254) = 898.94, p < 0.05, CFI = 0.92, RMSEA = 
0.055). To ensure configural invariance, metric invariance, scalar invariance, invariance 
of factor variance, invariance of the factor covariances, invariance of latent means and 
invariance of error variances, the model was tested constraining the item coefficients, 
item intercepts, error variances, factor variances, factor covariances and means to be 
equal over time, across a one year interval (x2(631) = 1232.63, p < 0.05, CFI = 0.92, 
RMSEA = 0.048). This led to a non-significant decrease in the overall fit of the model 
(Ax (377) = 333.69, p = 0.95) supporting all aspects of measurement invariance in the 
PVQ over time in the retired sample. 
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Discussion 
We first investigated the validity of the quasi-circumplex structure of relations 
among the ten values in the Schwartz (1992) value theory as measured by the PVQ in a 
sample of younger and older adults. Consistent with previous research, preliminary 
exploratory MDS analyses suggested support for the quasi-circumplex structure in both 
retired and student samples, with some variation between older and younger adults 
appearing in the pattern of associations among the values. Further tests assessing 
goodness of fit of the observed data to the predicted pattern of associations through CFA 
analyses did not, however, support the circumplex model. 
In order to achieve a good fitting model, 14 of the 40 items of the PVQ had to be 
dropped because they loaded weakly onto their respective factors and tended to be 
associated with other factors as well. The need to trim items from the PVQ in order to 
achieve a model with good fit is consistent with previous findings of a high degree of 
multi-collinearity among the values resulting in low levels of internal reliability and weak 
discriminant validity of SVS questionnaire items (Perrinjaquet et al., 2007). The resulting 
modified 26-item model loading onto ten factors (detailed in Appendix E) was found to 
have much improved fit indices over the poor fit of the 40-item model in both retired and 
student samples (Table 3), and was used for all subsequent tests. 
When constrained CFA was used to test whether the observed pattern of value 
inter-correlations approximated that predicted by the modified quasi-circumplex model 
(Schwartz & Boehnke, 2004), it was not possible to maintain a working model. In other 
words, the models failed to converge. The quasi-circumplex structure, despite its 
emergence in descriptive exploratory MDS analyses, did not hold up to statistical tests for 
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goodness of fit using CFA. This goes against the findings of Schwartz and Boehnke 
(2004) who found support for the quasi-circumplex structure using a constrained CFA 
method, but is consistent with other findings where the quasi-circumplex structure of 
values has not been supported (Hinz et al., 2005; Perrinjaquet et al., 2007). 
Following the tests of the quasi-circumplex structure, we then investigated the 
PVQ in terms of measurement invariance between student and retired samples. Using the 
modified 26-item model, support was found in both retired and student samples for most 
types of measurement invariance. In particular, these findings suggest that the PVQ, in a 
reduced 26-item format, has the following qualities related to its validity as a measure 
(Steinmetz et al., in press): (1) the same model structure in both younger and older adults 
{configural invariance); (2) the same factor loadings in both younger and older adults 
{metric invariance); (3) the same intercepts (and therefore same systemic response bias) 
in younger and older adults {scalar invariance); (4) the same variance within factors in 
both younger and older adults {invariance of factor variance); and (5) the same 
reliabilities in younger and older adults {partial invariance of error variance). All of this 
supports the validity of a 26-item version of the PVQ, and suggests, simply, that values 
can be measured in the same way across different stages of the lifespan using this 
measure. As a result, any differences observed in the values of younger compared to 
older adults can be interpreted as meaningful, and not as an artifact of differences in 
measurement or structural properties of the PVQ. 
Consistent with previous reported correlations between age and values, (Schwartz 
et al., 2001), retirees reported higher scores on conformity, tradition, and security values, 
whereas students reported higher achievement, power, stimulation, hedonism, and self-
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direction values. Only the latent means of benevolence and universalism showed no 
differences between younger and older adults. It is important to note that the observed 
differences in values between students and retirees may reflect development and changes 
associated with aging, but might equally represent generational cohort differences based 
on differing sets of historical events as a framework for value development. As this part 
of the study did not examine the same people over time, but rather two different cohorts 
of different ages, there is no way to tease apart these two potential explanations for age-
related differences in the latent means of values. 
Along with differing value means, retirees and students showed a differential 
pattern of associations among the ten values, as depicted in Figures 2 and 3. Of note, the 
pattern among older adults (summarized in Table 4 and Figure 3) suggests a higher 
degree of inter-relatedness among all values, even between theoretically contradictory 
values (e.g., achievement and benevolence). In younger adults, only values theoretically 
similar in motivation showed large or medium sized associations. This may be an 
indication of a higher degree of value pluralism in older adulthood, where multiple and 
theoretically competing values may co-exist to a greater extent than in younger 
adulthood, when values may be more disconnected from one another. 
After testing measurement invariance across age groups, invariance of the PVQ 
across a one-year interval was also tested. Support was found for all types of previously 
mentioned measurement invariance suggesting, simply, that values can be measured in 
the same way at different points in time in the same people using the 26-item form of the 
PVQ. It is striking that even in a time of great transition - the early stages of retirement -
that none of the latent means of the ten values showed any change across a one-year 
71 
interval among retirees. This suggests that values, even if they do change with 
development and aging, or differ from one generation to the next, are not likely to show 
much change in the short term within individuals. 
Implications for value measurement 
What does it mean if the quasi-circumplex structure of relations among the values 
of the Schwartz value theory does not hold up to statistical scrutiny? Is the theory itself 
reduced in importance or in usefulness in the field of values research? Despite the lack of 
support for the quasi-circumplex model based on statistical criteria, the PVQ remains a 
useful empirical measure of values. The PVQ captures the importance that individuals 
place on ten distinct values, in a format that does not require abstract thought about 
values, and that can be completed in a matter of minutes. In addition, it is appropriate for 
use in research with both younger and older adults as well as in longitudinal studies, as 
we have shown here, as well as across nations and cultures as shown elsewhere (e.g., 
Davidov, 2008). The lack of support for the quasi-circumplex model, found here and 
elsewhere (Hinz et al., 2005; Perrinjaquet et al., 2007) impacts how we understand the set 
of relations among the ten values, but not the capacity of the PVQ to measure values. 
There is no theoretical imperative to have a circumplex model of relations among values 
in order to have a valid measure of values. 
Based on the results of this study, what appears to be more of a threat to the 
integrity of the PVQ is the problem of multi-collinearity among items and among factors, 
and the resulting lack of discriminant validity among the 40 items of the PVQ. This 
finding parallels similar problems reported with the SVS (Perrinjaquet et al., 2007). The 
necessity to eliminate 35% of the items of the PVQ (14 out of 40) in order to establish an 
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adequate fit of all items onto ten factors suggests that researchers consider using shorter 
forms of the PVQ, such as the one generated here, to avoid excessive overlap among the 
items and the constructs. The consequence of dropping items is, of course, the loss of 
some aspects of values in the service of having a more psychometrically valid instrument. 
For example, in the 26-item model, items measuring personal security (health, 
cleanliness, safe accommodation) are no longer represented, whereas those representing 
security at a social level (social order and national security) remain. Although some 
information is lost, a more precise and valid measure of the ten values as an entire system 
is gained, as conceptual and measurement overlap of the values are reduced. Further 
research is required to determine whether the 26-item model generated here represents 
the best fitting model in other types of samples. 
There is a conceptual issue worth considering at this point regarding the problem 
of low discriminant validity among the PVQ items. The difficulties we encountered in 
finding items that load only on a single factor suggest that values in nature may not 
cleanly fall within the value categories of this model. Value items, rather, may be 
associated with multiple value categories, and the particular pattern of associations 
among items and value categories may be highly idiosyncratic. The question that follows 
is whether there is a better way to conceptualize values than dividing them up, somewhat 
arbitrarily, into ten categories. What alternatives are there for the measurement of such a 
complex motivational continuum? 
The author of the PVQ, S. H. Schwartz (personal communication, July 11, 2008), 
suggests that the ten categories of values on the PVQ are unlikely to hold up as distinct 
according to the rigorous requirements of CFA, and this is for two reasons. First, with 
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only a few items per value and with multiple motivations contained in each value, it is 
impossible to achieve high internal reliability unless the number of items is increased and 
the breadth of each value is limited to only one central motivation. For example, 
universalism would have to be focused on only one of its three components — 
tolerance/understanding, concern for nature, or broad social concern. Second, each value, 
according to the theory of quasi-circumplex structure, should be correlated with adjacent 
values on the value circle, and some item loading onto multiple adjacent values is 
therefore to be expected. Unfortunately, this lack of clean loading of items onto only one 
construct inevitably plays havoc with CFA analyses. 
One possible alternative to the use often value categories is the use of the two 
established higher-order value dimensions: openness to change vs. conservation and self-
enhancement vs. self-transcendence. This is a method that has been employed in a few 
existing studies (e.g., Caprara, Caprara, & Steca, 2003; Ros, Schwartz, & Surkiss, 1999), 
and has recently been recommended as a strategy for improving reliability of the the 21-
item PVQ data within the European Social Survey and of improving the ease of 
presenting the relationship of values to other variables (Verkasalo, Lonnqvist, Lipsanen, 
& Helkama, in press). While increasing the number of items in each factor does tend to 
increase the size of Chronbach's alpha (an indicator of internal reliability), reliability 
values based on a large number of items (e.g., 7-13 items representing each of the four 
higher order values for the 40-item PVQ) can be seen as inflated, given that the size of 
Cronbach's alpha tends to increase with number of items. Higher reliabilities for a 
smaller number of value categories does not necessarily translate into a better fit of the 
model to the data. In fact, Schwartz and Boehnke (2004), in their CFA tests of the 
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circumplex model, tested a model with the four higher-order value categories that showed 
slightly poorer fit indices compared to the ten-value model. In follow-up tests in our 
sample of older adults, combining the values into four higher order categories did 
improve alpha reliabilities to more acceptable levels (conservation .82; openness to 
change .79; self-enhancement .83; self-transcendence .81) but did not improve model fit 
indices over a ten-value model. 
Limitations 
This study involved some exploratory analyses, especially in the selection of PVQ 
items based on factor loadings, that may invalidate tests of fit that depend on the same 
relationships that were used to select the items. So while the application of the 26-item 
model to the student sample represents a legitimate test of fit, as it was not generated on 
that sample, the 26-item model as applied to the retired sample would technically need to 
be replicated in a different sample of retired adults in order to be fully supported. 
Future directions 
Our analyses suggest that the pattern of covariance among the ten factors differs 
between younger and older adults. In other words, while the means of particular values 
differed in expected ways between younger and older adults, the way in which values 
hang together as a system also differed across age groups. These differences may result 
from aging and developmental processes or from generational differences. If the observed 
differences in covariance among values are due to changes in values that occur with adult 
development across the lifespan, then values researchers should consider the possibility 
of investigating a shift in not only value priorities with age, but also of value structure 
with age. Our findings suggest that such an age-related change in value structure might 
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involve moving from rigidly ordered priorities in young adulthood to a more pluralistic, 
paradoxical value structure in older adulthood, where values with seemingly opposite 
motivational underpinnings may be held simultaneously and applied more flexibly than at 
earlier points in the lifespan. 
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Table 1 
Definitions of 10 Values and Sample PVQ Items, Male Version (Adapted from Schwartz 
et al, 2001) 
POWER: Social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources. 
(It is important to him to be rich. He wants to have a lot of money and expensive things.) 
ACHIEVEMENT: Personal success through demonstrating competence according to 
social standards. (Getting ahead in life is important to him. He strives to do better than 
others.) 
HEDONISM: Pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself. (Enjoying life's pleasures 
is important to him. He/she likes to 'spoil' himself.) 
STIMULATION: Excitement, novelty, and challenge in life. (He thinks it is important to 
do lots of different things in life. He always looks for new things to try.) 
SELF-DIRECTION: Independent thought and action-choosing, creating, exploring. 
(Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to him. He likes to do things in 
his own original way.) 
UNIVERSALISM: Understanding, appreciation, tolerance and protection for the welfare 
of all people and for nature. (He wants everyone to be treated justly, even people he 
doesn't know. It is important to him to protect the weak in society.) 
BENEVOLENCE: Preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom 
one is in frequent personal contact. (It's very important to him to help the people around 
him. He wants to care for their well-being.) 
TRADITION: Respect, commitment and acceptance of the customs and ideas that 
traditional culture or religion provide the self. (Religious belief is important to him. He 
tries hard to do what his/her religion requires.) 
CONFORMITY: Restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm 
others and violate social expectations or norms. (It is important to him to always to 
behave properly. He wants to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong.) 
SECURITY: Safety, harmony and stability of society, of relationships, and of self. 
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Connecting Text: From Study 1 to Study 2 
Results of the first study suggest that the PVQ can reliably be used to measure 
values in both younger and older adults and across time, although this was achieved using 
a trimmed version of the PVQ with fewer items. The trimming of items in the first study 
allowed for a confirmatory factor analysis of ten discrete value constructs with items that 
load cleanly onto their respective factors. The problem in using such a trimmed version 
of the PVQ, however, is the loss of content due to dropped items. Each value in itself is 
conceptually broad, and the loss of 14 of 40 items eliminates significant portions of the 
conceptual content of the values. In order to be consistent with prior research using the 
40-item PVQ, data analysis in both the second and third studies in this dissertation 
involved the full 40-item version of the PVQ. Internal reliabilities of the values were 
improved by using the four higher-order value categories (self-transcendence, self-
enhancement, openness to change, conservation) rather than the ten value categories. The 
second study, presented next, focuses on the impact of these four value types in addition 
to health and financial status, and the impact of this set of variables on affective well-
being in retirement. 
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Study 2 
Affective Well-Being in Retirement: The Influence of Values, Money, and Health Across 
Three Years 
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Affective Weil-Being in Retirement: The Role of Values, Money, and Health Across 
Three Years 
The leading edge of the baby boom cohort (born between 1946 and 1964) turned 
60 in 2006 and as a result, retirees will represent an increasingly large proportion of the 
population over the next decades (Statistics Canada, 2005). Understanding well-being in 
retirement is, therefore, an issue of growing importance for both researchers and for the 
aging population. Retirement, while not typically a crisis, is a unique transition in the 
lifespan that involves changes in roles, relationships, and daily routines as well as shifts 
in income and in health. Retirement affords increased opportunities for living the good 
life, such as spending time with friends and family and pursuing satisfying activities, but 
it is also a hallmark of the transition to the later stages of life and an introduction to the 
realities of aging. It brings with it an increased salience of age-related physical and 
cognitive changes and of the mortality of relatives, friends, and the self. 
While free time without the pressures of work may seem an inevitable boon to 
well-being, this is not necessarily the case. The impact of retirement on well-being has 
been a subject of much debate among researchers. Recent research has demonstrated that 
the retirement transition is complex and variable and is characterized by non-uniformity 
in adjustment patterns and by multiple pathways to well-being through both contextual 
and psychological variables (e.g., Kim & Moen, 2001; 2002; Pinquart & Schindler, 2007; 
Szinovacz & Davey, 2004; van Solinge & Henkens, 2008; Wang, 2007). Research has 
consistently indicated the importance of health and adequate finances for well-being in 
retirement (e.g., van Solinge & Henkens, 2008; Wang, 2007). Little research, however, 
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has focused on the motivational determinants of retirees' well-being. Given that 
retirement represents a shift from structured to unstructured time, motivational factors are 
likely an important determinant of how well retirees cope with the challenges of 
retirement. These include adjusting to the loss of the work role and associated social ties 
in addition to establishing a new and satisfying post-retirement lifestyle. Motivational 
factors such as personal values, then, in so far as they help to shape attitudes, coping 
styles, and behavior, are likely to play an important role in the subjective well-being of 
retired adults. 
One of the primary theoretical frameworks for understanding happiness among 
aging adults, socio-emotional selectivity theory (Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & Charles, 
1999), is based on motivational changes related to perception of future time. This theory 
proposes that when future time is perceived as limited, older adults tend to shift their 
priorities from future-oriented goals focused on expanding horizons to present-oriented 
goals aimed at emotion regulation and emotionally satisfying interactions and pursuits 
with close family members and friends. If retirement is understood as a hallmark of aging 
and the beginning of the later stages of life, it may be a time when the project of building 
for one's personal future becomes less important for well-being compared to an 
emotionally-meaningful present. 
The aim of this paper is to examine how personal values as motivational factors 
may play a role in the affective component of subjective well-being of recent retirees. In 
particular, we investigate personal values from the Schwartz (1992) value theory and test 
how they, both directly and in combination with finances and health, are linked to the 
emotional experiences of retirees (positive and negative affect). Given the transitional 
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nature of the early years of retirement, we also test the stability of these patterns across a 
period of three years. 
Values 
Values represent abstract, global aspirations of how to live based on what is most 
important in life. Values are separable from goals in that goals represent more concrete 
aspirations for the future. While goals may be accomplished as particular projects, values 
are unending projects and represent relatively stable motivational traits. Values, then, can 
be understood as desirable, trans-situational goals that serve as guiding principles in 
people's lives (Schwartz, 1992). Despite conceptual overlap with research into goals, 
values represent a distinct and under-studied motivational construct, especially as they 
relate to well-being in general and to the well-being of older adults in particular. 
The Schwartz (1992) Value Theory. Although a wide variety of value constructs 
and measurement tools have been developed to assess personal values, the Schwartz 
(1992) value theory is arguably the most empirically supported and widely used theory of 
personal values in the current literature. The Schwartz (1992) value theory was developed 
as an integration and extension of the diverse values literature that preceded it. It 
postulates the existence often universal values that exist for all people based on the 
fundamental needs of human beings. The ten values are benevolence, universalism, self-
direction, stimulation, hedonism, achievement, power, security, tradition, and conformity. 
The Schwartz (1992) model of values has been extensively investigated in terms of both 
structure and content. Due to space restrictions, this literature will not be reviewed here, 
but more comprehensive reviews are available elsewhere (e.g., Schwartz et al., 2001; 
Schwartz & Boehnke, 2004; Schwartz & Rubel, 2005). 
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The ten values have also been conceptualized as forming four higher-order value 
types (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & Boehnke, 2004): self-enhancement, self-
transcendence, openness to change, and conservation. These four values are the focus of 
this study. Self-enhancement values (comprised of power and achievement) emphasize 
pursuit of status, success, and dominance over others and are consistent with materialistic 
values in other value paradigms (Burroughs & Rindfleisch, 2002). Self-transcendence 
values (comprised of universalism and benevolence) emphasize concern for the welfare 
of others and for the natural world, and are consistent with community values in other 
value paradigms (Burroughs & Rindfleisch, 2002). Conservation values (comprised of 
security, tradition, and conformity) emphasize self-restriction and the preservation of the 
status quo, and are consistent with religious and family values in other value paradigms 
(Burroughs & Rindfleisch, 2002). Finally, openness to change values (comprised of self-
direction, stimulation, and hedonism) represent an emphasis on "the proactive and 
voluntary search for stimulation, novelty, and change and on free and autonomous 
thinking and behavior" Oreg et al., 2008, p. 937) and are consistent with variety-seeking 
values in other value paradigms (Burroughs & Rindfleisch, 2002). 
Values and subjective well-being 
Subjective well-being is usually conceived of as a broad domain of interest rather 
than a specific construct, and it encompasses multiple components including pleasant or 
positive affect, unpleasant or negative affect, and cognitive judgments about satisfaction 
with life (Diener et al., 1999). We focus here on the two affective components of 
subjective well-being - positive affect and negative affect, which are considered relatively 
independent constructs (Schimmack, 2008). The presence of positive affect reflects 
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pleasurable engagement in life, whereas its absence reflects sadness and lethargy 
(Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). The presence of negative affect represents a variety 
of forms of distress whereas its absence reflects calmness and serenity (Watson et al., 
1988). High negative affect has been linked to depression and several anxiety disorders 
whereas low positive affect relates primarily to depression (Brown, Chorpita, & Barlow, 
1998). 
Specific types of aspirations (intrinsic and extrinsic) have been linked to 
subjective-well-being. The self-determination theory of subjective well-being (Ryan, 
Sheldon, Kasser, & Deci 1996; Deci & Ryan, 2000) proposes that intrinsic aspirations 
(i.e., pursuing self-acceptance, affiliation with others, and contribution to the community) 
promote well-being because they satisfy basic needs for competence, autonomy, and 
relatedness. Extrinsic aspirations (i.e., pursuing contingent approval or external signs of 
worth), on the other hand, are thought to interfere with basic needs satisfaction, and 
therefore be associated with reduced well-being (Deci & Ryan, 2000). Research into 
materialistic values (i.e., beliefs about the central importance in life of money, 
possessions, image, and popularity) (Kasser & Ahuvia, 2002; Kasser & Ryan, 2001) has 
supported the self-determination theory of subjective well-being. Materialism is 
associated with lower levels of happiness and life satisfaction (Chan & Joseph, 2000; 
Hellevik, 2003; Kashdan & Breen, 2007; Kasser & Ahuvia, 2002; Kasser, Ryan, 
Couchman, & Sheldon, 2004; for a review, see Burroughs & Rindfleisch, 2002) whereas 
intrinsic value orientations are associated with higher well-being (Brown & Kasser, 2005; 
Kasser, 2004; Kasser & Ryan, 1993; Sheldon, 2005; Sheldon et al., 2004; Sagiv, Roccas, 
& Hazan, 2004). Evidence also suggests that it is not just particular value orientations 
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that promote well-being, but in addition values act as a moderator of the link between 
activities and life satisfaction (Oishi, Diener, Suh, & Lucas, 1999). Activities are 
therefore satisfying to the extent that they are consistent with important values. Whether 
values function in an implicit or explicit manner in determining the everyday activities 
and behaviour of individuals, however, remains unclear. Recent research suggests that 
values tend to relate to more abstract and long-term planning than to concrete and short-
term goals (Eyal, Sagristano, Trope, Liberman, & Chaiken, 2009; Torelli & Kaikati, 
2009). 
Within the Schwartz model of values, only one study has investigated associations 
among values and subjective well-being and it focused on younger and working adults. 
Sagiv and Schwartz (2000) assessed ratings of affect and life satisfaction among student 
and adult samples across three cultures (West Germany, the former East Germany, and 
Israel) and found that values were associated with only the affective component of 
subjective well-being (positive affect ratings). In all of these cultures, achievement, self-
direction, and stimulation correlated with higher positive affect. In contrast, Sagiv and 
Schwartz (2000) found that tradition, conformity, and security values correlated with 
lower positive affect ratings. An effect of context was also established in that for business 
students power values were associated with increased positive affect while for 
psychology students power values were associated with reduced positive affect. 
While Sagiv and Schwartz's (2000) study established theoretically sound links 
between values and well-being, it left several questions unanswered. Although the 
authors assessed negative affect, scores were not analyzed due to the poor reliability of 
the measure, and therefore no conclusions were possible about the link between values 
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and negative emotions. Further, demographic variables, which can explain up to 15% of 
variance in subjective well-being outcomes (Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999), were 
not examined, preventing conclusions as to whether values contribute to well-being 
above and beyond basic demographic characteristics. Our study attempts to address these 
limitations and the general lack of values research with older adults by providing an 
analysis of both positive and negative affect outcomes while controlling for relevant 
demographic variables using a sample of retired adults. 
Lifespan and contextual considerations 
The same set of "healthy" values (achievement, self-direction, stimulation) 
identified by Sagiv and Schwartz (2000) may not apply to older, retired adults. Similarly, 
the values associated with lower affective well-being (tradition, conformity, and security) 
may not have the same negative function for well-being under different life 
circumstances and at a later stage of life. Extrapolating from socio-emotional selectivity 
theory (Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999), the priorities and goals of older adults 
stem from a longer personal history, different life context, and more time-limited future 
compared to younger adults. What constitutes "healthy values" for retirees may differ, 
then, compared to findings from younger and working populations. 
Values were hypothesized to have direct links with well-being for retirees, but 
also to interact with other contextual variables to promote or diminish subjective well-
being. In theory, some values may serve a protective function for retirees, buffering the 
effects of limitations in health and financial domains and in this way promoting and 
protecting well-being. Other values are potentially a source of frustration and contribute 
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to reduced well-being in the context of health and financial limitations. The particular 
hypothesized links and interactions are outlined below. 
Openness to change values are related to the pursuit of flexibility, creativity, 
independence, and pleasure. Consistent with the notion of emotionally meaningful and 
present-oriented goals, openness to change values create an opportunity for the pursuit of 
satisfying interactions and activities that in turn are likely to promote positive emotions. 
Openness to change values may also protect well-being in retirement when health or 
financial difficulties are encountered through promoting flexibility and resilience in the 
face of challenging life circumstances. Openness values may be of less importance for 
affective well-being, however, under more stable life circumstances involving good 
health and high financial status when basic conditions of life provide fewer challenges to 
well-being. 
Conservation values are related to the pursuit of conformity to social norms, 
upholding tradition and customs, and maintaining security of the individual person and of 
society. Conservation values have been found to be higher among older adults (Caprara, 
Caprara, & Steca, 2003), suggesting they have increasing importance across the lifespan. 
Among younger adults they are associated with lower affective well-being (Sagiv & 
Schwartz, 2000) and guilt-proneness (Silfver, Helkama, Lonnqvist, & Verkasalo, 2008). 
In contrast, among retirees conservation values may be linked to enhanced affective well-
being through their emphasis on tradition or religion which may provide retirees with 
social connectedness, purpose, and meaning, as well as through their emphasis on 
maintaining health. As such, conservation values are also consistent with emotionally-
meaningful present-oriented goals (Carstensen et al, 1999). 
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Self-enhancement values, herein referred to as enhancement values, are related to 
the pursuit of status, control over others, success and admiration. These values are 
associated with higher positive affect among younger and working adults (Sagiv & 
Schwartz, 2000), but conceptually overlap with materialistic and extrinsic goals that have 
shown links to reduced well-being (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Kasser, 2004). In the context of 
retirement enhancement values create a framework for potential goal frustration and 
associated negative emotions among retirees because valued goals, such as the 
accumulation of wealth, recognition for accomplishments, and control over others may 
become more difficult to attain in a post-employment lifestyle. When combined with 
health or financial difficulties, enhancement values were hypothesized to have a 
particularly deleterious effect in retirement as valued goals become increasingly 
unattainable. Enhancement values may have less impact on affective well-being, 
however, under more stable life circumstances involving good health and high financial 
status, when basic conditions of life do not conflict with the pursuit of valued goals. 
Self-Transcendence values, herein referred to as transcendence values, are 
oriented toward ends larger than the individual, and involve concern for the welfare of 
others and of the natural world. Among younger and working adults, transcendence 
values are not associated with affective well-being (Sagiv & Schwartz, 2000) and are 
linked to guilt-proneness (Silfver, Helkama, Lonnqvist, & Verkasalo, 2008). For retired 
adults, however, these values are consistent with present-oriented and emotionally 
meaningful goals and may promote positive emotions given their pro-social and 
affiliation motives and their compatibility with Erikson's (1959) concept of generativity. 
Generativity involves a concern for future generations, represents a key developmental 
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challenge of middle adulthood, and is associated with a variety of measures of well-being 
among middle-aged adults (e.g., Ackerman, Zuroff, & Moskowitz, 2000; An & Cooney, 
2006; McAdams, de St. Aubin, & Logan, 1993). 
The current study 
In light of the gaps in our knowledge about the links between values and well-
being in retirement, the general goals of this study were 1) to investigate the direct 
associations between retirees' values and their reports of positive and negative affect, 
taking into account important demographic determinants of well-being (gender, finances, 
and health); 2) to test for interactions between financial/health status and values as a 
measure of values' potential protective and deleterious effects on affective well-being; 
and 3) to test the stability of these patterns longitudinally across three years. Four higher-
order value categories from the Schwartz (1992) value theory were selected, rather than 
all ten personal values, in order to include all content of the Schwartz value system while 
keeping the number of variables to a manageable size for the sake of statistical model 
building using structural equation modeling. Based on the literature reviewed above, 
considering the particular opportunities and constraints of retirement, and taking into 
account the potential impact of retirement on future time perspective, we proposed the 
following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Higher affective well-being will be associated with openness to 
change, transcendence, and conservation values, whereas lower affective well-being will 
be associated with enhancement values among retirees. 
Hypothesis 2: Openness to change and enhancement values will interact with 
financial and health status in predicting affective well-being. Those low in openness or 
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high in enhancement values and simultaneously low in financial or health status are likely 
to experience reduced affective well-being. 
In addition to testing these hypotheses, another aim was to explore the stability of 
the links between values and well-being and any interactions of values with context over 
time. Especially in the case of the retirement transition, adaptation to new financial and 
day-to-day realities occurs across several years. Do values, finances, and health status 
predict well-being in a static, trait-like pattern across time, or does the pattern evolve with 
the adjustments inherent in the early years of retirement? Further, do values continue to 
exert an effect on well-being across time, taking into account baseline measurements? 




Participants were part of a larger longitudinal study investigating adjustment to 
life in retirement. Information about the retirement study was distributed by mail to 
recently retired employees through retirees' associations as well as ads in both French 
and English local newspapers over a period of one year. Criteria for participation in the 
study included fluency in French or English, having worked full-time for a minimum of 
20 years, not currently being in paid employment for more than ten hours per week, and 
mobility permitting attendance of annual testing sessions at Concordia University. A total 
of 446 retirees participated. Of these, 13 (2.9%) were eliminated by the researchers 
because of difficulty understanding and/or following instructions or due to mistakes 
regarding date of retirement, leaving a sample size of 433 retired adults. For the purpose 
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of longitudinal analyses, the sample for this study was restricted to the participants who 
were retained across three annual assessments, for a final sample size of 371, and a 
retention rate of 85%. MANOVA analyses revealed no significant differences between 
those who dropped out of the study and those who were retained through to T3 on 
demographics (age, gender, finance, illnesses) and outcome variables (positive and 
negative affect). Of 62 participants who were not retained for the second and third 
assessments, 35 were not reachable or did not respond when contacted; 22 withdrew 
because they were too busy, were no longer interested, or had health problems; 4 were 
eliminated by the researchers because they had difficulty understanding and/or following 
instructions in the materials; and one participant was known to have died. 
Demographics. The demographic characteristics of the 371 retirees in this study 
were as follows: 47.4% male (n = 176) and 52.6% female (n = 195); age ranged from 44 
to 77 years, with a mean age of 59.05 years (SD = 5.0). Although 59 years appears to be a 
relatively young mean age for a sample of retirees, the age of this sample is characteristic 
of Canadian age of retirement at the beginning of the 21st century (Statistics Canada, 
2006) due in part to public sector early retirement incentives that began in the 1980s 
(Bowlby, 2007). Participants were generally healthy and well educated (M= 14.90 years 
of education, SD = 2.50), had worked full-time for an average of 34.02 years (SD = 6.62), 
and were recently retired, with an average duration of retirement of 1.9 years (SD = 1.81). 
Personal income in retirement, for the sub-sample that reported it (N= 280) ranged from 
0 to $250,000 with a median retirement income of $41,250. The majority of the sample 
was either married (52%) or had a common-law partner (11.1%); 19.1% were divorced; 
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13.5% were single; and 3.8% were widowed. In terms of language, 61% of participants 
completed the questionnaires in French and 39% in English. 
Materials 
All participants completed a consent form (see Appendix B), demographic 
questionnaire (see Appendix C), and a series of other self-report measures. Only the 
materials relevant to the current study are described here. All English measures were 
translated into French appropriate to the Quebec linguistic context. 
The Portrait Value Questionnaire IV (PVQ: Schwartz et al, 2001; see Appendix 
D). The PVQ includes verbal portraits of 40 different people, gender matched with the 
participant. Each portrait describes a person in terms of their goals and what is important 
to them. For example: "It is very important to him to help the people around him. He 
wants to care for their well-being" describes a person for whom benevolence values are 
important. Participants indicate how much the portrait is similar to them on a 6-point 
scale, labeled from "very much like me" to "not like me at all." Transcendence, 
enhancement, openness to change, and conservation values were measured by 10, 7, 10, 
and 13 items respectively, consistent with Caprara et al. (2003). Possible scores on the 
PVQ range from 1 to 6 for each value, where 1 represents a value of no importance to an 
individual, and 6 represents a value of high importance. Each individual's score for a 
value represents their average score across all of the items representing that value1. The 
1
 Ipsative scores are often used with the PVQ (Schwartz & Rubel, 2005). Ipsative scores 
are calculated by taking each individual's mean score across all 40 PVQ items and 
subtracting it from the individual's mean score for each value. The result is a deviation 
score representing the relative importance of each value in the system. In preliminary 
analyses, ipsative value scores showed almost no association with the outcome measures, 
whereas the raw mean scores showed robust associations. The raw mean scores were 
therefore used with the understanding that results should be interpreted in terms of the 
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Cronbach's a coefficients for the four higher-order value categories were as follows: 
transcendence (.81); enhancement (.82); openness to change (.79); and conservation 
(.81). Test-retest reliability of an earlier version of the PVQ has been reported to be 
moderate to high, ranging from .66 to .88 (Schwartz et al., 2001). The values as measured 
by the PVQ have shown predictable associations with a variety of attitudes and 
behaviours (Schwartz et al., 2001), as well as with a second method of measuring the 
same ten value constructs, the Schwartz Value Survey (Schwartz, 1992). 
Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS: Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988; 
see Appendix F). The PANAS is a 20-item self-report questionnaire consisting of a list of 
words that describe different feelings and emotions. Participants were asked to rate the 
extent that they felt a given feeling or emotion during the past few weeks on a 5-point 
scale that ranges from "very slightly or not at all" to "extremely." Ten items reflect 
positive affect (interested, excited, strong, enthusiastic, proud, alert, inspired, determined, 
attentive, active); ten other items reflect negative affect (distressed, upset, guilty, scared, 
hostile, irritable, ashamed, nervous, jittery, afraid). The Cronbach a coefficients were .90 
for positive affect and .88 for negative affect in the current study. The PANAS has shown 
adequate test-retest reliability and scale validity (Watson et al., 1988). Higher scores on 
the two affect subscales indicate higher levels of positive or negative emotions 
experienced in the past few weeks. 
Financial and health status. Financial situation was assessed by one item on the 
demographic questionnaire (see Appendix C): "Compared to other people of your age 
that you know, how would you rate your financial situation?" Participants responded on a 
general importance of each value for an individual, not its importance relative to all other 
values. 
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7-point scale that ranged from "a lot worse that most" to "a lot better than most". Higher 
scores represent better self-rated financial status relative to other people of a similar age. 
This subjective measure of finances has been associated with retirement satisfaction 
(Pushkar et al., in press) as well as with favorable self-perception of current functioning 
for older adults (Pushkar, Arbuckle, Rousseau, & Bourque, 2003). Test-re-test reliability 
in the current sample across one year was r = .68, p < .001. 
Health status was assessed by the total number of illnesses reported on a 
questionnaire (based on Wyler, Masuda, & Holmes, 1967: see Appendix G) that listed a 
wide variety of common health conditions. Higher scores represent a greater number of 
illnesses. In prior research with older adults this measure of health predicted non-verbal 
cognitive functioning and correlated negatively with neuroticism adjustment (Gold et al., 
1995). Test-re-test reliability in the current sample across one year was r = .69, p < .01. 
Procedure 
Individuals interested in participating in the advertised retirement study contacted 
the researchers by telephone or email. Those who met inclusion criteria were given the 
choice of participating in either French or English, and then scheduled to come for testing 
at Concordia University in groups of up to six people. Upon completion of a battery of 
self-report questionnaires and cognitive tests that took approximately three hours, 
participants received a cheque for $50. After completing the first year's (Tl) materials, 
participants were invited to return at approximately one-year intervals for the next two 




Several of the predictor variables (financial status; number of illnesses; 
transcendence values) and both outcome variables (positive affect and negative affect) 
failed to meet strict criteria for normality of distribution. For these variables, appropriate 
transformations were made to normalize the variables and models were re-tested with the 
transformed data. The results based on the transformed data mirrored those based on the 
raw data in both pattern of associations and variance accounted for. The results below 
therefore represent analyses conducted on raw data. Descriptive statistics and a 
correlation matrix for all study variables, using raw data, are reported in Table 1. 
Structural Equation Modeling 
Statistical analyses were performed using structural equation modeling (SEM) in 
M-Plus (Muthen & Muthen, 2006). SEM analyses allowed us to examine the data in two 
different ways. The first approach involved creating three separate SEM models in order 
to examine significant paths between predictors and outcomes at each of three annual 
assessments. This approach demonstrates whether the same pattern of associations 
emerges at each assessment. The second and more sophisticated approach involved 
creating one integrated longitudinal model incorporating all three assessments. This 
integrated model indicates which predictors have an increasing impact on affective 
outcomes above and beyond prior associations, essentially covarying out Tl associations 
at T2 and, and covarying out both Tl and T2 associations at T3. Significant paths at T2 in 
the integrated longitudinal model, then, indicate increased effects beyond Tl; significant 
paths at T3 indicate increased effects beyond Tl and T2. Non-significant paths at T2 and 
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T3, on the other hand, indicate the absence of increased association (i.e., the stability of 
associations) rather than no association at all. Taken together, these two approaches 
(separate and integrated models) provide a portrait of the stability of associations as well 
as an indication of the variables that have increasing effects on positive and negative 
emotions as time goes on. 
The dependent variables used were positive and negative affect and the predictors 
included gender, finances, illnesses, enhancement, transcendence, openness to change, 
conservation, the finance-by-enhancement interaction and the finance-by-openness to 
change interaction. 
The first step of the SEM analyses involved the creation of three separate models 
examining the pattern of associations at Tl, T2 and T3 for both affective outcomes. The 
results of these models are described next and are represented visually in Figure 1. Below 
we report the standardized coefficients for each path in each model but in order to 
simplify the visual presentation, the coefficients do not appear in Figure 1. 
We tested two alternate models on Tl data to ensure that the reported models 
represented the best fit to the data. The first of these tested the possibility that positive 
and negative affect, rather than emotional consequences of values, are emotional 
tendencies that lead to values. The second alternative model used a mediational approach 
to test whether the effects of the gender, health and finance on positive and negative 
affect occurred through values. Each of these alternative models was rejected separately 
on the basis that they had significant chi-square values of model fit (p < .01), low fit 
indices (CFI < .90) and high residuals (RMSEA > .06). Comparisons of each alternative 
model to the original revealed that they were of significantly worse fit to the data (Delta-
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Chi-Square (4) = 25.99,/? < .05 and Delta-Chi-Square (31) = 464.12,/? < .05). The fit 
indices of the alternate models were unacceptable regardless of any post-hoc attempts to 
change paths to improve model fit. The original model with values and demographic 
variables predicting affective outcomes was therefore retained for all subsequent 
analyses. 
Time 1. In terms of the demographic variables at Tl, female gender (coded as men 
= 1, women = 2) (|3 = .13,Z(37i) = 2.73,/? < .05), better finances (|3 = .17, Z(37i)= 3.81,/? < 
.05), and fewer illness (|3 = -.09, Z(-n\y i-taiied)= 1.87,/? < .05) were associated with higher 
positive affect. Consistent with the hypotheses for values, transcendence (|3 = .14, Z(37i) = 
2.70,p < .05), openness to change ((3 = .35, ZQT\) = 6.78,/? < .05), and conservation values 
((3 = .11, Z(37|)= 2.24,/? < .05) were all associated with higher positive affect. 
Enhancement values showed no association with positive affect ((3 = -.02, Z(37i)= -.30,/? > 
.05). Also as hypothesized, the finance-by-enhancement interaction ((3 - .10, z^7\)= 2.28, 
p < .05) and the finance-by-openness to change interaction ((3 = -.15, Z(-ii\)= -3.33,/? < 
.05) uniquely contributed to the variance in positive affect. These interactions are 
illustrated in Figures 2 and 3 respectively, with low and high categories of each variable 
representing - 1 SD and + 1 SD. 
Follow-up tests were conducted to analyze the significance of the slopes in each 
interaction. In the finance-by-enhancement interaction at Tl, positive affect did not vary 
with financial status for those low in enhancement (|3 = .14,/? > .05). However, for those 
high in enhancement, positive affect did vary according to financial status, such that 
those with lower financial status reported lower levels of positive affect ((3 = .22, p < 
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.05). In other words, enhancement values moderated the association between financial 
status and positive affect. 
In the finance-by-openness to change interaction at Tl, positive affect did not 
vary with financial status for those high in openness to change (|3 = .03,p > .05). 
However, for those low in openness to change, low financial status was associated with 
lower levels of positive affect (|3 = .28,/? < .05). In other words, openness to change 
values moderated the association between financial status and positive affect. 
In terms of negative affect at Tl, female gender ((3 = .10, Z(37i)= 2.00, p < .05) 
poorer finances (|3 = -.13, ZQJ\)= 2.69, p < .05), and a greater number of illnesses ((3 = 
.25, Z(37i)= 5.10, p < .05) significantly predicted negative affect scores. Consistent with 
hypotheses for values, higher enhancement values ((3 = .19, Z(37i) = 3.52,p< .05) and 
lower openness to change values ((3 = -.19, Z(37i) = 3.54,p < .05) were also associated 
with increased negative affect. 
The total set of predictor variables at Tl accounted for 29.50% of the variability 
in positive affect and 14.80% of the variability in negative affect. Fit indices suggested an 
excellent fit of the model to the data (x2(4) = 1.74,/? > .05, CFI = 1.0, RMSEA = .00). 
Time 2. The overall pattern of association between the demographic variables, 
values, interactions and well-being outcomes remained relatively stable from Tl to T2, 
although some associations that were present at Tl disappeared at T2 (Figure 1). Female 
gender continued to be associated with higher positive affect (|3 = .09, Z(m) = 1.96 , p < 
.05), but was no longer associated with negative affect (|3 = .06, ZQ7\)= \.26,p< .05). 
Finances continued to predict negative affect ((3 = -.10, 2(371,1-tailed)- -1.89,/? < .05), but 
no longer predicted positive affect ((3 = .06, 2(371)= 1.28,/? > .05). Number of illnesses 
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continued to predict both positive affect ((3 = -.16, ZQJ\)= -3.32,p < .05) and negative 
affect (|3 = .25, Z(37i)= 5.15 ,p< .05). Values continued to be associated in the 
hypothesized directions, with transcendence (|3 = .16, Z(37i> = 3.35,p < .05), openness to 
change (|3 = .29, Z(37i) = 5.20,/? < .05), and conservation values ((3 = .10, Z(37i; i-taiied) = 
1.82,/? < .05) all predicting positive affect, and with enhancement ((3 = .24, Z(37i)= 4.61,/? 
< .05) and openness to change values ((3 = -.15, Z(37i)= -2.75, p < .05) predicting negative 
affect. Neither of the interactions observed at Tl, however, were significant predictors at 
T2. The total set of predictor variables at T2 accounted for 21.3% of the variability in 
positive affect and 13.8% of the variability in negative affect. Fit indices suggested an 
excellent fit of the model to the data (x2(4) = 6.64, p > .05, CFI = .98, RMSEA = .04). 
Time 3. Again, the overall pattern of associations remained relatively stable from 
T2 to T3, although one significant association from T2 disappeared while others that had 
disappeared at T2 emerged again (Figure 1). Similar to T2, female gender predicted 
positive affect (|3 = .13, z^\)= 3.02,p < .05) but not negative affect ((3 = .04, ZQ-J\)= .77, 
p > .05); and number of illnesses predicted both positive affect (|3 = -.20, Z(37i)= -4.62, p 
< .05) and negative affect ((3 = .25, Z(37i) = 5.04,p < .05). Values showed the same pattern 
of associations, with transcendence (|3 = .17, Z(37i) = 3.19, p < .05), openness to change (P 
= .40, Z(37i)= 7.53,p < .05), and conservation values (P = .10, Z(37i)= 2.10,p < .05) all 
predicting positive affect, while enhancement ((3 = .18, Z(37i)= 3.25, p < .05) and 
openness to change values (|3 = -.14, ZQ7\)=-2.53 ,p< .05) predicted negative affect. 
Finances, which were predictive of both positive and negative affect at Tl but only 
negative affect at T2, were associated at T3 with only positive affect (|3 = . 11, Z(37i) = 
2.52, p < .05). Finally, although the interactions between values and finances from Tl 
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had not emerged at T2, the finance-by-enhancement interaction returned at T3 for 
positive affect (|3 = .12, Z(si\)= 2.47, p < .05. The total set of predictor variables at T3 
accounted for 33.5% of the variability in positive affect and 10.3% of the variability in 
negative affect. Fit indices suggested an excellent fit of the model to the data (x2(4) = 
5.50,/? > .05, CFI = .99, RMSEA = .03). 
Integrated longitudinal model. Following the three separate SEM models, a single 
longitudinal model was created to examine the associations at each time point while 
controlling for prior levels of each variable as well as prior associations among predictors 
and outcome variables. This strategy allowed for an examination of whether predictor 
and outcome variables were associated above and beyond associations observed in the 
previous year(s). Below we report the standardized coefficients for the integrated 
longitudinal model but in order to simplify the visual presentation, the coefficients do not 
appear in Figure 4. 
Every variable was predicted based on the data from the previous time point (e.g., 
T2 positive affect predicted by Tl positive affect). The effect of gender was modeled 
only at Tl. Finally, covariances between the predictors were also added to the model to 
account for shared method variance, though only in cases of theoretically sound 
associations within the same time points (e.g.: T2 enhancement with T2 transcendence). 
The integrated longitudinal model fit the data reasonably well (x2(352)= 826.65, p < .05, 
CFI = .90, RMSEA = .06). The Tl results were exactly the same as those reported for the 
Tl separate model as no prior levels are accounted for (see Figure 1). 
Integrated model at T2. At T2, two values and one contextual variable were 
associated with affective outcomes above and beyond Tl levels and associations, 
106 
indicating that their effects on well-being became stronger over time. In the integrated 
longitudinal model, T2 positive affect was significantly predicted by T2 transcendence 
values ((3 = .15, Z(37i> = 3.34,p < .05); T2 negative affect was predicted by T2 
enhancement values (|3 = .19, zp7i)= 3. 91,/? < .05); and number of illnesses predicted 
both positive affect (|3 = -.07, z(37i, i-tailed)= 1.72,/? < .05) and negative affect ((3 = .19, 
Z(37i)= 3.41,/? < .05). In other words, higher transcendence values and fewer illnesses 
continued to predict positive affect while higher enhancement values and more numerous 
illnesses continued to predict negative affect above and beyond the levels of variables 
and the pattern of associations at Tl. Taking into account all prior Tl levels and 
associations as well as these increased effects, 49% of variance in positive affect and 
24.8% of negative affect were accounted for at T2. 
Integrated model at T3. Finally, at T3 one value and one context variable 
contributed to affective outcomes above and beyond variable levels and associations at 
Tl and T2. First, positive affect at T3 was significantly predicted by higher openness to 
change values (|3 = .26, Z(37i)= 6.05, p < .05). Second, having more illnesses predicted 
lower positive affect ((3 = -.12, Z(37i)= 3.28,/? < .05) and higher negative affect (|3 = .13, 
Z(37i)= 2.87,/? < .05). In other words, openness to change continued to predict positive 
affect while number of illnesses continued to predict both positive and negative affect 
even after controlling for all variable levels and associations at T2 and Tl. All in all, 
56.9% of the variability in T3 positive affect and 34.90% of the variability in T3 negative 
affect was accounted for. It is worth noting that positive affect and negative affect were 
significantly negatively correlated at Tl (r = -.18, z = 3.51,/? < .05) and T2 (r = -.20, z = 
4.08, p < .05) but not at T3 (r = -.06, z = 1.05, p > .05). 
Discussion 
This study contributes to the literature on subjective well-being and retirement by 
being the first to examine the links between values as measured by the Portrait Value 
Questionnaire (Schwartz et al, 2001) and affective well-being (positive and negative 
affect) among retirees. We also considered the interaction of values with financial and 
health status as well as the stability of the links between values and well-being across 
three years of retirement. 
Direct effects and interactions 
We hypothesized that values would show direct links with the affective well-
being of retirees, even when important demographic predictors (gender, health, and 
financial status) were controlled for. Demographic variables played a significant role in 
affective outcomes, such that higher levels of both positive and negative affect were 
reported by women, and better financial and health status were significantly associated 
with higher levels of positive affect and lower levels of negative affect. These results, 
including the fact that women reported more of both positive and negative emotions 
compared to men, are consistent with previous findings (Diener et al., 1999). It is not 
clear whether this gender difference represents actual differences in the intensity of 
emotional life between men and women or differences in the style of self-report of 
emotional experience. In either case, these results support gender role stereotypes in 
which men tend to present themselves as experiencing a more restricted range of emotion 
than women (Diener et al., 1999). 
Regarding the emotional impact of financial status, our results offer further 
support for the importance of subjective perception of financial status for affective well-
108 
being. Although objective income tends to be related to well-being only at the lowest 
levels of revenue (e.g., Diener & Oishi, 2000; Diener & Seligman, 2004), subjective 
indicators of financial matters, such as the perception of adequacy of financial resources, 
are more robust and relevant predictors of well-being (Diener & Seligman, 2004; Sing-
Manoux, Adler, & Marmot, 2003). 
Regarding the emotional impact of illness, self-reported health has tended to be 
strongly correlated with subjective well-being (e.g., Diener et al, 1999; Piazza, Charles, 
& Almeida, 2007). Consistent with previous findings, our results indicate that having 
fewer illnesses is an important ingredient in affective well-being, contributing to both 
higher positive affect and lower negative affect among retirees. 
Beyond these contextual variables, the results also indicated that certain value 
orientations appear to be beneficial for retirees' affective well-being while others may be 
detrimental. Higher openness to change values enhanced positive emotions and protected 
against negative emotions among retirees in our sample, while higher transcendence and 
conservation values predicted more positive emotions. This pattern differs from previous 
findings with younger and working adults (Sagiv & Schwartz, 2000) for whom affective 
well-being was associated with lower conservation values, and for whom transcendence 
values were not linked with positive emotions. These differing links between values and 
affective well-being might be partially explained by Sagiv and Schwartz's use of ipsative 
value scoring indicating the relative importance of values compared to the use of raw 
value means indicating the absolute importance of values in the current study. The 
differential patterns in these two studies may also, however, support the idea that the 
emotional benefits of particular value orientations depend on position in the lifespan. An 
emphasis on conformity to social norms, upholding tradition and customs, and 
maintaining security of the individual person and of society (conservation values), while 
potentially detrimental for younger adults, appears beneficial for retired adults. Similarly, 
while focusing on ends larger than the individual and being concerned for the welfare of 
others and of the natural world (transcendence values) had no impact on emotions among 
younger adults (Sagiv & Schwartz, 2000), this value orientation has emotional benefits 
for retired adults, consistent with generativity theory (e.g., McAdams et al., 1993). The 
findings also support the emotional benefits of prioritizing of present-oriented and 
emotionally-meaningful goals in the context of limited future time as proposed by socio-
emotional selectivity theory (Carstensen et al., 1999). 
The pattern of links between values and well-being is also consistent with self-
determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 2000), which posits that higher well-being should be 
associated with motivational content that supports basic psychological needs for 
competence, relatedness, and autonomy. The pursuit of these basic needs is generally 
reflected in the values that were associated with enhanced well-being (openness to 
change, transcendence, and conservation). The only value to have negative effects on 
well-being, enhancement, has an emphasis on status, power, and seeking the admiration 
of others and is largely consistent with the extrinsic aspirations proposed by self-
determination theory to interfere with basic need satisfaction (Deci & Ryan, 2000). 
Our findings, in conjunction with a growing body of research on intrinsic and extrinsic 
goals (see review by Kasser, 2004), do seem to support the notion that prioritizing 
intrinsic value orientations (pursuing self-acceptance, affiliation with others, and 
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contribution to the community) has emotional benefits, whereas prioritizing extrinsic 
values (pursuing contingent approval or external signs of worth) has emotional costs. 
Finally, the pattern of links between values and affective outcomes can be seen as 
reflecting the importance of an outward focus (e.g., transcendence values) for older 
adults' experience of positive affect as well as the negative effects of inward focus (e.g., 
enhancement values) in terms of increased negative affect (Kunzmann, 2008). An 
outward orientation (i.e., successfully engaging in the environment) has been shown to 
primarily predict positive affect among older adults, whereas an inward orientation (i.e., 
constant self-evaluation) primarily predicts negative affect among older adults 
(Kunzmann, 2008). 
Beyond direct links with well-being, we also hypothesized that values would 
serve as either protective or risk factors in the context of lower health or financial status. 
Of note, there were no health-by-value interactions for either positive or negative affect, 
suggesting that values do not influence emotional well-being in the context of physical 
illness. In addition, no finance-by-value interactions emerged for negative affect, 
suggesting that in the context of financial difficulties, values do not protect individuals 
from negative emotions. 
Values, on the other hand, did moderate the association between financial status 
and positive affect. The finance-by-enhancement interaction indicated that those higher in 
enhancement values who were in a poor financial situation experienced fewer positive 
emotions compared to those with better finances. High enhancement values, then, not 
only predict negative emotions directly among retirees, but also contribute to reduced 
positive emotions for retirees when financial resources are low. We interpret the negative 
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effects of enhancement values on well-being not as an indication that these values are 
ethically wrong, but rather as representing the difficulty of expressing enhancement 
values in activities in the context of retirement. Given that being able to express 
important values in behavior is a key ingredient in subjective well-being (Oishi et al., 
1999), prioritizing enhancement in a post-employment stage of life may put retirees at 
risk for a reduced quality of emotional life. That is not to say that it is impossible to value 
enhancement and be happy. If enhancement-oriented retirees can find activities that 
support their drive for status and recognition, for example by getting involved in 
leadership of organizations, they are likely to be happier. The issue, however, is one of 
limited availability of such opportunities outside the hierarchies and rewards of the 
workplace. 
The other way that values interacted with finances was through openness to 
change. Those higher in openness to change values tended to experience the same 
frequency of positive emotions regardless of their financial status. In contrast, those 
lower in openness to change values and who were in a poor financial situation tended to 
experience reduced levels of positive emotions. High openness to change values, then, 
not only directly predicted more positive and fewer negative emotions among retirees, 
but also contributed to higher levels of positive emotion when financial resources were 
low. Again we do not interpret the positive effects of openness to change on well-being 
as an indication that these values are ethically superior. Rather, our results indicate the 
goodness of fit between retirement, with its lack of structural constraints and greater 
opportunities for self-determination, and the constellation of motivations represented by 
the openness to change orientation. 
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Patterns of association across time. 
The strength of the current study stems partly from the longitudinal design with 
measurements every year over three years but also from the statistical approach to data 
analysis. The longitudinal SEM model allows for the examination of associations 
between the variables while controlling for all of the links at previous time points. The 
primary advantage of this method of data analysis is the ability to examine change in 
patterns of association over time, rather than simply change in individual variables. This 
method provides an alternative to more traditional approaches to the analysis of change 
by creating a portrait of the evolving pattern of associations among a set of variables. 
The initial separate SEM analyses across the three waves of data (see Figure 1) 
suggested that the pattern of associations among health, finances, values, and emotional 
well-being was generally consistent across three years, albeit with some temporal 
variations. Given that the same participants were included at each time point, these 
inconsistencies do not reflect attrition in participants. It appears that a process of 
adaptation to the circumstances of retirement over time occurs, especially in the domain 
of finances. The role of finances in affective well-being changed slightly from year to 
year, showing associations with both positive and negative affect at Tl, then only one or 
the other in subsequent years (see Figure 1). This may reflect an evolving relationship 
with money (i.e., adaptation to generally reduced and fixed income) in a new stage of 
life. Similarly, the interactions of finances with values were inconsistent, perhaps also 
reflecting an evolving financial philosophy. Beyond these inconsistencies across three 
years, however, when all prior levels and associations among variables were taken into 
account in an integrated longitudinal model (see Figure 4), the effects of finances on 
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well-being did not change beyond Tl levels. This suggests that retirees in some way 
adjust to or cope with the effects of lower finances on well-being, as these effects do not 
increase over time. Finances are, therefore, a significant but constant predictor of well-
being in retirement. This is in contrast to health and values, which showed increasing 
effects across three years. Having fewer illnesses was a significant and increasingly 
important ingredient in well-being across three years, as were lower enhancement and 
higher transcendence values (at T2) and higher openness to change values (at T3). 
A speculative explanation for these increased effects is that values and health 
status manifest in patterns of activity and social engagement that may have accumulating 
benefits or deficits. For example, being concerned with helping others may result in 
reciprocated help that returns to the individual over time; placing high importance on 
status and wealth may lead to goal frustration, an effect that compounds over time; being 
creative and interested in seeking new experiences and pleasure may aid in establishing 
healthy activity patterns in retirement that promote positive experiences and prevent 
negative ones; and finally, having illnesses may result in activity restriction and social 
disengagement, the negative effects of which may multiply as years go by. In this way, 
the determinants of well-being described above may have evolving and cumulative 
effects as retiring adults adjust to the circumstances of retirement. 
The total pattern of results raises some questions about the independence of 
positive and negative affect scales of the PANAS. Prior research has demonstrated that 
positive and negative affect are relatively independent affective dimensions and are 
generally related to different predictors (Schimmack, 2008). Our results indicate, 
however, that several factors (gender, finances, illness, and openness to change values) 
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predict both positive and negative affect. What does this say about the independence of 
these affective constructs? While it is true that they share some predictors in this study, 
(particularly at Tl) there's more evidence to suggest that the two constructs could and 
should be seen as separate. First, although illness has typically been associated with both 
affective dimensions, strength of association is usually much stronger for negative affect 
(Schimmack, 2008), as is the case here. Like illness, openness to change values clearly 
show stronger links to one affective dimension than the other (in this case, to positive 
affect), also supporting the relative causal independence of the two affective dimensions. 
Only financial status and gender have approximately equal degree of association with 
both positive and negative affect. 
In addition, the models have been constructed with the affective variables as 
separate and this approach resulted in a good fit with the data. Although not strictly 
orthogonal (i.e., r = 0), positive and negative affect were only moderately correlated at Tl 
and T2 (r's < -.20), and not significantly at T3, representing at most 4% of shared 
variance. Weak to moderate negative association between the affective dimensions is also 
consistent with prior research (Schimmack, 2008). Finally, evidence that the constructs 
should be seen as independent is seen in the different amounts of variability that was 
explained in each at T3, with 57% accounted for in positive affect and only 35% in 
negative affect by the total set of predictors in the integrated longitudinal model (see 
Figure 4). 
What are the implications of our findings for those in or near retirement? Clearly, 
adequate finances and good health are an important foundation for emotional well-being 
in retirement. These are factors, however, that are difficult to modify for those already in 
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or approaching the retirement stage, as financial and health status in retirement depend to 
a large extent on patterns of living established over several decades prior to retirement. 
From a psychological perspective, the message for retirees is more interesting: personal 
values matter in terms of happiness, and may help to maintain well-being even in difficult 
situations involving less than satisfactory finances. Although value systems are thought to 
be relatively stable in the short term, major life transitions like retirement may be 
facilitated by an adjustment of values to match new opportunities and constraints. 
Eliciting and evaluating values as workers approach retirement and asking to what extent 
one's values will be consistent with the opportunities and resources available in 
retirement should be an important part of retirement planning from a psychological 
perspective. 
Limitations and future directions 
While this study is novel and timely in its relevance to our aging workforce, there 
are inevitable limitations in the methodology and sample that impact how the results of 
this study should be interpreted and to what extent they are generalizable. First, this data 
was collected between 2005 and 2007 just before the 2008 onset of a global economic 
crisis, and therefore does not represent the unstable financial climate that future retirees 
are facing. Second, despite the longitudinal design of this study, the results are 
nonetheless correlational in nature. It is plausible, therefore, that values do not play a 
causal role in well-being, as we have inferred, but are themselves the consequences of 
longstanding personality traits. To take this possibility into account, however, we tested 
alternative SEM models. In support of values as determinants of emotional outcomes, the 
model with values predicting affective outcomes was the best fit to the data. Third, there 
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was no comparison sample of non-retirees, so it is impossible to know whether the 
observed pattern of associations is unique to the context of retirement or more broadly 
applicable to older adults in general. Future retirement research would benefit from such 
comparison samples. Finally, participants in this study represent a sample of those 
interested and healthy enough to participate. While this sample does represent a wide 
range of occupations and income levels as well as both genders and two linguistic 
cultures, results are not necessarily generalizable to retired populations with more severe 
financial and health limitations. 
Our use of the PANAS as a measure of affective well-being also comes with 
certain limitations. Despite the fact that the PANAS is a widely used and 
psychometrically sound instrument for measuring positive and negative affect, it 
nonetheless has certain disadvantages such as (a) a focus on only high-activation or high-
arousal emotions; and (b) and the self-report nature of the scale (Pavot, 2008). Regarding 
the former, it is important to note that some low-arousal affective states (e.g., calm; 
worried), are not captured by the PANAS. Regarding the latter, self-reports of well-being 
come with the potential influence of contextual factors, biases, and response styles. Much 
research, however, has demonstrated that the influence of such confounding factors is 
limited and that self-report measures such as the PANAS are generally reliable and valid 
(Pavot, 2008). Finally, there is some debate as to the best way to conceptualize and 
measure affect as a component of subjective well-being. For example, there is evidence 
to suggest that it is the frequency rather than intensity of emotional experiences that 
determines happiness (Diener, Sandvik, & Pavot, 1991). The PANAS, with its 
instructions to rate the extent to which certain emotions were experienced, could be 
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interpreted as capturing either or both frequency and intensity. Due to this ambiguity we 
are unable to contribute to this debate. In addition, other researchers have found that it is 
more important to consider the ratio of positive affect to negative affect over time than 
absolute levels of either one (Larsen & Prizmic, 2008). Although this is not the approach 
that we have taken, this may be an important consideration and a useful alternative 
approach to analyzing PANAS data. 
Future research into well-being in retirement would benefit from examining new 
samples of retirees that are facing the evolving economic realities of a global financial 
crisis. Retirement, especially in the future, is likely to be qualitatively different than it has 
been in the past due to multiple social and economic factors, including the recent drastic 
downturn in the global economy coupled with the increasing proportion of the population 
that is retired to that which is working. 
Regarding the study of values in retirement, the mechanism through which values 
enhance or diminish affective well-being remains unknown. We found support for the 
self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 2000) in that specific intrinsically-oriented 
value content promotes well-being, whereas extrinsically-oriented values diminish well-
being. We were not able to assess, however, whether value-activity congruence (as in 
Oishi et al., 1999) was more important for happiness than value content. Further research 
will be necessary to delineate the specific pathways from values to emotions. 
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Table 1. Correlations and descriptive statistics for all variables. 
Time 1 
01. Gender 
02. Positive Affect 
03. Negative Affect 
04. Financial situation 
05. Number of Illnesses 
06. Enhancement 
07. Transcendence 






02. Positive Affect 
03. Negative Affect 
04. Financial situation 
05. Number of Illnesses 
06. Enhancement 
07. Transcendence 






02. Positive Affect 
03. Negative Affect 
04. Financial situation 
05. Number of Illnesses 
06. Enhancement 
07. Transcendence 








































































































































































































Means 1.53 37.45 16.23 4.90 4.39 2.99 4.69 4.27 3.87 
Standard Deviations .50 6.30 5.69 1.24 4.06 .91 .67 .75 .74 
*/?<.05 
Instructions for Mailing list 
Date of Contact: Write LAST date of contact, which is the date that you spoke with mom and 
agreed to the study 
Mailed: Leave blank. When I mail the package I will fill that spot in 
Address: Self-explanatory 
Boxes of Consent: Consent for me > SSHRC 4 testing (i.e. Questionnaires, visits) 
Consent for B4 > Medical consent (i.e. I'assurance maladies) 
Envelope: Small envelope > mom agrees to Consent form (s) (i.e. to visits only, no questions for 
her of child) 
Big envelope > mom agrees to questionnaires AND/OR Report cards 
*lf she agrees to everything then check BOTH boxes* 
Letter: Circle everything they agreed to 
1. MOM Questionnaire 
2. Child Questionnaire 
3. Teacher Pack 
4. Cortisol Grid 
5. Report Card 
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Mon nom est et j'appelle de Concordia pour l'etude « L'individu dans son milieu ». Ca 
va bien? 
Je vous appelle aujourd'hui pour vous poser quelques questions. Ca va prendre un dizaine de 
minutes. Est-ce que vous avez le temps de me parler maintenant? Parfait. 
Tout d'abord, j'aimerais vous poser quelques questions juste pour m'assurer de l'information 
qu'on a a votre sujet. (Remplir le formulaire) 
La deuxieme raison de mon appel c'est que ca serait maintenant le temps de revoir nom de 
1'enfant dans le cadre de notre etude. Alors pour ce volet-ci, Nadine irait faire 2 visites a l'ecole 
de nom de l'enfant qui durent entre lh30 puis 2hrs chacune. 
Ensuite, on vous enverrait 2 series de questionnaire que vous allez devoir remplir. La raerae 
chose pour nom de 1'enfant. Et puis finalement si vous acceptiez on enverrait un petit 
questionnaire a son professeur. 
Alors, vous allez etre recompense pour votre temps. 
Vous recevrez un cheque de 35,00$ pour chaque serie de questionnaires completee, pour un 
montant total de 70.00$. 
Votre garcon/fille lui/elle va recevoir un cheque de 15,00 $ pour chaque serie de questionnaires 
completee, puis pour chaque rencontre qui va se faire a l'ecole, alors pour lui/elle ca sera un 
montant total de 60,00$. 
Est-ce que vous avez des questions? Est-ce que vous accepteriez de participer a ce volet-ci ? 
Parfait alors je vais vous faire parvenir 2 formulaires de consentement. Un va etre pour la 
participation a l'etude et puis 1'autre est a pour but de nous dormer acces a des informations qui 
out ete collectes par le regime d'assurance maladie entre Janvier 2004 puis Decembre 2006. Ces 
informations-la vont nous servir a mesurer la frequence de certaines maladies, comme Tasthme 
et les problemes pulmonaires, puis on va essayer de les associer a differents facteurs. comme le 
stress par exemple. 
Aussi, si c'est possible d'avoir les bulletins check list of R.C needed de nom de l'enfant. 
Je veux tout de suite vous assurer que les informations qui vont nous etre transmis sont 
totalement confidentielles. A aucun moment votre nom ou celui d'un des membres de votre 
families est associes avec cette information. On fonctionne avec des numeros. 
Alors je vais vous faire parvenir les formulaires avec une enveloppe-retour que je vais vous 
demander de remplir et de me retourner par la poste le plus tot possible. Puis une fois que je les 
aurai recu je vais entrer en contact avec le directeur ou la directrice de nom de l'enfant pour 
ceduler les rencontre avec Nadine, puis une fois que ca sera fait je vais vous envoyer une lettre 
de confirmation pour vous dire quand vont etre les RDV. *** ask for address*** 
(KSAD) Aussi, Nadine va vous contacter juste avant les rencontres pour vous poser quelques 
questions au telephone. 
Ca vous va? 
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Low Financial status High Financial status 
• Low Self-Enhancement • High Self-Enhancement 
Fig. 2 Interaction of financial status with enhancement values for positive affect at Tl. 
Slope for high self-enhancement: (3 = .32,/? < .01; slope for low self-enhancement: (3 = 


























Low Financial Status 
- • Low Openness to Change 
High Financial Status 
• High Openness to Change 
Fig. 3 Interaction of financial status with openness to change values for positive affect at 
Tl. Slope for low openness to change: |3 = .29, p < .01; slope for high openness to 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































Connecting Text: From Study 2 to Study 3 
The second study of this dissertation investigated the link between values, 
financial status, health status, and affective well-being among retirees. Although there 
was a longitudinal component to the data analysis, this involved examining change in the 
pattern of associations among a set of variables over time, as opposed to change in 
specific values across retirement. The third study in this dissertation addresses the 
question of whether and how values might change or be adapted to meet the new 
situational opportunities and constraints of retirement. In addition to the question of 
longitudinal change as measured by three annual administrations of the PVQ, the third 
study addresses subjective self-perceptions of change in values. By giving participants 
the opportunity to answer direct questions about how they saw their values as changing 
(upon their third annual testing session), we were able to assess subjective value change 
as potentially distinct from "objective" longitudinal measures of change. Given the 
potential discrepancy between perceived and actual change, hypotheses were developed 
to reflect the potentially adaptive nature of perceived improvement in the self over time 
(self-enhancing memory bias) in terms of well-being outcomes. The third and final study 
of this dissertation is presented next. 
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Study 3 
Longitudinal and perceived change in values in retirement: Causes and consequences of 
positive illusions of personal growth 
Andrew Burr, Jonathan B. Santo, and Dolores Pushkar 
Centre for Research in Human Development, Psychology Department, 
Concordia University 
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Andrew Burr, Psychology 
Department, Centre for Research in Human Development, Concordia University, 7141 
Sherbrooke St. West, PY-170, Montreal, QC, H4B 1R6, Canada. Tel: (514) 848-2424, 
ext. 2258; Fax: (514) 848-2815; E-mail: a_burr@live.concordia.ca 
Longitudinal and perceived change in values in retirement: Causes and 
consequences of positive illusions of growth 
There is abundant evidence for self-enhancing biases, misconceptions, and 
illusions at play when people evaluate themselves (Dunning, 2006; Dunning, Heath, & 
Suls, 2004). Such biases and illusions are present not only in flawed assessments of 
ability (Dunning, et al., 2004) but also in the way that people think of themselves as 
having changed over time (e.g., Ross & Buehler, 1994; Ross & Conway, 1986). There is 
debate, however, as to the consequences of unrealistically positive self-evaluations (i.e., 
positive illusions: Taylor & Brown, 1988). Some studies have found that positive 
illusions are associated with better psychological adjustment (Taylor & Brown, 1988, 
1994; Taylor, Lerner, Sherman, Sage, & McDowell, 2003), with health benefits in the 
context of disease (Taylor, Kemeney, Reed, Bower, & Gruenewald, 2000), and with 
better physical and mental health among older adults (Gana, Alaphilippe, & Bailly, 
2004). Other researchers, however, have debated these findings (e.g., Block & Colvin, 
1994; Colvin & Block, 1994) and several studies have demonstrated that although 
positive illusions about the self may be beneficial in the short term (e.g., in terms of self-
esteem and positive emotions), they can be maladaptive over the long term (e.g., in terms 
of negative interpersonal relations and declines in self-esteem: Paulhus, 1998; Robins & 
Beer, 2001). 
The adaptive benefits of positive illusions reported in the literature appear to be 
tied to the optimistic perception of self as better than others in general on a given 
dimension, whereas the maladaptive qualities of positive illusions are tied to positive 
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self-assessment that is discrepant with assessment by knowledgeable others such as peers 
(Paulhus, 1998). Neither of these definitions, however, reflect positive illusions in the 
temporal sense of perceiving positive change in self over time. This study differs from 
previous investigations into the consequences of positive illusions, therefore, by 
investigating positive illusions of personal growth over time. 
Positive illusions of personal growth represent a type of memory bias, originally 
proposed by temporal comparison theory (Albert, 1977), in which the current self is 
evaluated favorably relative to the past self (Ross & Wilson, 2003; Wilson & Ross, 
2001). There is some evidence for the illusory nature of such temporal self-comparisons 
(i.e., the tendency to see improvement in the self over time where none actually occurred: 
e.g., Woodruff & Birren, 1972). This bias toward perceiving an improving self may exist 
for several reasons: (1) People have a basic desire to perceive progressive improvement 
in themselves (Albert, 1977); (2) perception of change is derived at least in part from 
general beliefs and stereotypes about how people change with age and under what 
circumstances (McFarland, Ross, & Giltrow, 1992; Heckhausen, Dixon, & Baltes, 1989); 
and (3) perceptions of personal improvement can arise as a means of coping with 
negative and stressful experiences such as illness (McFarland & Alvaro, 2000; Ransom, 
Sheldon, & Jacobsen, 2008). 
There is evidence to suggest that the perception of personal growth, especially 
over the course of major transitions or after traumatic events, has implications for 
psychological well-being. Perceptions of growth through adversity have been linked to 
higher levels of a variety of measures of well-being (e.g., Bauer & McAdams, 2004; 
Calhoun & Tedeschi, 2006; McAdams, Reynolds, Lewis, Patten and Bowman, 2001; 
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Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1996). It has also been argued that perceptions of post-traumatic 
growth reflect "motivated illusions" that help people to cope with traumatic experiences 
(McFarland & Alvaro, 2000, p. 330). Individuals accomplish this by derogating a past 
self relative to a present self, essentially creating room for improvement by 
reconstructing the past (McFarland & Alvaro, 2000). Perceptions of personal growth 
have also been conceptualized as a meaning making process stemming from trauma or 
major life disruptions. Such disruptions result first in a shattering of assumptions about 
the world, followed by a search for meaning (e.g., Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Calhoun & 
Tedeschi, 2006) 
In addition to temporal comparison theory, another theoretical framework relevant 
to how people see themselves as changing over time is a theory of optimal life 
management involving the processes of selection, optimization, and compensation (SOC; 
Baltes & Baltes, 1990). The SOC model of adaptive resource allocation has typically 
been applied to the experience of aging, and for good reason. As adults grow older, they 
face inevitable declines in cognitive and physical domains, and yet research has 
consistently shown that older adulthood is associated with maintained or even improved 
psychological well-being, at least until very old age and frailty (Carstensen, Mikels, & 
Mather, 2006). The presence of simultaneous losses and gains in older adulthood has 
been referred to as "the paradox of aging" (Carstensen et al., 2006, p. 346), and SOC 
provides a conceptual framework in which to understand this paradox. 
Adaptive development in the SOC framework is defined as, "a tendency toward 
simultaneous minimization of losses that impair effective functioning and maximization 
of gains that promote growth and maintenance" (Riedeger, Li, & Lindenberger, 2006, p. 
293). The three general mechanisms through which this is achieved are the following: 1) 
selection, or the narrowing of goals and domains to which resources are allocated from 
the pool of available alternatives; 2) optimization, or attempts made to optimize available 
opportunities in order to improve functioning; and 3) compensation, or efforts made to 
compensate for restraints or losses (Reideger et al., 2006). 
In the context of older adulthood, then, there may be beneficial ways in which to 
perceive the self as changing over time that would be representative of selection and 
optimization processes in particular. For example, perceiving increased specialization in 
areas that reflect core values (e.g., being helpful to others or being creative) may be a 
way of selecting and optimizing personal characteristics for emphasis and development, 
and as such a means of enhancing important of aspects of the self. In other words, 
individuals who perceive increases in desirable characteristics over time (through 
temporal comparisons) may be engaging in an adaptive means of coping with the many 
challenges and transitions of aging. Perceptions of positive change in the self, therefore, 
may represent a manifestation of SOC processes. 
Given that self-improvement through temporal comparison is proposed to occur 
especially in major life transitions that involve shifts in roles, relationships, and 
occupation (Albert, 1977), retirement should be particularly fertile ground for the 
emergence of perceptions of positive change in the self. Retirement also represents a 
stage of life when actual adjustments in goal structures may occur, given the major life 
changes that accompany retirement. One way of representing such goal structures that are 
central to the self is in the construct of personal values, defined as desirable, trans-
situational goals that serve as guiding principles in peoples' lives (Schwartz, 1992). How 
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values change over time in retirement, how people perceive them as having changed, and 
the consequences of both self-perceived and longitudinally-assessed value change are 
issues that we address in this study. 
Schwartz's (1992, 1994) value theory proposes the existence of four higher order 
value categories that represent ten universal values: self-transcendence (benevolence, 
universalism); self-enhancement (achievement, power); openness to change (self-
direction, stimulation, hedonism); and conservation (tradition, conformity, and security). 
Self-enhancement values emphasize pursuit of status, success, and dominance over 
others, whereas self-transcendence values emphasize concern for the welfare of others 
and for the natural world. Conservation values emphasize self-restriction and the 
preservation of the status quo through conformity to social norms, respect for traditions, 
and security of society, relationships, and the self. In contrast, openness to change values 
represent an emphasis on stimulation, novelty, and independent thought and behavior. 
Life stage is proposed to influence values due to the particular set of opportunities 
and constraints that occur at different points in the lifespan. In regards to retirement in 
particular, Schwartz (2005) hypothesizes that with the end of paid employment comes a 
decrease in opportunities to express achievement and power (self-enhancement) and 
stimulation and hedonism (openness to change) values, and possibly an increase in the 
importance of security and tradition (conservation) values. From the perspective of 
adapting to opportunities for value expression, increases in conservation and decreases in 
self-enhancement and openness to change values could be expected in retirement. 
From the perspective of continuity theory (Atchley, 1999), however, the 
maintenance of values across transitions can be conceptualized as potentially contributing 
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to a sense of internal continuity and therefore to a stable sense of self. According to 
continuity theory, values that are most likely to remain stable across time are those that 
are most central to a sense of identity and self. Values that are more tied to particular 
contexts, such as work, may be more likely to shift with the end of full-time work. If 
particular values become less achievable due to changes in life circumstances, then some 
degree of value adjustment may be adaptive in times of transition, but continuity in 
central values may also be seen as adaptive. Putting together continuity theory with the 
possibility of adaptive value change, we can hypothesize that (a) most of the values from 
the Schwartz (1992) value theory are likely to show continuity across the early years of 
the retirement transition, as a function of the preservation of well-established identity 
across changing life circumstances (e.g., self-transcendence, openness to change, 
conservation); but that (b) the values related to the importance of extrinsic rewards 
associated with working (i.e., achievement and power: self-enhancement) are the most 
likely to be the focus of change, particularly in the direction of declining importance, as 
these general goals may become less attainable and less relevant in a post-employment 
context. 
We developed the following hypotheses regarding perceived and longitudinal 
value change in retirement: Hypothesis 1) Among recent retirees, objective longitudinal 
assessments of values (repeated administrations of a values questionnaire) are likely to 
reflect trait-like motivational patterns, and therefore show little to no change across three 
years, with the exception of work-related values (enhancement values) which are more 
likely to show decreases in importance. Hypothesis 2) Subjective reports of value change, 
assessed either through direct questions about change or by comparing current and 
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retrospective reports of values, are likely to reflect interpretations of growth and 
improvement in the self over time. The pattern of perceived value change was therefore 
predicted to differ from that of objective change, such that increases would be perceived 
in desirable values (openness to change and transcendence), and decreases in work-
related, extrinsically oriented values (enhancement) Hypothesis 3): If perceived value 
change represents an adaptive positive illusion and meaning-making process that is 
distinct from longitudinal change, perceived value change should be associated with well-
being (higher positive affect, lower negative affect, higher meaning in life) above and 
beyond any contribution of longitudinal value change to well-being. Hypothesis 4): If 
perceived change also represents an adjustment to loss and difficult circumstances, then 
self-perceived changes in desirable values should be predicted by markers of prior 
personal struggle (illness, negative affect and stress ratings). Hypothesis 5): Perceptions 
of change in desirable values represent adaptive SOC processes and as such overall SOC 
scores should predict self-perceived changes in desirable values. 
Method 
Participants 
The participants were retirees in a larger longitudinal study investigating 
adjustment to life in retirement. Information about the retirement study was distributed by 
mail to recently retired employees through retirees' associations as well as ads in both 
French and English newspapers in the Montreal area. Criteria for participation in the 
study included fluency in French or English, having worked full-time for a minimum of 
20 years, not currently being in paid employment for more than 10 hours per week, and 
mobility permitting attendance of three annual testing sessions at Concordia University 
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(Tl, T2, and T3). A total of 446 retirees entered the study. Of these, 13 (2.9%) were 
eliminated by the researchers because of difficulty understanding and/or following 
instructions or due to mistakes regarding date of retirement, leaving a Tl sample size of 
433 retired adults. Eighty-five percent of the Tl sample was retained for both the second 
and third wave of annual assessments, for a final T3 sample size of 371. Of the 15% (n = 
62) participants who were not retained for the second and third assessments, 35 were not 
reachable or did not respond when contacted; 22 withdrew because they were too busy, 
were no longer interested, or had health problems; four were eliminated by the 
researchers because they had difficulty understanding and/or following instructions in the 
materials; and one participant was known to have died. 
Demographics. The demographic characteristics of the 371 retirees in this study 
were as follows: 47.4% male (n = 176) and 52.6% female (n = 195);-mean age of 59.05 
years (SD = 5.0). Participants were generally healthy and well educated (M = 14.90 years 
of education, SD = 2.50), had worked full-time for an average of 34.02 years (SD = 6.62), 
and were recently retired, with an average duration of retirement of 1.9 years (SD = 1.81). 
The majority of the sample was either married (52%) or had a common-law partner 
(11.1%); the remaining participants were either divorced (19.1%); single (13.5%); or 
widowed (3.8%). In terms of language, 61% of participants completed the questionnaires 
in French and 39% in English. 
Materials 
All participants completed a consent form (see Appendix B), demographic 
questionnaire (see Appendix C), and a series of other self-report measures. Only the 
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materials relevant to the current study are described here. All English measures were 
translated into French appropriate to the Quebec linguistic context. 
The Portrait Value Questionnaire IV (PVQ; Schwartz et al, 2001; see Appendix 
D). The PVQ was administered at Tl, T2, and T3 and these served as a measure of 
longitudinal change in personal values across three years of retirement. In addition, at Tl 
a retrospective version of the PVQ (see Appendix H) asked participants to respond to the 
same set of items as they remembered themselves ten years before they retired. The PVQ 
includes verbal portraits of 40 different people, gender matched with the participant, 
which assess ten values. Each portrait describes a person in terms of their goals and what 
is important to them. For example: "It is very important to him to help the people around 
him. He wants to care for their well-being" describes a person for whom benevolence 
values are important. Participants indicate how much the portrait is similar to them on a 
6-point scale, labeled from "very much like me" to "not like me at all." The PVQ does 
not ask participants directly about their values, but rather infers values from similarity 
ratings. The ten values were combined into four higher-order value categories (Schwartz 
et al., 2001; Caprara, Caprara, & Steca, 2003) that have been established in prior 
research: self-transcendence (comprised of benevolence and universalism values); self-
enhancement (comprised of power and achievement values); openness to change 
(comprised of self-direction, stimulation, and hedonism values); and conservation 
(comprised of security, conformity, and tradition values). These four values were 
measured by 10, 7, 10, and 13 items respectively. Possible scores on the PVQ range from 
1 to 6 for each value, where 1 represents a value of no importance to an individual, and 6 
represents a value of high importance. Each individual's score for a value represents their 
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average score across all of the items representing that value. The Cronbach a coefficients 
for the four higher-order value categories were as follows: transcendence (.81); 
enhancement (.82); openness to change (.79); and conservation (.81). Test-retest 
reliability of an earlier version of the PVQ has been reported to be moderate to high, 
ranging from .66 to .88 (Schwartz et al., 2001). The values as measured by the PVQ have 
shown predictable associations with a variety of attitudes and behaviors (Schwartz et al., 
2001), as well as with a second method of measuring the same ten value constructs, the 
Schwartz Value Survey (Schwartz, 1992). 
Value Change Questionnaire (VCQ; see Appendix I). The VCQ, created for this 
study, was administered at T3 only, and assessed perceived change in values. On the 
VCQ participants read a definition of each of the ten values and respond to a direct 
question about how they think their values have changed since they first entered the 
study. The period of perceived change assessed by the VCQ therefore corresponded to 
the time frame of the PVQ assessments at Tl, T2, and T3. Participants first read a list of 
the motivational aspects of a value (e.g., "Self-Direction: creativity, curiosity, 
independence, choosing one's own goals") and then rate the extent to which each value 
has changed in importance since they entered the study at Tl. Response options were on 
a seven-point scale ranging from "A great deal less important" to "no change" to "a great 
deal more important". The response "no change" was represented by zero, an increasing 
importance of values by positive numbers (+1, +2, +3), and a decreasing importance of 
values by negative numbers (-1, -2, -3). Perceived change scores for each of the four 
higher order value categories (transcendence, enhancement, openness to change, 
conservation) were calculated by computing the mean change score for each of the values 
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representing it. The Cronbach's a coefficients for perceived changes in each of the four 
value categories were as follows: transcendence (.63); enhancement (.80); openness to 
change (.73); and conservation (.75). 
Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988; 
see Appendix F). The PANAS, administered at Tl, T2, and T3, is a 20-item self-report 
questionnaire consisting of a list of words that describe different feelings and emotions. 
Participants were asked to rate the extent that they felt a given feeling or emotion during 
the past few weeks on a 5-point scale that ranges from "very slightly or not at all" to 
"extremely." Ten items reflect positive affect (interested, excited, strong, enthusiastic, 
proud, alert, inspired, determined, attentive, active); ten other items reflect negative affect 
(distressed, upset, guilty, scared, hostile, irritable, ashamed, nervous, jittery, afraid). The 
Cronbach's a coefficients were .90 for positive affect and .88 for negative affect in the 
current study. The PANAS has shown adequate test-retest reliability and scale validity 
(Watson et al., 1988). Higher scores on the two affect subscales indicate higher levels of 
positive or negative emotions experienced in the past few weeks. 
Orientations to Happiness Measure (OHM; Peterson, Park, & Seligman, 2005; 
see Appendix J). The six-item meaning subscale from the OHM scale was the measure of 
meaning in life, administered at T3 only. Participants read statements on the meaning 
subscale such as "What I do matters to society"; "My life serves a higher purpose"; and 
"I have spent a lot of time thinking about what life means and how I fit into its big 
picture. They then rate the extent to which each statement applies to them on a 5-point 
likert scale, ranging from "very much unlike me" to "very much like me." Means 
represent the average score across the six meaning items. Subscale means range from 1 to 
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5, where 5 represents higher levels of meaningful living. Internal reliability coefficients 
have been reported to be adequate (Peterson et al., 2005) and in this sample the Cronbach 
alpha coefficient for the meaning subscale was .83. 
Financial and health status. Financial situation was assessed by one item at Tl, 
T2, and T3 (see Appendix C): "Compared to other people of your age that you know, 
how would you rate your financial situation?" Participants responded on a 7-point scale 
that ranged from "a lot worse that most" to "a lot better than most". Higher scores 
represent better self-rated financial status relative to other people of a similar age. Health 
status was assessed at Tl by the total number of illnesses experienced over the past five 
years reported on a questionnaire (based on Wyler, Masuda, & Holmes, 1967: see 
Appendix G) that listed a wide variety of common health conditions. At T2 and T3, the 
number of illnesses reported related only to those experienced in the previous year. 
Higher scores represent a greater number of illnesses. 
Stressful life events (SLE; Sarason, Johnson, & Siegel, 1982; see Appendix K). 
The SLE, administered at T2, asks participants to indicate what types of stressors they 
have experienced in the past five years. Participants mark stressors from a list or add 
their own stressors as necessary, and rate the degree of stress each event caused them. 
The total SLE score represents the sum of the stressfulness ratings (not the number of 
stressful events listed), and is therefore a measure of the subjective impact of stressful life 
events. A higher score represents a higher degree of stress experienced over 
approximately the five years leading up to the T2 assessment. 
Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR; Paulhus, 1984, 1991; see 
Appendix L). The BIDR is a 40-item questionnaire that was administered at T3. It 
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comprises two subscales: (a) the Self-Deception subscale (20 items) is designed to 
measure overly positive self-evaluations of being capable and well-adjusted (e.g., "I don't 
care to know what other people think of me"); and (b) the Impression Management 
subscale (20 items) is designed to tap a tendency to enhance one's public impression by 
presenting a socially conventional and dependable persona (e.g., "I have never dropped 
litter on the street"). Participants respond to what extent they agree with each statement 
on a 7-point likert scale ranging from "not true" to "somewhat true" to "very true." 
According to the BIDR scoring protocol (Paulhus, 1991), once reverse scored items are 
recoded, only extreme scores (6 or 7) are counted and these are summed for each 
subscale so that the total score for each subscale can range from 0 to 20. This scoring 
method ensures that high scores represent only exaggeratedly desirable responses 
(Paulhus, 1991). The BIDR has shown adequate levels of reliability (internal consistency 
and test-retest) and validity (convergent and discriminant) (see Paulhus, 1991 for a 
review). 
Selection, Optimization, and Compensation (SOC; Baltes, Baltes, Freund, & 
Lang, 1999; see Appendix M). This 12-item version of the original 48-item SOC 
questionnaire was administered at T3 only. It assesses four aspects of adaptive life 
management strategies (elective selection, loss-based selection, optimization, and 
compensation) with three items for each, presented in random order. Participants are 
presented with a forced-choice format. Examples of two different ways that people might 
behave in terms of approaching life goals are listed (a distractor, representing a non-SOC 
related strategy, and a target, describing a behavior that reflects SOC strategies). 
Participants are asked to choose the description to which they are most similar. For 
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example, an optimization item presents the following options: "I prefer to wait for a 
while and see if things will work out by themselves" (distractor) and " I make every 
effort to achieve a given goal" (target). Target responses are coded " 1 " while distractor 
responses are coded "0". The total SOC score is the sum of all target responses across the 
12 items. A higher score is interpreted as an indicator of the general processes of 
selection, optimization, and compensation. Each subscale of the 12-item short version has 
shown high correlations with those of the longer version, ranging from .79 to .87 (Baltes 
et al., 1999), and the full version has shown adequate reliability and re-test stability 
(Freund & Baltes, 2002). Internal reliability of the 12-item SOC questionnaire in this 
sample (Cronbach's alpha = .48), however, was below typical standards for adequate 
reliability (.70 or higher). 
Procedure 
Individuals interested in participating in the advertised retirement study contacted 
the researchers by telephone or email. Those who met inclusion criteria were given the 
choice of participating in either French or English, and then scheduled to come for testing 
at Concordia University in groups of up to 6 people. Upon completion of a battery of 
self-report questionnaires and cognitive tests that took approximately three hours, 
participants received a cheque for $50. After completing the first year's (Tl) materials, 
participants were invited to return at approximately one-year intervals for the next two 
years (T2 and T3). 
Results 
Longitudinal and Perceived Value Change 
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Longitudinal change in PVQ scores was assessed by conducting four separate 
one-way ANOVA to test the effect of time on each of the values across four PVQ 
assessments: retrospective pre-retirement, Tl, T2, and T3. ANOVA results (details 
presented in Table 1) indicated that there was a significant main effect of time for all four 
values. Post hoc comparisons with Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons 
indicated that three of four values showed significant differences between retrospective 
and Tl versions of the PVQ, suggesting retirees perceived changes in their values from 
work to retirement. In particular, retirees reported being higher at Tl in openness to 
change and transcendence compared to ten years earlier, and lower in enhancement 
values, but no different in terms of conservation values. In terms of longitudinal change 
(PVQ scores for Tl, T2, and T3), contrary to predictions there were small but significant 
differences across time points in raw scores such that for openness to change, 
conservation, and transcendence, mean scores decreased from Tl to T3 as well as from 
T2 to T3, but no change occurred from Tl to T2. 
To assess perceived value change as assessed at T3 by the VCQ, one-sample t-
tests of the mean for perceived change in each of four value categories were conducted. 
Responses on the VCQ were coded such that perceived value increases were scored as 
positive values, decreases as negative values, and no change as zero. These tests indicated 
that mean perceived change scores in all four of the value categories were significantly 
different than zero, suggesting that on average retirees perceived their values as changing. 
Consistent with hypothesis two, perceived change differed from longitudinally assessed 
change such that on average since entering the study, retirees perceived increases in 
openness to change values (M= .65, SD = .80; t(370) = \5.67,p< .001) and 
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transcendence values (M= .78, SD = .77; 7(370) = 19.42,/? < .001), whereas longitudinal 
analyses (above) indicated small decreases in these values. Retirees also perceived 
decreases in enhancement values (M= -.43., SD = .97.; 7(370) = -8.61,/? < .001), whereas 
longitudinal analyses (above) indicated no change in enhancement values from Tl to T3. 
In addition, retirees on average perceived increases in their conservation values (M= .49, 
SD = .73; 7(370) = 13.00,/? < .001), whereas longitudinal analyses (above) indicated 
decreases in conservation values. In all cases, therefore, perceived value changes did not 
correspond to the longitudinal pattern of PVQ responses from Tl to T3. In addition, the 
pattern of perceived changes from Tl to T3 closely resembled the pattern of differences 
reported between the retrospective pre-retirement PVQ and Tl PVQ. In both cases 
retirees perceived increases over time in openness to change and transcendence values, 
and decreases in enhancement values. 
In order to statistically compare individuals' longitudinally measured change in 
PVQ scores with their perceived change across the same period, we first calculated 
difference scores (herein referred to as longitudinal change scores) for each value. In 
order to be consistent with the coding of perceived change scores on the VCQ, 
longitudinal change scores were calculated (using raw scores) as T3 minus Tl so that a 
positive number indicated increased importance of the value over time, a negative 
number indicated decreased importance of the value over time, and zero indicated no 
change. No significant correlations emerged between longitudinal change and perceived 
change scores. Using Bonferonni correction for multiple comparisons (p < .01), there 
were no significant associations between perceived and longitudinal change scores for 
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enhancement (r = .08, ns), transcendence (r = .02, ns), conservation (r = .02, ns), or 
openness to change values (r = .10, ns). 
Value Change Predicting Weil-Being. 
Next, hierarchical multiple regressions were conducted to assess the extent to 
which longitudinal change and self-perceived change were associated with three 
components of well-being (positive affect, negative affect, and meaning in life). 
Important demographic control variables (gender, health, and financial status) were 
entered in the first step of each regression, follow by longitudinal change scores for each 
of the four values in the second step, followed by perceived change scores for each of the 
four values in the final step. Results, outlined below, indicate that perceived value change 
was associated with all three of these T3 outcome measures beyond the effects of 
demographic control variables and longitudinal change. In addition, perceived and 
longitudinal value changes scores were associated with changes in positive affect across 
three years (see below). All analyses were performed with raw variables first, and then 
compared to analyses performed with variables transformed to compensate for skewed 
distributions. Results with skewness transformations mirrored the results with raw data in 
terms of both the pattern of predictors and the amount of variance accounted for. Only the 
results with the raw data are therefore presented here. 
For T3 positive affect (PA), demographic variables accounted for 9.0% percent of 
the variance, with female gender, better financial situation at T3, and fewer number of 
illnesses at T3 all predicting higher levels of positive emotions. At the second step, 
longitudinal change in openness to change values accounted for an additional 3.7% of 
variance in PA, with increases in this value over time predicting higher levels of PA at 
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T3. At the third step, perceived change in openness to change values accounted for an 
additional 6.4% of variance in PA, with perceived increases in this value also predicting 
higher levels of PA. The total variance explained by all variables in this model predicting 
PA was 19.1%. The details of this regression are presented in Table 2. 
For the regression predicting T3 negative affect (NA), only one demographic 
variable (number of illnesses) accounted for 7.7% of the variance, with more illnesses 
associated with higher levels of negative emotions. At the second step, longitudinal value 
change showed no association with NA. At the third step, perceived change in 
conservation values accounted for an additional 3.3% of the variance in NA, but in a 
direction contrary to hypotheses. Perceived increases in conservation values predicted 
higher rather than lower levels of NA, suggesting this type of perceived change may be 
less of a growth-oriented process and more of a reaction to ongoing life struggles, likely 
related to health given the focus on preserving health in the security component of 
conservation values. The total variance explained by all variables in this model predicting 
NA was 11.5 %. The details of this regression are presented in Table 3. 
For the regression predicting T3 meaning, none of the demographic variables 
(gender, finance, and illnesses) were significant predictors at the first step, nor were 
longitudinal value change scores at the second step. Perceived change in values, at the 
third step, were significant predictors of meaning, with perceived increases in 
transcendence and openness to change values associated with higher levels of meaning, 
accounting for 10% of the variance in meaning at T3. These results are summarized in 
Table 4. 
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To summarize, well-being outcomes at T3 were predicted primarily by perceived 
changes in values rather than longitudinally assessed change, with one exception. For 
openness to change values, both perceived and longitudinal change scores were 
associated with higher levels of T3 positive affect. 
In addition to examining longitudinal and perceived value change as predictors of 
T3 well-being, these variable were also tested as predictors of change in well-being from 
Tl to T3. The meaning variable was not measured longitudinally, so it could not be 
assessed for change. For both positive affect and negative affect, T3 scores were 
residualized (controlling for Tl levels) and then used as outcome variables for 
regressions using the same three-step model used for the other regressions described 
earlier. 
Change in negative affect was not predicted by either longitudinal or perceived 
value change scores. Change in positive affect across three years, however, was 
associated with both longitudinal and perceived value change scores. At the first step, 
none of the demographic predictors were significantly associated with change in positive 
affect, though a trend emerged for an association between having more illnesses and 
showing reductions in positive affect over time. At the second step, longitudinal value 
change accounted for 10% of the variance, with increases in both openness to change 
and, paradoxically, conservation values predicting increases in positive affect across three 
years. The positive effect of longitudinal change in conservation values stands in contrast 
to the regression findings (see above) for perceived change, in which changes in 
conservation predicted higher negative affect. Finally, at the third step, perceived change 
in values accounted for an additional 5% of the variance, with perceived increases in 
openness to change values predicting increases in positive affect across time, but no 
effect of perceived change in conservation. The total variance accounted for in change in 
positive affect from Tl to T3 was 17%. These results are summarized in Table 5. 
As a follow up to the contradictory findings for self-perceived and longitudinal 
changes in conservation values (the former linked to negative affect, the latter linked to 
increases in positive affect), regression analyses were conducted to determine which 
components of conservation (i.e., security, conformity, or tradition) were responsible for 
these associations. For both perceived and longitudinal changes in conservation, security 
was the only component of conservation significantly associated with the well-being 
outcome. Self-perceived change in security predicted 4% of variance in scores in T3 
negative affect while longitudinal change in security predicted 4% of variance in 
residualized positive affect scores (T3 controlling for Tl). These results are summarized 
in Tables 6 and 7 respectively. 
Self-perceived change in desirable values: Predictors and consequences 
Following regression analyses, an overall score for self-perceived change in 
desirable values was calculated to reflect overall perceptions of personal growth. To 
establish what would constitute desirable value change, three methods were used. A 
priori, transcendence and openness to change are values that most people would likely 
agree represent positive qualities. However, in order to provide an additional empirical 
basis for what would constitute desirable value change, PVQ scores were also examined 
in terms of their overall hierarchy as well as their relationship with socially desirable 
responding. The hierarchies of PVQ-assessed values for Tl, T2, and T3 were identical, 
therefore only T3 value hierarchy is reported. The value with the highest overall rating at 
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T3 was transcendence (M= 4.69, SD = .67), followed by openness to change (M= 4.27, 
SD = .75), followed by conservation (M= 3.87, SD = .74). The value with the lowest 
overall rating was enhancement (M= 2.99, SD - .91). As a second method of assessing 
the desirability of the values, Pearson correlations were calculated between the four value 
categories using the PVQ at T3 and the BIDR and its subscales, impression management 
and self-deception. Openness to change was associated with self-deception (r = A7,p = 
.001); conservation was associated with impression management (r = A2,p = .02); 
transcendence was associated with both impression management (r = .25,p < .001) and 
self-deception (r = .18,/? < .001); and finally enhancement was associated (negatively) 
with impression management (r = -.23,p < .001). Given the convergence between the 
overall importance of the values and associations with the BIDR scale, self-perceived 
change in desirable values was defined as perceived increases in openness to change, 
conservation, and transcendence values. Rather than consider decreases in enhancement 
as desirable, we eliminated enhancement values from the calculation of the self-perceived 
changes in desirable values score (PCDV). PCDV was calculated by taking the mean 
score across the eight items representing transcendence, openness to change, and 
conservation values from the Perceptions of Value Change questionnaire, with a higher 
score indicating a greater degree of perceived increases in desirable values. 
Structural Equation Modeling (SEM). To consider the total pattern of both 
predictors and consequences of perceptions of desirable value change (PCDV), an SEM 
model was created with a total of eight variables that included PCDV as well as measures 
of prior life struggle (Tl illnesses, T2 stress, mean negative affect T1-T2), SOC strategies 
at T3, and T3 well-being outcomes (positive and negative affect, meaning). Given that 
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several of these variables had significant skew in their distributions, analyses were run 
with both raw data and data transformed for skewness. The pattern of associations 
differed between the two types of analyses, and to remove the possibility of mistaken 
conclusions based on violations of the assumption of normality, the transformed data is 
presented here. SEM results are therefore reported with the appropriate transformed 
variables. The correlation matrix and descriptive statistics for these variables are 
presented in Table 8. To improve model fit, additional theoretically sound paths between 
variables were also added based on modification indices provided by M-Plus. The results 
for the final model are described below, and are represented visually in Figure 1. 
SEM results. Fit indices suggested a good fit of the model to the data (x2(9)= 
14.12,/?== .12, CFI = .99, RMSEA = .04), and provided support for both hypotheses 4 
and 5 (i.e., that perceptions of desirable value change stem from life struggle and are 
related to SOC strategies). Higher levels of PCDV were predicted by having greater 
number of illnesses at Tl (|3 = .13, z(37i)= 2.47,/? = .01), as well as by higher stress levels 
at T2 (|3 = .13 , Z(37i)= 2.47 ,/? = .01). PCDV was not, however, predicted by prior levels 
of negative affect (|3 = .07, z^\)= 1.22, p = .22). Selection, optimization, and 
compensation (SOC) scores predicted PCDV as hypothesized, with higher SOC scores 
predicting higher levels of PCDV (|3 = .14, z(371)= 2.70,/? = < .01). 
Both PCDV and SOC contributed to well-being outcomes at T3. Consistent with 
regressions described earlier, PCDV showed paradoxical associations with well-being 
variables, predicting both higher levels of T3 positive affect (|3 = .19, ZQ7i)= 4.09, p < 
.001) and T3 meaning ((3 = .21, 2(371) = 4.34,/? < .001) at the same time as higher levels 
of T3 negative affect ((3 = .11, Z(37i)= 2.77,/? < .01). SOC scores were associated with 
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well-being in a more consistent manner, predicting higher levels of both T3 positive 
affect (|3 = .26 z(37i)= 5.63,p <.001) and T3 meaning (|3 = .24, z(37i)= 4.90,/? = < .001), 
but showing no association with negative affect. 
The prior life struggle variables also contributed to T3 well-being outcomes. Prior 
negative affect predicted reduced levels of positive affect at T3 (|3 = -.18, z(371) = -3.82,/? 
< .001) as well as higher levels of T3 negative affect (|3 = .64, Z(37i> = 21.11,p < .001). 
Finally, the well-being variables themselves were inter-related with T3 positive affect 
showing a positive association with T3 meaning ((3 = .27, Z(37i)= 5.54, p < .001) and a 
trend toward negative association with T3 negative affect ((3 = .-.09, Z(37i) = -1.91,/? = 
.06). 
In terms of effect sizes, the model accounted for 14.4% of the variance in T3 
positive affect, 44.2% of the variance in T3 negative affect, 11.2% of the variance in T3 
meaning, and 6.8% of the variance in PCDV. The large amount of variance explained in 
T3 negative affect is due to having prior levels of negative affect in the model, suggesting 
that the tendency to experience negative affect at one point in time is highly predictive of 
having similar experiences several years later. 
Discussion 
In this study we examined three different methods of assessing change in personal 
values over time in a sample of recently retired adults, as well as the links of different 
types of change assessment to measures of well-being. To begin with, longitudinal 
assessments of values and subjective perceptions of value change over the same time 
period were discrepant. Contrary to hypotheses, the longitudinal method (repeated 
administrations of the PVQ at one-year intervals) indicated small decreases in the 
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importance of three of four value categories (openness to change, transcendence, 
conservation), and no change in the one category that was predicted as most likely to 
show change in retirement due to its status-related emphasis (enhancement). In contrast, a 
subjective method of assessing value change (direct questions about value change on the 
VCQ) indicated perceived increases in values desirable to retirees (openness to change, 
transcendence, and conservation values) and decreases in status-oriented enhancement 
values. No association was found between longitudinal change scores and perceived 
change scores. Further, a second method of assessing subjective perceptions of value 
change (differences between Tl and retrospective pre-retirement versions of the PVQ) 
supported the notion that retirees perceive themselves as gradually increasing in desirable 
values (openness to change and transcendence) and decreasing in status-oriented values 
(enhancement). 
An important consideration at this point is the explanation for the discrepancies 
between longitudinal and perceived change scores. Given that, on average, retirees 
perceived increases in desirable values over three years but their longitudinal reports 
contradicted these perceptions, it is tempting to conclude that subjective perceptions of 
value change represent positive illusions (i.e., unrealistically positive appraisals of 
change in self over time). However, an alternative explanation for these discrepancies is 
possible in that there were important differences in the response format for longitudinal 
and subjective change. In one case, participants filled out the same questionnaire three 
times annually (an indirect format which does not name values as the topic of 
investigation); in the other, participants were given a list of the same values (direct 
format), and asked directly how these may have changed since entering the study. Values 
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measured with a direct format might differ from values measured with an indirect format 
because of different types of responding (e.g., desirable response bias). Follow-up 
correlational analyses suggest, however, that this does not appear to be the case here, at 
least in terms of differences in the social desirability of the response format. Neither 
longitudinal change nor perceived change measures were associated with socially 
desirable responding (BIDR scores), with one exception: longitudinal decrease in 
enhancement values was associated with higher impression management scores (r = -.12, 
p = .02). 
What can we conclude, then, about perceptions of value change and positive 
illusions? The nature of the difference between repeated measures designs compared to 
retrospective temporal self-comparison is of critical importance to the issue of positive 
illusions. While repeated administrations of the PVQ at long intervals (e.g., one year in 
this study) likely represent relatively stable motivational traits (as participants do not 
have the opportunity to compare their answers from one year to the next), perceptions of 
value change over time are presumed to tap into individuals' efforts to adapt to their 
changing circumstances, and to construct a narrative about the self that is growth-
oriented. Evidence from both the VCQ (perceived value change questionnaire) and the 
retrospective version of the PVQ supports the idea of retrospective temporal self-
comparison as growth-oriented. When participants did have the opportunity to respond to 
the full PVQ in a retrospective manner, and could compare their responses to the current 
(Tl) version of the PVQ, they responded in a manner largely consistent with the 
perceived changes from Tl to T3: they saw themselves as increasing in desirable values 
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(openness to change and transcendence) and decreasing in status-oriented, arguably 
narcissistic values (enhancement). 
In addition to providing evidence supporting the existence of positive illusions in 
the form of temporal self-comparisons, our findings add to the debate over the costs and 
benefits of such positive illusions (see Block & Colvin, 1994; Colvin & Block, 1994; 
Paulhus, 1998; Robins & Beer, 2001). Our results suggest (a) that benefits do stem from 
such positive illusions, but also (b) that positive illusions are linked to distress. How is 
this paradox best understood? The costs and benefits of positive illusions about value 
change, in particular, appear to depend on the value. Perceived increases in openness to 
change and transcendence values were the most beneficial, predicting higher levels of 
positive affect and meaning as well as increases in positive affect (openness only for the 
latter). Perceived increases in conservation values, however, showed paradoxical links to 
well-being. On one hand, perceived increases in conservation values predicted higher 
levels of current distress (negative affect). Security values appear to be primarily 
responsible for the link between perceived changes in conservation values and negative 
affect. Follow up regression analyses revealed that perceived changes in security, but not 
in tradition or conformity, predicted negative affect. Notably, security values include a 
"staying healthy" component, which seems the most likely driving force behind 
security's links to well-being outcomes among retirees (as opposed to the other 
components "personal safety, national security, and organization"). 
In contrast to the findings for subjective change in conservation values, however, 
longitudinal increases in conservation values predicted higher well-being (increases in 
positive affect over time). Again security values alone were found to be responsible for 
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the link between conservation and change in positive affect. This contradictory pattern 
may indicate differences between the process of subjective retrospection about values 
compared to longitudinal assessment. Subjective increases in security values (presumably 
health-related) could be an a ego-protective response to a current salient stressor, thereby 
linking subjective change with current distress: "I am more concerned with my health 
now because I have health problems." On the other hand, those who encounter illness and 
actually adapt by increasing the importance of health-related behaviors over time are 
those more likely to see increases in well-being. 
Perceived value change, therefore, may represent both the expansion of positive 
qualities (in the cases of openness to change, transcendence), with links to enhanced 
well-being, as well as reaction to struggle (in the case of conservation values), with links 
to distress. SEM analyses supported this notion, showing that self-perceived desirable 
value change stems from prior life struggle (illness and stress ratings) but also predicts 
higher current levels of both positive affect and negative affect. Positive illusions about 
personal growth, therefore, appear to be born of prior struggle and related to current 
distress, but also to have an adaptive effect in the present in terms of higher levels of 
positive emotions and a deeper sense of meaning in life. 
The potential maladaptive nature of positive illusions in prior research (e.g., 
negative interpersonal relations and declines in self-esteem: Paulhus, 1998; Robins & 
Beer, 2001) relates largely to the social consequences of misjudging one's own abilities. 
In the case of positive illusions based on temporal comparison of the self over time, the 
link with lower well-being is likely more representative of the life difficulties that give 
rise to the need for growth narratives (e.g., illness, stress) rather than representing 
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negative social consequences of self-misperception. In other words, people's self-
narratives of growth are born of both prior and current struggle but also appear to provide 
a more positive and meaningful experience of life simultaneously. 
How do the above findings regarding changes in values map onto the theoretical 
circumplex structure of values? In other words, as a value at one end of a dimension 
increases, does the value at the opposing end of the dimension decrease? If this were so, 
then an increase in transcendence values should be accompanied by a decrease in 
enhancement values; similarly, an increase in openness should be accompanied by a 
decrease in conservation. Depending on how one looks at the results, there is at best only 
partial support for circumplex-consistent value change. Longitudinally-assessed patterns 
of change did not reflect such a structure of changes, as three of four values showed 
decreases, and one did not change. The perceived change scores in the openness-
conservation dimensions also did not reflect the circumplex structure, as both of these 
theoretically opposing values showed overall perceived increases (whereas the 
circumplex structure predicts change in opposite directions). In addition, the correlation 
between perceived change in openness and conservation was r = .30,/? < .001, suggesting 
that these supposedly opposing types of values were seen as changing in a partially 
consistent direction. However, transcendence and enhancement values, theoretically 
opposing in terms of motivation were seen as increasing and decreasing respectively, 
which lends some support to the idea of circumplex-consistent value change (although 
there was no association between change in one and change in the other (r = -.04, p = 
.41). On the whole, only perceived change on the transcendence-enhancement dimension 
reflected theoretical opposing motivations in values. 
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How should the overall changes in values be understood in terms of shifts in value 
priorities? The minor longitudinal shifts in values do not appear to indicate any kind of 
substantial rearrangement of value priorities in retirement. Transcendence at all points of 
assessment remained the most important value on average for retirees, followed by 
openness to change, conservation and enhancement values (see Table 1). The perceived 
change scores mirror this pattern, with retirees perceiving the largest increases in the 
most important value (transcendence), and decreases in the least important value on 
average (enhancement). To their benefit, then, retirees report (a) holding as most 
important and (b) perceiving growth in the two values that here and elsewhere (Burr, 
Santo, & Pushkar, 2009) are most strongly linked to well-being. 
How can one explain that most values would decrease in absolute importance in 
retirement? One possible explanation is something akin to a practice effect, whereby 
repeated administrations of the PVQ changed the overall response tendency away from 
strong identification with the portraits. A speculative reason for this might be an 
increasing sense on the part of participants, as they returned each year, that the 
complexity of self and of one's motivations is not always captured by the PVQ. When 
participants asked questions of the researchers, it was often to express frustration in that 
they did not relate the same way to the two components of each PVQ item (e.g., "He 
believes he should always show respect to his parents and to older people. It is important 
to him to be obedient"). In other words, being "very much like" a short, two-pronged 
description of another person may become too simplistic a statement with repeated 
administrations, and rating portraits as less similar to the self could have been a 
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manifestation of participants increasingly acknowledging their own motivational 
complexity, not necessarily being one way all the time in all situations with all people. 
Finally, it was hypothesized that self-perceived changes in desirable values would 
reflect adaptive selection, optimization, and compensation (SOC) processes. Our results 
supported this hypothesis, although SOC strategies accounted for only a small portion 
(about 2%) of the variance in perceived desirable value change. The SEM model 
employed only the total SOC score, but follow up correlational analyses indicated that 
PCDV were linked with only two of the four components of SOC. In particular, PCDV 
was associated with optimization (r = .11, p < .05) and elective selection (r = .16, p < .01) 
subscales, but not with loss based selection or compensation subscales. This suggests that 
as a coping process, perceiving personal growth in values has more to do with selective 
attention to improvements in one's positive traits and motives than it does with 
compensating for losses. As such, perceiving positive change in values may represent a 
kind of selective attention for the evolution of one's positive traits over time, a process 
which appears adaptive for well-being regardless of whether growth actually occurred or 
not. SOC strategies have been shown to be predictors of a variety of general and domain-
specific indicators of adaptive development at various points of the adult lifespan (see 
citations in Riediger et al., 2006, p. 295). The average age (59 years at Tl) represented in 
this study is younger than that of many other investigations that examine SOC processes 
in young-old and old-old adults (e.g., Jopp & Smith, 2006). However, our results are 
consistent with other research involving middle-aged samples in which SOC strategies 
were related to a variety of components of well-being, including a sense of purpose in life 
(Ryff inventory) as well as to positive emotions (Freund & Baltes, 2002). Where we 
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extend this research is by suggesting that positive illusions of personal growth may 
represent a manifestation of SOC strategies in the unique form of temporal self-
comparisons focused on selecting and optimizing one's positive qualities over time. 
Limitations and future directions 
We have inferred that perceptions of positive change in values for retirees 
represent positive illusions of personal growth, but it is also possible that these types of 
changes represent as well a different process involving stereotypes about aging. In two 
types of subjective change assessment in this study, retirees reported increases in 
desirable values and decreasing in status-oriented values. It is possible that such 
subjective perceptions of change in the self are at least in part due to stereotypes about 
how values change with age and stage of life. This possibility cannot be ruled out, and 
future research should examine the contributions of stereotypes to perceived change 
through assessing the views of both younger and older adults about qualities that change 
with age and position in the lifespan. However, if stereotypes were the sole contributor to 
perceived value change, then it is unlikely that this type of subjective change would show 
associations with enhanced levels of well-being. The links to flourishing suggest that 
perceived personal growth is more than a stereotype of aging, and that it represents an 
adaptive reaction to challenge and transition, perhaps best conceptualized as a meaning-
making process. Future research could also extend the importance of subjective growth to 
other normative transitions (e.g., becoming a parent, immigration, career transition), and 
consider the clinical implications of how to foster such growth perspectives. 
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Summary of Hierarchical Regression for Longitudinal Change and Perceived Change in 
Values Predicting Positive Affect at T3 
Variable B SEB (3 p 
Step 1: Demographic controls (R2 = .09**) 
Gender 2.44 .63 .19** <. 001 
T3 Finance .82 .26 .16** <. 001 
T3 Illnesses -.26 .08 -.17** <. 001 
Step 2: Longitudinal Value Change (R2 = .13.; AR2 = .04*) 
LC Openness to Change 1.61 .73 .12* .03 
LC Conservation .90 .77 .06 .24 
LC Enhancement .01 .56 .01 .99 
LC Transcendence .47 .77 .03 .54 
Step 3: Perceived Value Change (R2 = .19; AR2 = .06**) 
PC Openness to Change 1.77 
PC Conservation -.15 
PC Enhancement .07 
PC Transcendence .62 
*p < .05 **p < .001. Note: LC = longitudinal change scores (T3 minus Tl); PC 















Summary of Hierarchical Regression for Longitudinal Change and Perceived Change in 
Values Predicting Negative Affect at T3 
Variable B SEB 6 p 
Step J: Demographic controls (R = .08**) 
Gender -.02 .59 
T3 Finance -.29 .24 
T3 Illnesses .341 .07 
Step 2: Longitudinal Value Change (R2 = . 08; AR2 ns) 
LC Openness to Change -.32 .69 
LC Conservation -.41 .73 
LC Enhancement .28 .53 
LC Transcendence -.52 .73 
Step 3: Perceived Value Change (R2 = .12; AR2 = .033*) 
PC Openness to Change .34 .39 
PC Conservation 1.31 .49 
PC Enhancement -.20 .31 
PC Transcendence -.02 .48 
*p < .05 **p < .001. Note: LC = longitudinal change scores (T3 minus Tl); PC 

























Summary of Hierarchical Regression for Longitudinal Change and Perceived Change in 
Values Predicting Meaning at T3 
Variable B SEB B p 






















Step 2: Longitudinal Value Change (R = .02.; AR =.01, ns) 
LC Openness to Change .59 .66 .05 .38 
LC Conservation -.42 .69 
LC Enhancement .12 .50 
LC Transcendence .73 .70 
Step 3: Perceived Value Change (R2 = .12; AR2 = .10** ) 
PC Openness to Change .82 
PC Conservation .29 
PC Enhancement .53 
PC Transcendence 1.46 
*p < .05 **p < .001. Note: LC = longitudinal change scores (T3 minus Tl); PC = 















Summary of Hierarchical Regression for Longitudinal Change and Perceived Change in 
Values Predicting Change in Positive Affect from Tl to T3 
Variable B SEB (3 p 
Step 1: Demographic controls (R2 = .02) 
Gender .17 .10 .09 .10 
T3 Finance .01 .04 .02 .51 
T3 Illnesses -.02 .01 -.10* .03 
Step 2: Longitudinal Value Change (R2 = .12; AR2 = .10**) 
LC Openness to Change .45 .12 .21** <001 
LC Conservation .26 .12 .13* .03 
LC Enhancement .14 .09 .08 .11 
LC Transcendence .03 .12 .02 .78 
Step 3: Perceived Value Change (R2 = .17; AR2 = .05**) 
PC Openness to Change .24 
PC Conservation .002 
PC Enhancement -.05 













*p < .05 **p < .001. Note: LC = longitudinal change scores (T3 minus Tl); PC 
perceived change scores at T3. 
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Table 6 
Summary of Hierarchical Regression for Components of Self Perceived Change in 
Conservation (Security, Tradition, Conformity) predicting T3 Negative Affect 
Variable B SEB 6 z 


































**p < .01. Note: PC = perceived change score 
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Table 7 
Summary of Hierarchical Regression for Components of Longitudinal Change in 
Conservation (Security, Tradition, Conformity) Predicting Changes in Positive Affect 
Variable B SEB 6 p 


































**p < .01. Note: PC = perceived change score 
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Table 8. 
Correlation matrix and descriptive statistics for all variables used in SEM analyses. 
01.PCDVT3b 
02. Illnesses T l a 
03. Stress T2a 
04.NAT1-T2b 
05. SOCa 
06. Positive Affect T3 
07. Negative Affect T3 b 































































Note: PCDV = Self-perceived changes in desirable values; SOC = Selection, 
Optimization, and Compensation; NA = Negative Affect;a square root transformation for 
skew; b inverse (with reflection) transformation for skew;c based on raw data; * p < .05; 
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Figure 1. SEM model for correlates of self-perceived change in desirable values. 
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General Discussion 
To briefly summarize the preceding manuscripts, all three studies comprising this 
dissertation were based on data collected between 2005 and 2008 as a part of the 
Concordia Longitudinal Retirement Study (Dolores Pushkar, principal investigator). The 
first study investigated age differences in the structural and measurement properties of a 
popular value measure, the Portrait Value Questionnaire (PVQ: Schwartz et al., 2001); 
the second study examined the emotional consequences of retirees' values and the 
interaction of values with life circumstances; the third study focused on different ways of 
assessing change in values, the idea of self-perceived value change as a positive illusion 
of growth, and the correlates of both objective and subjective methods of change 
measurement. 
Relevance of findings to theories of aging 
These three studies on the values of retired adults raise several issues for values 
research in general, as well as having implications for a variety of theories related to 
successful aging. Before proceeding to general issues, let us consider the relevance of the 
findings herein to current theories of aging. Riediger, Li, and Lindenberger (2006) review 
current conceptual frameworks for adaptive lifespan development, and identify a key 
theme across frameworks. The theme relates to changes across the lifespan in the 
availability of certain limited resources, and how people use the available resources to 
their advantage. Riediger and colleagues cite four frameworks in the current literature 
that specifically address adaptation to changing resources across the lifespan. These 
include, "socio-emotional selectivity theory (SST: Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & Charles, 
1999); assimilative and accommodative coping (Brandtsadter & Renner, 1990); 
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optimization in primary and secondary control (Heckhausen & Schulz, 1995); and 
selection, optimization, and compensation (SOC: Baltes & Baltes, 1990)" (p. 291). Each 
of these frameworks describe methods of adapting to and allocating limited resources that 
are particularly relevant to later stages of adult development, which can be understood as, 
"a life phase that is characterized by a wealth of objective and subjective resource losses" 
(Riediger et al., 2006). How then do the results of the studies herein relate to the theme of 
adaptive use of limited and declining resources? 
Study 1. Results of the first study indicated tentative evidence for age-related 
shifts in value priorities that can be understood as motivational adaptation in reaction to 
changing life stages. The means of most of the ten values measured by the PVQ differed 
between university students (age 30 or under) and retirees (average age 59 years), 
suggesting that there are age-related changes in values over time (assuming these 
differences do not represent cohort differences in values based on differing historical 
contexts for value development). The observed age-related value differences were 
consistent with the different developmental challenges faced by students (career, 
relationship, and identity exploration) compared to retirees (maintenance of established 
relationships, health, and activity levels). In particular, the students reported higher scores 
on achievement, power, stimulation, hedonism, and self-direction compared to retirees, 
whereas retirees reported higher scores on conformity, tradition, and security compared 
to the students. There were no differences in terms of benevolence and universalism 
values. 
As young adults move through the career and family life cycle and toward 
retirement, then, they may naturally move from exploration and status-oriented values 
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toward more preservation-oriented values. This process would be consistent with the 
adjustment of preferences and goals to situational constraints represented by 
accommodative coping (Brandtsadter & Renner, 1990), the process of disengaging from 
unattainable goals and compensatory secondary control processes (Heckhausen & Schulz, 
1995), as well as with the minimization of losses and maximization of gains represented 
by selection, optimization, and compensation processes (Baltes & Baltes, 1990). The 
findings of the first study are less conclusive regarding SST's proposed increase of focus 
on emotion-related goals through connection to close others when the future is perceived 
as time-limited (as might be the case for retirees). If such a shift in priorities was actually 
occurring, then benevolence in particular would be expected to be higher among retirees 
compared to students, but this was not the case. 
There were a few important findings related to the issues of measurement 
invariance and the circumplex structure of the ten values, but these have little relevance 
to theories of aging. First, tests of measurement invariance supported the notion that 
values can be measured in the same way at different points in the adult lifespan. Second, 
tests of the circumplex structure suggest that the theoretical structure of relations among 
the values appears descriptively (i.e., in multi-dimensional scaling analyses) in both 
younger and older samples, but not when using strict statistical criteria (i.e., constrained 
confirmatory factor analyses). 
A final finding of note from the first study that is important regarding theories of 
aging was the differing pattern of covariance among the ten values between younger and 
older adults. This differential pattern in the structure of values may have implications for 
conceptualizing values across the lifespan. In particular, retirees showed a higher degree 
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of inter-relatedness among all values, even between theoretically contradictory ones. A 
greater capacity to hold multiple competing values (i.e., a pluralistic value system) for 
older adults might represent a type of motivational flexibility that is consistent with the 
importance of adaptation in theories of successful aging and adaptive resource 
management. 
Study 2. The second study regarding the emotional consequences of values 
provides further support for the benefits of motivational flexibility for successful aging 
(openness to change values), as well as the benefits of an other-oriented motivational 
focus (transcendence values). Openness to change values were the most important value 
category for well-being in that they were linked to both positive emotions and less 
distress (negative affect), whereas transcendence values predicted positive emotions. The 
values that would most benefit from adjustment in retirement appear to be the status-
oriented enhancement values (power and achievement). Although value systems are 
thought to be relatively stable in the short term, results of the second study suggest that 
major life transitions like retirement may be facilitated by an adjustment of enhancement 
values to match new opportunities and constraints of retirement in order to protect and 
enhance emotional well-being. In other words, letting go of the importance of that which 
is no longer modifiable is likely a beneficial strategy, and such motivational adjustment is 
again consistent with the above theories of adaptive resource allocation in successful 
aging. Insofar as retirement may represent a signal of limited future time, the importance 
of openness to change and transcendence values for affective well-being can be seen as 
reflecting the benefits of holding present-oriented and emotionally meaningful goals in 
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the context of limited future time as proposed by socio-emotional selectivity theory 
(Carstensenetal., 1999). 
Finally, the links between transcendence values (benevolence and universalism) 
and positive affect are consistent with prior research showing the benefits of generative 
concern for older adults. The construct of generativity, originally proposed by Erikson 
(1959) as a crucial stage of development in mid to later adulthood, involves caring for 
and contributing to future generations. Although generativity is not typically described as 
a value, it nonetheless functions as a value in the sense that it represents a set of 
principles that guide attitudes and behavior toward concern for others and the broader 
social good. At the same time as it is pro-social and outwardly focused, generativity is 
proposed to have benefits for the generative adult, and is conceived of as a mark of, 
"maturity and successful adaptation in the middle adult years" with benefits for health 
and well-being (McAdams, 2008). An empirical measure of generativity was developed 
by McAdams and colleagues (McAdams & de St. Aubin, 1992; McAdams, de St. Aubin, 
& Logan, 1993) and has since been linked, in a variety of studies, to measures of 
subjective well-being and mental health, as well as broader networks of social support 
and friendship (e.g., Ackerman, Zuroff, & Moskowitz, 2000; McAdams, 2001, 2008; 
McAdams & de St. Aubin, 1995; Huta & Zuroff, 2007). 
One of the reasons that generativity and transcendence values both show links to 
higher levels of well-being may be that they involve an integration of meeting needs of 
both self and others. McAdams (2008) suggests that generativity is not about 
transcending self-interest, but rather integrating an other-orientation into self-serving 
motivations so that, for example, the products of generativity (e.g., children, 
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grandchildren, reputation, accomplishments) become a self-rewarding legacy and 
function as a kind of symbolic immortality ultimately serving both the common good as 
well as the self. Although the values of benevolence and universalism carry the label of 
self-transcendence, their underlying motivations, similar to generativity, may not be 
entirely altruistic and likely integrate both other-orientation and self-interest. The links 
between self-transcendence values and affective well-being certainly support the idea that 
there is personal gain in being concerned about others. 
Study 3. The third study, focused as it is on different ways of assessing value 
change, adds some complexity to the issue of whether value adjustment is adaptive for 
retirees, and what value adjustment actually consists of. One thing is clear: retirees on 
average see in themselves positive personal growth over time. They reported seeing 
themselves as becoming more concerned about close others (benevolence) and the world 
in general (universalism); more creative, independent, novelty-seeking, and hedonistic 
(openness to change); and less concerned with money, control of others, success, and 
demonstrating competence (power and achievement: enhancement values). They also 
perceive themselves as placing increasing importance on their general health, safety, and 
security, on their traditions, and on maintaining the status quo (conservation values). 
The remarkable thing about these perceptions of change in values is that (a) they 
showed no link to more objective measures of change through repeated administrations of 
the PVQ; and more importantly (b) it was the subjective rather than objective measures of 
change that were the strongest predictors of experiencing positive emotions and a sense 
of meaning in life. Self-perceived change in desirable values also turned out to be 
correlated with SOC strategies, to a small degree. In other words, regardless of whether 
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perceived value changes are illusory or not, they appear to be an adaptive reaction to 
challenge and transition and are perhaps best conceptualized as a meaning-making 
process. The findings from the third study, then, support theories of adaptive resource 
allocation for successful aging, but in a novel way, by demonstrating the benefits of 
temporal self-comparisons focused on selecting and optimizing one's positive qualities 
over time. 
Questions, concerns, and areas for future investigation 
Turning now to the general issues about values raised by this program of research, 
a host of questions, concerns, and areas for future investigation can be identified. These 
include (1) questions about the specifics of the best way to measure values across 
adulthood, and the pros and cons of the PVQ as a measurement tool; (2) the distinction 
between values as researchers define them and how the average person thinks about 
values; (3) the question of when values actually matter to people in their day to day lives; 
(4) how morality and ethics can be brought into a discussion of values; (5) contradictory 
findings regarding the role of money, status-oriented values, and happiness; and finally 
(6) the question of whether and how a focus on personal values might be useful in 
psychological intervention for older adults. These questions and concerns are outlined in 
greater detail in this final section. 
(1) How best to measure values? The PVQ is an instrument born of the prolific 
cross-cultural research program of S. H. Schwartz. It is designed to be quick to 
administer, appropriate across a wide range of ages and levels of education, a concrete as 
opposed to abstract task, and appropriate for inclusion in large-scale sociological research 
programs. To these ends, it serves its purpose well, as demonstrated by its inclusion in 
174 
large-scale research projects such as the on-going World Values Survey and the European 
Social Survey. Completing the PVQ is a task that, relative to the laborious value-ranking 
tasks on older values surveys (e.g., Rokeach Value Survey), is straightforward, requiring 
only that respondents think about their similarity to short descriptions of different types 
of people. Further, it does not ask participants about their values directly, making it, in 
theory, less susceptible to socially-desirable responding. As a brief measure of values, 
then, the PVQ is a strong measurement tool. 
That being said, the PVQ is not without its drawbacks. First, although inter-
relatedness of all values and all items is a part of Schwartz's theory of values as existing 
on a motivational continuum, the measurement properties of the PVQ as a whole are only 
marginally adequate, as the first study suggests. This is largely due to problems of 
internal discriminant validity caused by the measurement often inter-related constructs, 
resulting in items that load onto multiple factors. In addition, each value category is 
conceptually broad in and of itself (e.g., security representing safety, stability, and 
harmony of society, of relationships, and of the self). Conceptual breadth does not lend 
itself well to precise measurement, and none of the ten value categories have strong 
internal validity co-efficients as a result. 
The second drawback of the PVQ, and perhaps more so of the Schwartz value 
theory in general, is the highly abstract nature of the values it measures, and its lack of 
focus on value-expressive behaviors. If researchers want to know what types of activities 
or decisions are representative of specific value types, they must investigate this as a 
separate and distinct question. Value-expressive behavior is a crucial component of 
understanding how values are central to human motivation and unfortunately the PVQ 
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provides no insight in and of itself as to what people actually do that reflects their values, 
or if they engage in any value-related activity. The PVQ begs the following question: "So 
you say that it is important to you to be benevolent, but what do you actually do that 
shows that you are?" The PVQ can tell us as much as that a benevolent person is 
concerned for close others and cares for their well-being, but does not answer the 
question "In what way and how?" Other much longer and more comprehensive value 
assessments, such as those used in the European Values Survey 
(http://www.europeanvaluestudy.eu/) and the World Values Survey 
(http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/) include a wide variety of value measurements, from 
the abstract to the highly concrete and behavioral. These include questions about morality 
and the nature of good and evil (e.g., rating agreement with statements such as "There are 
absolutely clear guidelines about what is good and evil. These apply to everyone, 
whatever the circumstances"); face valid and concrete questions about what is most 
important in life (e.g., work, family, friends and acquaintances, leisure time, politics, and 
religion); participation in different types of voluntary organizations; attendance of 
religious services; beliefs about the roles of men and women in society; beliefs about 
parenting; interest in contemporary social issues; and ratings of the desirability of 
different types of people (e.g., homosexuals, Muslims, right-wing extremists) as potential 
neighbours. In sum, the PVQ captures values only at the most abstract level, and as such 
does not represent a truly comprehensive assessment of values. Comprehensive values 
assessment should include a variety of measures of beliefs and behaviors, each of which 
contribute to an overall value system. The measurement of values at only the abstract 
level is perhaps the most significant limitation of the PVQ. 
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The final measurement issue that merits revisiting here is the use of ipsative 
scoring. Schwartz has advocated for the exclusive use of ipsative scores, except in certain 
cases such as with factor analytical techniques, because of the importance of considering 
values as a part of a system, and as a means of controlling for individual differences in 
use of the response scale. The usefulness of raw, or absolute, value scores, however, has 
been demonstrated in the second and third studies here, as they are important considering 
well-being (because overall strength of identification with values, which is partialled out 
with ipsative scores, is significantly related to well-being outcomes). Further, raw scores 
are useful when considering change over time because change in the entire value system 
may differ from change in the importance of a particular value. A compromise approach 
may be best when considering ipsative scoring; that is to consider both forms of scoring 
as complimentary sources of information about values (Ovadia, 2004). 
(2) Research and lay definitions of values. The highly abstract nature of values as 
measured by the PVQ is useful for psychological researchers insofar as examining the 
association between abstract motivational principles and other variables and how these 
principles differ across groups or time. But the PVQ may not capture values as the 
average person thinks about them. For example, when asked directly about what is most 
important in life, people are likely to respond with categories such as 'my family, my 
children, my health, my relationship, my career, my friendships, my faith, protecting the 
environment.' In the language of the Schwartz value theory, most of these would be 
subsumed into higher order categories of guiding principles, or be considered concrete 
manifestations of values. For example, the importance of "family" can be subsumed into 
the category of benevolence, or, "preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people 
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with whom one is in frequent personal contact." A disjoint between lay and scientific 
definitions of values is not in and of itself a problem unless one wishes to bring values to 
the table as a focus of clinical work or public policy initiatives, in which case the ability 
to discuss values in lay terms is essential. An individual is unlikely to identify with the 
abstraction of "benevolence", but knows exactly what "family" means. 
(3) When do values matter? The extent to which values play a conscious role in 
activities, decision-making, and the allocation of time and resources is an important issue 
for consideration in terms of understanding value-behavior relations. Prior research has 
found mixed results regarding how well values predict behaviour (e.g., Bardi & 
Schwartz, 2003; Kristiansen & Hotte, 1996). Recent evidence from experimental research 
paradigms suggests that the abstract nature of values is linked to behavior only at more 
abstract levels, and less so at more concrete levels. For example, Eyal, Sagristano, Trope, 
Liberman, and Chaiken (2009) found that values are better predictors of behavioural 
intentions in the distant future compared to the near future. If planned behaviour is 
construed in an abstract, de-contextualized way (as in thinking about the distant future), it 
appears to be more strongly related to values than planned behavior in a concrete, short 
term way (which involves focusing on feasibility and pragmatic details). Similarly, 
Torelli and Kaikati (2009) found that values are most likely to influence behavioral 
intentions when people have been primed to think about and interpret their actions with 
an abstract mindset (focused on the "why" behind their goals) compared to a concrete 
mindset (focused on the "how" of achieving goals). 
The question that arises, then, for the impact of values in retirement, is the extent 
to which retirees take a long-term, abstract and de-contextualized perspective on their 
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retirement, or whether they are focused on short-term, concrete details of this major life 
transition. Clearly, both approaches are important to some extent. What these recent 
studies suggest, however, is that older adults are more likely to plan value-congruent 
behavior for the distant future, whereas short-term goals and day-to-day activities may 
not necessarily be value-expressive. The implications of these findings for retirement 
planning are discussed further below. 
A final issue in terms of when values matter is that of how people deal with 
conflict among values, or value trade-offs. The Schwartz value theory is built on the 
principle that people hold a variety of values, each of which is compatible or conflicting 
with other values to varying degrees. People must regularly deal with situations in which 
decisions rest on competing values, and the prioritization of a particular value over 
another depends to a large extent on the particular demands of the situation. In other 
words, even if an individual's general value hierarchy can be established through a 
measurement tool such as the PVQ, there is no guarantee that the top ranked value will 
always apply across all situations. In the words of psychologist and philosopher William 
James (1891), "Every real dilemma is in literal strictness a unique situation; the exact 
combination of ideals realized and ideals disappointed which each decision creates is 
always a universe without precedent, and for which no adequate previous rules exist" (p. 
350). Although values may be conceived of as generally stable over time, the application 
of values to real life decisions and planning is nuanced, complex, and relative to each 
new situation. As such, a descriptive understanding of values is more easily arrived at 
than knowledge of how values function in our lives. 
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(4) Values, morality, and ethics. While philosophers have tended to examine the 
inherent worth of certain values as a function of what a morally good life consists of, 
psychologists, especially in the recent movement of positive psychology, have taken a 
different approach. Avoiding the question of what is morally good, psychologists 
(including the author of this dissertation) have asked what kinds of value systems are 
associated with positive outcomes such as personal happiness. The conclusions that can 
be made about values based on their associations with happiness have to do with how 
psychologically healthy values are for individuals. A larger question not generally 
addressed by psychologists is to what extent psychological health as an outcome can be 
considered a proxy for moral goodness. If certain values are linked to higher levels of 
psychological well-being, does that make those values a moral imperative? Should those 
values be prescribed for all as a means to the good life? The link between personal values 
and morality has not been clearly defined by psychologists, and, especially in the case of 
the Schwartz value theory, moral statements about values are notably absent. The ten 
values are not defined or organized in terms of their moral worth, but simply as a 
function of their underlying motivations. But values play a central role in the issue of 
morality because they potentially provide the path toward the good life. In the words of 
social psychologist Jonathan Haidt (2006), when people ask the moral question "What 
should I do to have a good, happy, fulfilling, and meaningful life? ... one of the things 
they are hoping for is a set of principles or goals that can guide their actions and give 
their choices meaning or value" (p. 218). How might psychologists bring values into 
focus, then, on the issue of morality? 
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Recent developments in moral psychology may be paving the way towards an 
answer to this question. For a long time the study of morality in psychology was based on 
the assumption of rational models of moral judgment (Kohlberg, 1969; Piaget, 1965: 
Turiel, 1983) that assumed moral judgments are reached through rational processes and 
that focus heavily on the principle of justice (Haidt, 2001). More recently, psychological 
research focused on morality has highlighted the role of emotion and intuition, derived 
from social and cultural factors, in moral judgments (the social intuitionist model: Haidt, 
2001,2008). 
In the context of this latter perspective, two recent studies (Janoff-Bulman, 
Sheikh, & Baldacci, 2008; Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009) focus on morality 
through the lens of motivation, and are therefore relevant to the issue of values inherent 
in morality. Janoff-Bulman and colleagues (2008) proposed a model of moral motives 
with two-bipolar dimensions and four resulting categories of moral motives that is 
remarkably similar to both the structure and content of the Schwartz value theory. The bi-
polar dimensions of motivation (approach vs. avoidance; self-focus vs. other-focus) 
overlap to a high degree with Schwartz's four higher-order value categories (openness to 
change vs. conservation; self-transcendence vs. self-enhancement), and are good 
predictors of political orientation (avoidance motives associated with political 
conservatism; approach motives with political liberalism). Janoff-Bulman and colleagues 
(2009) also propose two forms of morality that stem from the approach-avoidance 
dimension. The first of these is a prescriptive morality that is approach-based and focused 
around what we should do, while the second is a proscriptive avoidance-based morality 
that is focused around what we should not do. Also discussed is the merit of moral 
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behavior that stems from a sense of desire compared to a sense of duty. Given the 
conceptual similarity between the four higher-order categories of values in the Schwartz 
paradigm and the four categories of moral motives proposed by Janoff-Bullman and 
colleagues, future research into the moral implications of values would benefit from 
examining the links between these motivational theories and their respective 
measurement tools. 
(5) Status, money, and happiness. There are some paradoxical findings regarding 
the enhancement values (achievement and power), money, and the links between these 
variables and affective well-being. There is substantial evidence that money does not 
make people happier beyond a modest amount of annual income and that the rising levels 
of income have not made people happier in prosperous nations (Diener & Seligman, 
2004). Further, over-valuing extrinsic goals has been shown to relate to reduced levels of 
well-being (Kasser et al., 2004) and the related construct of enhancement values (power 
and achievement) have been found to have a negative impact on affective well-being 
(study 2). A focus on the accumulation of money, then, appears to not only be insufficient 
for happiness, but also to erode it to some extent. In contrast to these findings, however, 
is the link between higher subjective ratings of financial adequacy and higher affective 
well-being (study 2). This link is consistent with previous findings that subjective 
indicators of financial matters are not entirely consistent with objective financial 
indicators (such as income) and that subjective financial ratings are more robust and 
relevant predictors of well-being (Diener & Seligman, 2004; Sing-Manoux, Adler, & 
Marmot, 2003). In the current sample of retirees, actual income accounted for only 25 to 
36% of the variance in perceived financial adequacy scores. Putting all of these findings 
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together, although a materialistic, status and wealth-oriented set of motivations appears 
detrimental to well-being, and although having more money beyond a modest threshold 
does not increase happiness, the perception of having more money than others is linked to 
higher well-being. If people think they have more or less money than others, this 
perceived discrepancy plays an important role in emotional life. 
(6) Values and psychological intervention. The PVQ was not designed as a 
clinical tool, but if there is to be any practical application of basic values research then 
abstract value constructs must be translated, to some extent, into lay terms and useful 
clinical technologies. What kinds of examples exist of the application of the values 
construct at a clinical level? In terms of the former, helping individuals to articulate what 
is most important in their lives and subsequently bringing behavior into line with values 
is a strategy for enhancing motivation for change that has recently been formalized by 
two recent models of psychological intervention. The first is motivational interviewing 
(Miller & Rollnick, 2002), in which a key principle is developing discrepancy between 
how things are and how the client would like them to be. Discrepancy is developed 
through evoking the perceived importance of change relative to the clients' general life 
goals and personal values. A second clinical framework in which values loom large is a 
recent development in cognitive-behavioral therapy know as acceptance and commitment 
therapy (ACT; Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999), which is based on mindfulness and 
acceptance techniques as well as values-based behavior change strategies. ACT attempts 
to foster acceptance of uncomfortable thoughts, emotions, and physical sensations, as 
well as helping clients to identify, commit to, and act out important values, despite 
discomfort and anxiety. 
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Specific value-eliciting questionnaires (Eifert & Forsyth, 2005, p. 174) help 
clients to first identify which among ten areas of life are most important to them (family; 
intimate relationships; parenting; friends and social life; work and career; education and 
training; recreation and fun; spirituality; citizenship and community life; health and 
physical self-care). Subsequently, clients rate their satisfaction with the quality and depth 
of experience in areas they deem important, and indicate how often they have taken 
action in the past week that represent each important domain. Thus, value-activity 
discrepancy is elicited, and value-activity congruence is promoted through a variety of 
other strategies. The definition of values in the ACT framework are clearly much more 
suitable for lay discussion of what is most important in life compared to the highly 
abstract and research-oriented definitions of the Schwartz value theory. 
How might the research literature on values and the findings from the studies 
herein contribute to psychological interventions for those in or nearing retirement? 
Findings reviewed above (Eyal et al., 2009; Torelli & Kaikati, 2009) suggest that older 
adults are more likely to plan value-congruent behavior for the distant future, but may 
have difficulty seeing short-term goals and day-to-day activities as value-expressive. 
Given that value-activity congruence has been shown to be predictive of well-being 
(Oishi et al., 1999), finding ways to help retirees think about their concrete day-to-day 
activities as opportunities for value expression might be a way to promote both healthy 
activities and social engagement as well as to promote general well-being. Further, a 
process of expressing one's core values has been shown among younger adults to help to 
counteract threats to self-regard as well as to fortify the self-concept and boost capacity 
for self-regulation (Schmeichel & Vohs, 2009). Insofar as retirees face challenges related 
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to finding new ways to express long-standing values amid fundamental changes in life 
circumstances, an intervention based on the expression, elaboration, and explanation of 
core values in and of itself might be a simple way to help older workers prepare for 
retirement and recent retirees to adjust to retirement. 
As retirees age, the major values-related challenge becomes finding ways to 
continue to express cherished values in the context of ongoing losses in physical, 
financial, and social resources. The particular concrete manifestation of values in 
activities may require some adjustment, but fundamental value adjustment only seems to 
be called for in the case of the status-oriented values. Of particular interest to the clinician 
working with older adults and to public policy makers should be the challenge of helping 
aging adults to find value-consistent activities that promote competent and independent 
aging. If retirees can find self-regulatory strength in their values in order to stay 
physically, cognitively, and socially active, and thereby maintain emotional competence 
with age (Pushkar & Arbuckle, 1998), then values may be seen as an important tool in 
building the foundation of an autonomous, competent lifestyle in older adulthood. 
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Appendix A 























The score for each value is the mean of the raw ratings given to the items listed above 
for that value. For most purposes, it is necessary to make a correction for individual 
differences in use of the response scale before performing analyses. Below are 
instructions for making the correction that is appropriate to various types of analyses. 
Failure to make the necessary scale use correction typically leads to mistaken 
conclusions! 
Individuals and cultural groups differ in their use of the response scale.1 Scale use 
differences often distort findings and lead to incorrect conclusions.2 To correct for 
scale use: 
(A) Compute scores for the 10 values by taking the means of the items that index it 
(above). If you wish to check internal reliabilities, do so for these value scores. 
(B) Compute each individual's mean score across ah 40 value items. Call this 
MRAT.3 
(C) Center scores of each of the 10 values for an individual (computed in A) around 
that individual's MRAT (i.e., subtract MRAT from each of the 10 value scores) 
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1. For correlation analyses: Use the centered value scores (C). 
2. For group mean comparisons, analysis of variance or of covariance (t- tests, 
ANOVA, MANOVA, ANCOVA, MANCOVA): Use the centered value scores as 
the dependent variables. 
3. For regression: 
a. If the value is your dependent variable, use the centered value score. 
b. If the values are predictor variables: 
1. Enter up to 8 centered values as predictors in the regression. 
a' If all 10 values are included, the regression coefficients for the 
values may be inaccurate and uninterpretable due to 
multicolinearity. 
b' Choose the values to exclude as predictors a priori on 
theoretical 
grounds because they are irrelevant to the topic. 
2. If you are interested only in the total variance accounted for by 
values and not in the regression coefficients, you may include all 
10 values as predictors. The R2 is meaningful but, because the 10 
values are exactly linearly dependent, the coefficients for each 
value are not precisely interpretable. 
c. In publications, it is advisable to provide a table with the correlations 
between the centered values and the dependent variables in addition to 
any regression. These correlations will aid in understanding results and 
reduce confusion due either to multicolinearity or to intercorrelations 
among the values. 
4. For multidimensional scaling, canonical, discriminant, or confirmatory factor 
analyses: 
Use raw value scores for the items or 10 value means.4 
5. Exploratory factor analysis is not suitable for discovering the theorized set of 
relations among values because they form a quasi-circumplex, which EFA does not 
reveal. Factors obtained in an EFA with rotation will only partly overlap with the 10 
values and will exploit chance associations. The first unrotated factor represents scale 
use or acquiescence. It is not a substantive common factor. A crude representation of 
the circular structure of values can be obtained using EFA by plotting the value items 
in a two-dimensional space according to their loadings on factors 2 and 3 of the 
unrotated solution. 
Footnotes 
1. For a discussion of the general issue, see Sans (1988). Schwartz, et al. (1997) examine 
meanings of such scale use as an individual difference variable. Smith (2004) discusses 
correlates of scale use differences at the level of cultures. 
2. Two critical assumptions underlie these corrections. 
(1) The set often individual level values is reasonably comprehensive of the 
major motivationally distinct values recognized across individuals and cultural groups. 
Empirical evidence supports this assumption (Schwartz, 1992, 2004). 
(2) Studies of value priorities are concerned with the importance of particular 
values as part of the value system of a person or group. This is because the way values 
affect cognition, emotion, and behavior is through a trade-off or balancing among 
multiple values that are simultaneously relevant to action. The relevant values often have 
opposing implications for the action. The absolute importance of a single value across 
individuals or across groups ignores the fact that values function as a system (Schwartz, 
1996, 2004a,b). The scale use correction converts absolute value scores into scores that 
indicate the relative importance of each value in the value system, i.e., the individual's 
value priorities.5 
3. When centering, do not divide by individuals' standard deviation across the 40 items. 
This is because individual differences in variances of value ratings are usually 
meaningful. Even if, on average, individuals attribute the same mean importance to the 
set of values, some individuals discriminate more sharply among their values and others 
discriminate less sharply. Standardizing that makes everyone's variance the same (i.e., 1) 
would eliminate these real differences in the extent to which individuals discriminate 
among their values. 
4. Centering creates linear dependence among the items. This is problematic in these 
analyses The scale use problem is avoided or eliminated by other aspects of these 
analyses without centering. 
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Appendix C 
Demographic Questionnaire (Tl) 
What is your sex? Male Female 
What is your date of birth*' yeaj Month .... Date 
What is your age9 
\\ hat i> the highest level of education you have completed? (please circle that which corresponds best) 
Primary School: 1 2 
Secondary School, 7 8 
CECJEP College Diploma 
y.ij.j\ crsjty. Bachelor's 
Other (please indicate what, how many years) __ _ __ 
What uus your occupation'.' 
When did you retire'.' Year Month __ Date 
Hov, man> years were you employed' _ _ _ 
Do you receive a pension rrom \cur emplever'' Y.gj No 
At the time of your retirement, what was your annual salary*? 
What is your present annual income (include alt sources, e.g. 8JRSJCCl> etc.}'.' 
What is your total family income from all sources? _ _ _ 
Compared to ether people or your age that you know, how would you rate your financial situation? 
(please circle the corrcspor.d.nc number) 
1} A lot worse than most 
2) Worse than most 
3) A little worse than most 
4) About the same as most 
5) A little better than most 
6} Better than most 
7) A lot better than most 
3 4 5 6 
9 10 11 12 
Master's Doctorate 
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13. What languages do you speak'5 
French 
English 
Other (please specify): _ 
14. What languages do you read and write? 
French _ _ 
English 
Other (please specify): 






16. How many times have you been married? 
17. Do you have children? Yes No 
18. If yes, how many girls'' _ How many hoW> 






Other i please specify}.; _ __ 
20. How did >ou rind out about this study? __ _ 
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Appendix D 
Portrait Value Questionnaire (PVQ; Male Version; Schwartz et al., 2001) 
|PVQ-M 
Here we briefly describe some people. Please read each description and think about how much each person 
Is or is not like you. Put an X in the box to the right that shows how much the person in the description is 
like you. 
fc 















1 Ihir.k.ng ..p new ideas ar.d beinji creative .s important 
to h.m. He likes to do thing* ir. h-.s owr. ong.nal way. 
2. It is important to hirr. tc be rich Fie wants tc have a tot 
e: rr.or.cv and expensive things. 
i He thinks .: :s important that every person in the world 
be treated equally He believes everyone should have 
equal opportunities :n life 
- It s very important to him to show r..s abilities. He 
wants aeopie tc admire what he aces 
s. It.- .mportant to hint to H\e in secure surroundings. He 
avetds ar.v thing that m.ght endanger his safety 
(- He th.nks it .s important to do lots of different things in 
!.rc tie alw as s looks ;Cr new things to try. 
7. He believes that people should do what they're told. He 
thinks people should follow rules a*, all times, even when 
no-one is watching. 
)< It is important to h.m to listen to people who arc 
different irum hirr. Even when he disagrees with their., he 
still wants to understand them 
y He thinks it's .mportant not to ask tor more than what 
sou have He believes that people should be satisfied with 
what they have. 
10. He seeks every chance he can to have fun. It is 
important to him to do things that give him pleasure. 
11. It is important to him to make his own decisions about 
what he does. He likes to be free to plan and to choose his 
activities for himself. 
12. It's very important to him to help the people around 
him. He wants to care for their well-being. 
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13. Being very successful is smnortar.t to him. He likes to 
impress other people. 
14. :t .s \cry important te him that his cour.tr>- be safe. He 
trunks the state must be on watch against threats from 
with,n and w.ihout 
15. fie likes to lake risks. He is always looking for 
adventures. 
if». It :s .mportan: to him alwa>s :c behave property. He 
wants to avoid doing ansthing people would say is 
wrong. 
I7, it is important :c him to be in charge and tell others 
what to do He wants people to do what he iays 
'.S. I; is important to hur. to be loyal to his tner.ds. He 
wants :c de\otc himself to people close to h.m. 
iv He strongly believes that people should care for 
nature Looking alter the en\iror.ment is .important to 
him. 
20. Religious belief is important to him. He tries hard to 
do what his religion requires. 
21 it :s important to him that things he organized and 
clean. He really does not like things to be a mess 
22. He thinks it's important to oc interested in things He 
Lkes, to be cur.oas and :c try to understand all sons of 
things. 
23. He believes all the worlds* people should live in 
harmony. Promoting peace among all groups in the world 
is important to him. 
24. He thinks it is important to be ambitious. He wants to 
show how capable he is. 
25. He thinks it is best to do things in traditional ways. It 
is important to him to keep up the customs he has learned. 
26. Enjoying life's pleasures is important to him. He likes 
to "spoil" himself. 
27. it is important to hum to respond to the needs of 
others. He tries to support those he knows. 




tKH l ike 
me 
a l i t t le 
l ike use 
tome-
w l » t 




l ike me 
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28. He believes he should always show respect to his 
parents and to older people, it ss important to him to be 
obedient. 
29. He wants everyone to be treated justly, even people 
he doesn't know it is important to him to protect the 
weak in society. 
30. He like?, sjrpn.se*. It is important to him to have an 
excitmg life 
31. He tries hard to avoid certir.g sick. Staying healths is 
v en. important to htm 
32. Getting ahead .n Lie i< important to him. He strives to 
do better than others 
33. l-ergiv:ng people who have hurt him is important to 
rum He tries to see what i> good in them and not to hold 
a grudge. 
,U It is important to h.m to be independent. He likes to 
rely on himself, 
35 Has trig 3 .stable government .s important to him. He is 
concerned that the social order be protected 
it-. It .s .mponant to him to "no pol.te to ether necplc a!: 
the time He tries never to d.stjrh or irritate others. 
37 . He really wants to enjov lite Having a good time is 
very important to him 
38. It is important to him to be humble and modest. He 
tries not to draw aner.ticn to himself 
3V. He always wants to be the enc who makes the 
decisions He likes to be the leader. 
40. It is important to him to adapt to nature and to fit into 
it. He believes that people should not change nature. 

















Modified 26-item PVQ: Items included and excluded from original 40-item version of the 
PVQ (male version: Schwartz et al., 2001) 








(#17): It is important to him to be in charge and tell others what to do. He 
wants people to do what he says. 
(#39): He always wants to be the one who makes the decisions. He likes to 
be the leader. 
Excluded (#2): It is important to him to be rich. He wants to have a lot of 
money and expensive things. 
(#13) Being very successful is important to him. He likes to impress other 
people. 
(#24): He thinks it is important to be ambitious. He wants to show how 
capable he is. 
(#32): Getting ahead in life is important to him. He strives to do better than 
others. 
Excluded (# 4): It's very important to him to show his abilities. He wants 
people to admire what he does. 
(#10): He seeks every chance he can to have fun. It is important to him to do 
things that give him pleasure. 
(#26): Enjoying life's pleasures is important to him. He likes to 'spoil' 
himself. 
(#37): He really wants to enjoy life. Having a good time is very important to 
him. 
(#6): He thinks it is important to do lots of different things in life. He always 
looks for new things to try. 
(#15): He likes to take risks. He is always looking for adventures. 
(#30): He likes surprises. It is important to him to have an exciting life. 
(#1): Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to him. He likes 
to do things in his own original way. 
(#22): He thinks it's important to be interested in things. He likes to be 
curious and to try to understand all sorts of things. 
Excluded (#11): It is important to him to make his own decisions about what 
he does. He likes to be free to plan and to choose his activities for himself. 
Excluded (#34): It is important to him to be independent. He likes to rely on 
himself. 
(#19): He strongly believes that people should care for nature. Looking after 
the environment is important to him. 
(#23): He believes all the worlds' people should live in harmony. Promoting 
peace among all groups in the world is important to him. 
(#29): He wants everyone to be treated justly, even people he doesn't know. 
It is important to him to protect the weak in society. 
Excluded (#3): He thinks it is important that every person in the world be 
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treated equally. He believes everyone should have equal opportunities in life. 
Excluded (#8): It is important to him to listen to people who are different 
from him. Even when he disagrees with them, he still wants to understand 
them. 
Excluded (#40): It is important to him to adapt to nature and to fit into it. He 
believes that people should not change nature. 
Benevolence (#12): It's very important to him to help the people around him. He wants to 
care for their well-being. 
(#18): It is important to him to be loyal to his friends. He wants to devote 
himself to people close to him. 
(#27): It is important to him to respond to the needs of others. He tries to 
support those he knows. 
Excluded (#33): Forgiving people who have hurt him is important to him. He 
tries to see what is good in them and not to hold a grudge. 
Tradition (#20): Religious belief is important to him. He tries hard to do what his 
religion requires. 
(#25): He thinks it is best to do things in traditional ways. It is important to 
him to keep up the customs he has learned. 
Excluded (#9): He thinks it's important not to ask for more than what you 
have. He believes that people should be satisfied with what they have. 
Excluded (#38): It is important to him to be humble and modest. He tries not 
to draw attention to himself. 
Conformity (#16): It is important to him always to behave properly. He wants to avoid 
doing anything people would say is wrong. 
(#28): He believes he should always show respect to his parents and to older 
people. It is important to him to be obedient. 
(#36): It is important to him to be polite to other people all the time. He tries 
never to disturb or irritate others. 
Excluded (#7): He believes that people should do what they're told. He 
thinks people should follow rules at all times, even when no one is watching. 
Security (#14): It is very important to him that his country be safe. He thinks the state 
must be on watch against threats from within and without. 
(#35): Having a stable government is important to him. He is concerned that 
the social order be protected. 
Excluded (#5): It is important to him to live in secure surroundings. He 
avoids anything that might endanger his safety. 
Excluded (#21): It is important to him that things be organized and clean. He 
really does not like things to be a mess. 
Excluded (#31): He tries hard to avoid getting sick. Staying healthy is very 
important to him. 
Appendix F 
Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) 
PAN AS 
This scale consists c:'a ".is,: of words -hat describe different feelings and emotions. Read each item sad 
then circle the appropriate answer next to that word. Indicate to what extent you have felt this way 
during tkcpu*i /e>-' •••.•tvfo by choosing the answer that describes wu best. Use the following scale to 
record vour answers: 
1 
Very slightly or 














































































































Health Measure (based on Wyler, Masuda, & Holmes, 1967) 
The following questions deal with specific illnesses or conditions thai people may Have, 
Please check those symptoms or illnesses you have experienced in the last year. 
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Appendix H 
Instructions for Retrospecitve Version of the PVQ 
You have just been remembering your life as it was ten years before you retired. We 
would like you to continue remembering yourself at that age. Take a moment to think 
about what your priorities were, what your goals were, and what was most important to 
you in life at that time. Earlier, we asked you to read descriptions of people and decide 
how similar they were to you. We ask you now to read the same descriptions, but this 
time think about how much each person resembles you as you were ten years before your 
retirement. Put an X in the box that shows how much the person in the description is like 
you as you were at that age. 
Appendix I 
Value Change Questionnaire (VCQ) 
Values can be thought of as principles in life that help to guide our behaviour. We are 
interested In whether you feel that there have been changes in your values over the past 
few years. Below are descriptions of 10 different values. Please circle the box that best 
Indicates the extent to which the importance of each value has changed for \ou since 
the first time you came to Concordia to participate in this study about two years ago. 










No change A little 
more 
important 
















No change A little 
more 
important 
















No change A little 
more 
important 
















No change A little 
more 
important 
















No change A little 
more 
important 

















No change A little 
more 
important 
















No change A little 
more 
important 

















No change A httic 
more 
important 
















No change A little 
more 
important 
















No change A little 
more 
important 






11. Overall, do you feel that the principles that are most important to you la your 
own life are found in the ten sets of values that are listed above? 
The values listed above: 
Include very 
tittle of what is 
important to me 
Include a tittle 
of what is most 
impo-nant to me 
Include some of 
what is most 
important to rae 
Include most of 
what is most 
important to me 
Include all of 
what is most 
important to me 
Appendix J 
Orientation to Happiness Measure (OHM; Peterson, Park, & Seligman, 2005) 
OHM 
Please use the following scale to indicate the degree to which each of the items below applies to you, 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very much A little Somewhat Mostly Very much 
Ulike roc like me like me like me like me 
!. Regardless of what I am doing., time passes very quickly. 
2. My hfc serves a higher purpose, 
3. Life is too short to postpone the pleasures it can provide. 
4. I seek out situations that challenge my skills and abilities. 
5. In choosing what to do, I always take into account whether it will benefit other people. 
*• Whether at work or play. 1 am usually ".n a /one" and net conscious of myself, 
"•'. I am always very absorbed .n what 1 dc. 
X. 1 go oat of my way to fee! euphoric. 
9. in choosing what to do, I always take into account whether 1 can lose myself in it. 
10. i am rarely distracted by what is going on around me. 
11.1 have a responsibility to make the world a better place. 
12. My life has a lasting meaning. 
13. In choosing what to do, I always take into account whether it will be pleasurable. 
14. What 1 do matters to society. 
15. i agree with this statement: "Life is short eat dessert first." 
i6.1 love to do things that excite my senses. 
17.1 have spent a tot of time thinking about what life means and how I fit into its big picture. 
18. For me, the good life is the pleasurable life. 
Appendix K 
Stressful Life Events (SLE; Sarason, Johnson, & Siegel, 1982) 
|SLE 
Throughout our .i\es we cxpener.ee cvem.s that ha\e both pos.v.vc and nega te impacts on our physical, 
emotional, and psychological weli-bcinp. We arc interested ir. learn.na about the stresses 'hat ha\e occurred in 
\our lite since January 01. 2000 
Please place a check mark in the box next to each catcher, which applies to \ou since January 01. 2000. Then 
briefly describe the stressor and indicate when it occurred. KnaUy, rate the degree of stress. I here u 
additional space at the bottom of the list for stressors that do not fit :mc the existing categories 
Stressor 
U Relationship with spouse'parfner 
-J Relationship withchi'.d(ren) 
—1 Personal illness 
—1 Illness of family member 
-J Death of someone dose to you 
-J Work-related problems 






When? Degree of Stres* Slight „. 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1. 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 

















Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR; Paulhus, 1984; 1991) 
|BiDR 
Using the scale below as a guide, write a number beside each statement to indicate how much you agree 
with it, 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NOT TRIE SOMEWHAT TRUE VERY TRUE 
3. My first impressions of people usually ram out to be right. 
2. It would be hard tor me to break any ot my bad habits. 
3. I don't care to know what people really think of me. 
4. 1 have not always beer, honest with myself. 
5. I always know whs 1 l.ke th.na* 
6. When rr.y cmot.ons are aroused. :t biases my tlur.k.nt.*. 
7. Once I've ir.ade up ir.s mind, other people can seldom change my opinion. 
8. 1 am not a safe driver when 1 exceed the >peed l.mit 
V. I am fuliy in control of my own fate. 
10. It's hard for me to shut off a disturbing thought. 
11. 1 never regret my decisions. 
32. 1 sometimes lose out on tilings because 1 can't make up my mind soon enough. 
13. The reason I vote is because my \ote can mike a dttlcicnce. 
14. My parent* were net always fair when they punished me. 
15. 1 am a completely rational person. 
16. 1 rarely appreciate criticism 
17. 1 am % cry confident oi my judgements. 
18. 1 have sometimes doubted my ability as a lover. 
19. It's all riaht with me it <crr.e people happen to dislike me. 




SOMEWHAT TRUE VERY TRUE 
21. I sometimes tell lies if 1 have IO. 
22. I never cover up my mistakes. 
23. There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone. 
24. 1 never swear. 
25. 1 sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget. 
26. I always obey laws, even if I'm unlikely to get caught. 
27. 1 have said something bad about a friend behind his or her back. 
28. When 1 bear people talking privately, I avoid listening. 
29. 1 have received too much change from a salesperson without telling htm or her. 
30. I always declare everything at customs. 
31. V> hen I was young 1 >omet:mc,; stole things. 
32. 1 have r.e\ er dropped litter on the street 
33. I sometime* drive ta>tcr th3n the speed lurm. 
34. I never read sexv books or maga7ines 
35. I have dene :hmg» that I don't tell other people about. 
36. 1 never take thmes that don't belong to me 
3?. 1 have taken sick-leave from work or school even though 1 wasn't realty sick. 
38. 1 have never damaged a library book or -.tore merchandise without reporting u. 
39. I have some pretty awful habits. 
40. I don't gossip about other people's business. 
224 
Appendix M 
Selection, Optimization and Compensation (SOC; Baltes, Baltes, Freund, & Lang, 1999) 
Isoc 
We are Ttcrested .r. Icarr.ir.jc about it-. » >><L decide whic'i tririjs .n life a.v injvrui : for you and Vw yoa yo 
about accomp -dung *hat you * a.r. ir l.:e. 
In the tV>ll^ *'.nj;. *c prefect exar.p.es of twod-iYercm *a>« pec-pic might behave Imagine trere ure-r*>> rc.ip'c 
talking about ur.at tticy would do .n a particular s.tuat.o.i We wo-di like you to dec.de which rvrvor. »s nc<: 
Min.lar to you in ot.tcr werd«>, wh.eh en; >eha\es rrost like Ac way yec prr-ha'tvy wtuld 
No* trunk about yocr l.ic overall, tr.ciud.nj how thir.ys. arc #c.ng, th.tik atvet your avals tr-.at i«. rvtr. th.r.p.\ 
yc\. uam to :rr.pto\e and thing' that you arc »3U«r:cd with and want to maxtam 
,
T I»- , 
i. 
nil K f.vi-on urr \ 
Poor. A O 






th n;JS . 
• 'HhiA\ntkt n.»'»v>/<tirti/.v;v :.•>» «',' 
.»r.'t v>ork the way tltey ocd tv. i l..-.'-k t".-r otr.e: ways to ach.ee them. 
or : *'»>rk the « ; . they ..-cd i -, 1 accept ttr.r,^ ne way they ate 
To •« 
i 
Ait-* persun are ;,i 
Person A 0 
Person 3 Q 
>« ««.« similar? 
Whcr. something decsr.' 
about i:, 
When something docwf 
t work as well as usual. 1 c.-r.'t -pend muc.i time thinking 
• work as weii as usual. 1 look at how others cfc» it. 
To : 
3, 
kuk ,"**/••()« u'<« ', 
Person 3 O 
,U rtli.M *>*>,!yr-
Whcr. 1 can no forger do 5>orrc:h.ri£ i:t rr.y cs-a. » « , 
air. able to do under tr.c c.rcLrr.stanccs 
Whcr. ! can r..< longer do >»orre:h ny ir. rr.y -sua. way. 
1 think about what, exactly, ! 
1 don"', think long about it. 
To n 
4. 
•kick per •-«« ij^ t ;. 
Person 3 O 
.!« Wi-ar vi»f, , i i i '" 
When ! want to get ahead, only 1 snyself know the best way to do it. 
When 1 want to get ahead, i also lock at how others do ;t «yta succeed. 
To which persiM are ytm mint similar? 
Person A O 
Person 3 Q 
1 \en wher. 1 really c.^-siici w ut 1 *arr. in u'e, i v.a.t and -.cc A hat rarrens instead 
% f rorr.rr.it:.ru nrvse.: to )j< or.c or wu particular joa s 
Wher ! th.itk about what l w,si.i ,n life. I corrrru r u t . : to >EC or two important 
U.'4-S 
To wnu:li penon are you mom similar,' 
Person A 0 
Person 3 0 
I think about exactly how 1 can best realize my plans. 
I don't think lor.g abuut "row ic real./.- rny plans, 1 j.>! try i: 
To H-iticA /x»r?on are you most simiar? 
Person A 0 
Person 3 0 
I arr alw ay* w :>rkxc .>r. sc\era, goals at or.ee 
1 alv.ac- :".s.-us or, tic ore n.»*. irrrwur.: joa! at a given tirr.c. 
Ti'i H-to'ft/WMv; u'T ;,*>b ffliwisw.-ki* 
Person A O 
Person 3 0 
When I can't do something as well as 1 used to. then 1 asi sortieo-ns else to do :t for 
me. 




 f ^t / M^.' j r » ;, 
?c:-. • A O 
Person B 0 
;u moat similar? 
When 1 can't carry on »•» 1 used to,! d;rec; rr.y aitem.ur,. tike usual, to all my goal*. 
Wher. 1 caa't carry an as 1 used to. I direct rr.y attention to my most important goal 






When th.ngs dors" 
Wher. :h:ngs dor; 
: work so well. 1 pursue my m « : intxMtam goal 




hit.kpet't-n un ;. 
Pernor A O 
Person 3 0 
• u «<..u i mi lor? 
\ prefer to wait for a while and see ;f tilings w ill work out fey themselves. 
! make even- effort to achieve a given goal. 






! cofu.de: e\arti> wnst »s irr.portast for me. 
! take thirds as :he> coin* a t i carry or, from t'nete. 
